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ABSTRACT
The thesis covers the field of labour law known as employee participation in decision-making. It
deals with the examination of the extent to which the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (the Act)
promotes employee participation in decision-making. Firstly, the analysis shows that employee
participation in decision-making is an aspect of democracy, which is translated into industrial
democracy in industrial relations. In South Africa the philosophical foundation of employee
participation is supported by the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996
which embodies democratic values permeating all areas of the law including labour law. Secondly,
the study elucidates the jurisprudential background of employee participation in South Africa.
There is evidence of the development of some principles of participation like consultation;
information disclosure; and the existence of participatory forums like works councils under the
LRA 28 of 1956. Thirdly, in evaluating the extent to which the LRA 66 of 1995 promotes
employee participation, the following aspects are covered: the relevance and contribution of
information disclosure; the effect of consultation prior to dismissal for operational requirements;
the role of collective bargaining; and the contribution of workplace forums. The conclusion is
reached that all the foregoing aspects of the LRA 66 of 1995 will contribute to the promotion of
employee participation in decision-making. The Labour Court and the Commission for
Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration can also ensure that in interpreting the Act employee
participation is promoted where appropriate. Finally, employers and employees will have to accept
this necessary partnership for the entrenchment of employee participation in decision-making.
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1  Bayat A Work, Politics and Power (1991) p 2 writes that:‘ human beings, as history has shown, tend
to develop a strong desire to exercise control over their lives, and by the same token to reject attempts by other
human beings to restrict their freedom.’
2  Kahn-Freund O Labour and the Law (1977) pp 3-6, points out that the issuing of commands and
subordination is an exercise of social power. He points out that the object of labour law is to be a countervailing
force to counteract the inequality of bargaining power which is inherent in the employment relationship.
1
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
1.1 OBJECTIVE OF THE THESIS
The main objective of this thesis is to consider, by an examination of the Labour Relations Act
66 of 1995, the extent to which the Act provides the answer to the issue of employee participation
in decision-making. This is done by comparison against the background of the Labour Relations
Act 28 of 1956 which did not expressly provide for employee participation in decision-making.
1.2 BACKGROUND TO THESIS
The domination of the twentieth century by technological development may make man oblivious
of the intrinsic characteristics of a human being, which have brought the subject of employee
participation to the fore. It is in understanding these human qualities and the different stages of
industrial development wherein lies the background to employee participation in decision-making.
Perhaps one of the most defining characteristics of a human being is the desire for freedom and
the struggle against domination. Unfortunately society today is organised on the basis of
inequality in power and property, hence the continuous struggle for human beings to gain control
of their lives. It is therefore possible to see employee participation in decision-making as
representing a critical organisational form through which that desire to regain freedom is
manifested.1
The organisation of the workplace revolves around the relationship between the parties involved
in the working process. This relationship is not only technical but it is also social and
characterized by relations of domination and subordination.2 It was particularly strained in the
nineteenth century and deteriorated further in the early twentieth century with the emergence of
23  Sandberg A Technological Change and Co-determination in Sweden (1992) pp 1-6.
4  Greenberg E Workplace Democracy (1989) p 16 states that: ‘ Humans are purposeful beings who are
capable, if given a chance of making decisions intelligently, who have intentions and purposes, and who can
become  aware of alternatives and rationally choose among them. People are potentially self-determining: and to
be placed  in a setting where others direct all essential aspects of their efforts is to be separated from one’s
humanness.’
5  Mitchell A ‘Industrial Democracy: Reconciling theories of the firm and state’ (1998) 14 (1) The
International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations pp11-14: writes that in modern
industrialized western countries, liberalism is the dominant ideology. Although it is difficult to define liberalism,
it embodies the following: liberty, according to which individuals should have the maximum freedom that is
compatible with an equivalent level of freedom for all other individuals. Individualism, is in recognition of the fact
that human beings are inherently self-interested and self-reliant. Therefore society must be organized to allow
individuals to realize their full potential, utilize their talents and skills, and pursue their own ends in order that
society may function better as a whole.  Although individualism seeks to protect liberty of the individual, certain
limitations must be imposed on individualism in order to ensure maximum liberty for all.  Finally equality,
according to which people must have an equal opportunity to influence decisions by means of a democratic process.
This protects them from unwanted decisions which may regulate their lives.
6  Rothschild J et al The Cooperative Workplace (1986) where they state that: ‘ Indeed, some of the major
 architects of western political thought, such as Rousseau, J.S Mill, and twentieth-century theorists like G.D.H.
Cole argued that direct participation by citizens in government and other institutions is crucial for a democratic
society.’ 
7  Pateman C Participation and Democratic Theory (1970) pp 22-43.
Taylorism and Fordism, and in recent years by the developments in technology.3 This resulted in
the alienation of employees from their work because employers determined how employees were
to do their work. Consequently employees were unable to contribute to decision-making in the
workplace, which is contrary to human nature.4 This determination of work by the bosses in the
workplace was seen largely as an encroachment on the liberty5 of employees, and has been met
with continuous resistance.
The motivation for this resistance is based on the tenets of participatory democracy, which has
its foundation in the intellectual history of western societies.6 I elaborating on the extent to which
participatory democracy was to be practised in society, Pateman7 (summarisi g the views of
Rousseau, Mill and Cole), states that the existence of representative institutions at the political
level is insufficient to sustain democracy. For maximum participation by all people at the political
level, social training for democracy must take place in other spheres in order that the necessary
individual attitudes to democracy can be developed. This requires the extension of participatory
systems to other social institutions, and of particular importance in this regard is the workplace,
38  Rothschild op cit note 6 p 13.
9  Ibid p 14.
10  Mitchell op cit note 5 p10,writes that: ‘ as corporations increase in size and economic power, this
possibility may shift to the level of the state. Not only can corporations influence the choices and habits of
employees, they now have the opportunity to influence the choices of government in a manner inconsistent with
traditional notions of political democracy. Moreover it must be remembered that whatever the preferred ideology
regarding the value of democracy and state regulation of business, the goal of individual corporations generally
remains profit maximization. Therefore if subrogating democracy improves profit, there may be little to dissuade
managers from choosing that option.’ 
11  Vanek J Self-management: economic liberation of man (1975) pp 16-17.
12  Bayat op cit note 1 p 3.
where most adults spend the greater part of their working lives.8 Unfortunately workplaces, just
like other social institutions, are organised hierarchically and the political system is built on
representative democracy. This organisational set-up is based on the one-sided understanding of
the ‘classic democratic theory’ being representative democracy, which was stressed by scholars
like Bentham, Locke, and James Mill. According to them, the participation of the populace should
be limited to voting and discussion of issues.9 Such a view makes participation only relevant to
the political sphere and irrelevant in the workplace. This understanding of participation poses a
very serious threat to democracy, because as many commentators have argued, corporations have
always had the potential to distort democratic processes through their control of the working lives
of big groups of employees.10 Motivated by this threat to democracy, the struggle to democratise
the workplace has been evidenced in many stages of history, emphasising its importance.
In fact, the idea of employee participation is not new, it goes back to the industrial revolution.
According to Vanek,11 the idea of employees’ participation in decision-making emerged as an
intellectual reaction to the evils of modern capitalism. The earliest ideas of employee participation
were formulated by utopian socialists including Robert Owen in England, Saint-Simon, Charles
Fourier, and the spiritual father of anarchism, Pierre Joseph Proudhon, in France.12 Four er and
Owen advocated the establishment of autonomous communities to be organized by employees for
their own good. For the anarchists, employees’ communities provided a response to the increasing
alienation in the bleak conditions of the industrial environment. After World War 1 workers’ and
soldiers’ councils emerged in Russia, Hungary, Poland, Italy, Germany and Bulgaria, by means
of which the warmongering bourgeois states had been severely undermined, and revolutionary
413  Ibid p 16.
14  Ibid p 18.
15  Ibid p 20.
16  Ibid p 22.
17  Poole M Towards a New Industrial Democracy (1986) p 135 writes that: ‘The so-called micro-
electronic revolution has had far-reaching repercussions for industrial relations. Almost invariably the introduction
of new technology is accompanied by extensive consultation, but in some companies new technology agreements
have been  signed which involve extensive trade union involvement in the implementation and (and sometimes
the planning) process.’  
18  Kazuo O ‘Workers’ conditions and the functioning of trade unions in Japan under the conditions of
contemporary technological changes’- paper presented to the International Round Table on Workers participation
and trade unions in conditions of contemporary technological change, Belgrade (12-13 September 1988) pp 8-9.
movements had spread throughout the continent.13 In these countries the struggle for employee
participation assumed two organisational forms: factory committees and councils. The third
episode in the struggle for employee participation in Europe occurred in the 1950s in countries
which after World War 2, and in the support of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)
under Stalin, took a non-capitalistic road to development.14 Amongst these countries we can
count Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia and other Eastern European countries. In these countries
employees managed state enterprises and had rights to take decisions in important affairs, to
express opinions, take initiatives, put forward recommendations and exercise control over the
activities of the enterprises. The fourth historical stage took place in the 1960s as capitalist
Europe experienced a significant growth in the economic militancy of the working class. In
countries like Sweden and West Germany, the passivity of employees was broken and the weapon
of the strike was rediscovered by the trade unions.15 However, one of the most significant steps
in employee participation in the present decade has been the adoption of the social charter of the
European Community. This document calls for the representation of employees on the boards of
large enterprises within the European Community.16 The eed for employee participation has not
been confined to European countries, Japan and the United States of America (USA) have also
realised the need for the inclusion of employees in the decision-making process. This is as a result
of the developments in technology which have far-reaching implications for industrial relations.17
In Japan there was a feeling that in order for employees to function smoothly in the new
conditions, an understanding of the operations of the workplace was necessary. This
understanding was to be obtained through the involvement of employees in decision-making.18 In
519  Steven D ‘New Technology: union strategies and worker participation’ (1986) 7 Economic and
Industrial Democracy pp 529-39.
20  Ramaphosa C ‘ Opening speech to the inaugural congress of COSATU’ (1986) 35 Review of African
Political Economy p 79. Also see September Commission Report ‘From apartheid to democracy in the workplace
strategic engagement for change’ http://www.cosatu.org.za/congress/sept.ch6.
21  Yunus C ‘COSATU: towards disciplined alliances’ (1987) 40 Review of African Political Economy,
p 87.
22  As referred to in Anstey M Worker Participation (1990) pp 225-44.
the USA data shows that technology tended to encourage employee participation in two ways:
through economic pragmatism, that is, a trade-off between the employment of the new technology
by capital and some involvement in the organisation of work by employees. Secondly, there is
evidence that manufacturing technology will work better when built into a system of participative
management, in which employees are involved.19
 
South Africa has also not escaped the need for employee participation. The struggle for workers’
control has long been the strategy of South African trade union federations like COSATU and its
affiliates both against apartheid and the present socio-economic transformation, to achieve
employee participation.20 According to COSATU, under capitalism, conditions of exploitation and
unemployment are realities facing every employee at all times. In fact in the 1980s there was a
recognition that in South Africa, the introduction of new capital-intensive technology rendered
the workers weak. Therefore there was a need to wage a democratic struggle in order to achieve
employee participation in the decision-making process. This was seen by the South African labour
movement as part of a broader societal struggle against an undemocratic apartheid system.
According to COSATU leader at the time, Naidoo,21 empl yees had to strive for a democratic
socialist society controlled by the working class. Although employees had made employee
participation part of their struggle, it was not legislated into law under the Nationalist Party
government. However, employers and employees took some initiatives to achieve employee
participation. There is evidence of such initiatives in the 1980s which can be considered as a
foundation for the present day employee participation discourse. Smith22 give  a detailed account
of Volkswagen South Africa’s holistic approach to worker participation. In the early 1980s VW
SA experienced several work stoppages as a result of strike actions by NUMSA. By 1986 the
company had to change its philosophy and thus adopted employee participation. This moved the
623  Ibid pp 245-55.
24  Ibid pp 257-69.
25  This shall be discussed in detail in Chapter 2 below.
company away from the conflict that characterised its relations with the employees. Another
example is given by Dewer23 of ‘Total worker involvement at Toyota.’ This system was adapted
from Japan and it encouraged the total involvement of employees in quality circles, the aim of
which was to create thinking people within the workplace. Other attempts were by means of the
Anglo American Group’s employee shareholding schemes.24
The foregoing shows that employee participation in South Africa has roots in voluntary initiatives
by some employers and unions particularly in the 1980s. The courts have also developed some
principles of employee participation in decision-making under the LRA 28 of 1956, particularly
through the unfair labour practice jurisdiction. However, it was not until 1993 that a legal
foundation for the legislation of employee participation was set, through the Interim Constitution
of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993. This constitution provided the foundation for
the democratic transformation of all South African institutions. It was partly on the basis of the
quest for democracy in the workplace on the part of the unions and improvement of productivity
on the part of government that employee participation was to be legislated.25 Employee
participation saw its way into the statute books in 1995 under the Labour Relations Act 66 of
1995. The objective of this thesis is therefore to evaluate the extent to which the LRA is providing
the answer to employee participation in decision-making. 
1.3 OUTLINE AND APPROACH
The subject is dealt with in seven chapters. The first part consists of the philosophical antecedents
of worker participation (Chapter 2). These are examined mostly through the concepts of
democracy,   industrial democracy, the different forms of participation and industrial relations
theories.
Chapter two is followed by a jurisprudential analysis of employee participation in decision-making
in South Africa. This is traced through a summary of the previous legal regime, particularly the
Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956 and the historical underpinnings of the Labour Relations Act
766 of 1995 (Chapter 3).
Thirdly, an evaluation is made whether the LRA 66 of 1995 achieves employee participation. This
is done through analysing the following aspects of the Act, disclosure of information (Chapter 4),
consultation prior to dismissal for operational requirements (Chapter 5), collective bargaining
(Chapter 6) and workplace forums (Chapter 7). 
The thesis concludes (Chapter 8) with reflections on whether the LRA 66 of 1995 is the answer
to employee participation in decision-making and with indications of how the Act can be reformed
in order to achieve more employee participation in decision-making.  
Where possible there will be a comparative analysis with other jurisdictions like Germany, the
Netherlands and others.
1.3.1 Germany
The German system has been chosen for its emphasis on workers' rights to participate in decision-
making at the workplace. The principle of co-operative governance with employees is stressed
more than the conflict of interests between labour and management. This can be seen in the
intensive consultation with works councils and co-determination practices which compare well
with the concept of consultation and joint decision-making under the LRA 66 of 1995.
1.3.2 Netherlands
The Dutch system has been chosen for the firmly established works councils which have to be
consulted over a variety of matters, and which may compare with our workplace forums. For
instance, employers are expected to consult with works councils on major decisions like mergers,
closures, changes of location or important re-organisations. 
Reference to the above-mentioned countries, does not exclude reference to jurisdictions like
Britain, USA and others in respect of their well-developed collective bargaining jurisprudence and
principles that support employee participation.
81.4 SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY
Although the LRA is a new legislation, sources will be drawn from recent published work on the
Act. There is also some published work in Industrial Relations on employee participation which
is referred to. In order to make an extensive analysis, reference is also made to foreign sources
for comparison. Any relevant South African case law is also relied upon in order to trace the
development of employee participation prior to the promulgation of the LRA 66 of 1995. The
facts of the respective cases are outlined where necessary for purposes of illustration.
926  Nel P S ‘A Critical Overview of the Concepts, Democracy, Industrial Democracy, Participation and
Representation’  (1984) 8 (1) SAJLR p  4.
27  Mitchell A ‘Industrial democracy: reconciling theories of the firm and state’ (1998)14 (1) The
International Journal of Comparative Labour Law pp 15-16 writes that: ‘Broadly, democracy is a theory of
government that attempts to link the government to the people. It is based on a belief in the value of the individual
human being, and so it demands that the citizen is regarded as the sovereign of the state, and has the right to
decide matters of general concern.’
28  Ibid  p 18.
CHAPTER 2
THE PHILOSOPHY OF EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION IN DECISION-MAKING
2.1 INTRODUCTION
In order to avoid any misinterpretation, the definition of a concept must be canvassed if it is to
be subjected to some theoretical analysis. Since the subject matter of this thesis is employee
participation in decision-making, in relation to the LRA 66 of 1995, concepts like participation
and decision-making will be defined. Participation can best be defined with an understanding of
both political and industrial democracy. Since for a long time now trade unions have dominated
the employee and employer relationship, it is important to highlight the effect they may have in
the participation discourse. Finally, the corporate decision-making structures also have to be
explained, because they may determine the success of employee participation in decision-making.
2.2 POLITICAL DEMOCRACY
In defining political democracy, Nel26 states that: 
‘[P]olitical democracy refers to the extent to which an individual or a group of individuals are involved in the
making and execution of decisions concerning the primary concerns of their particular society or community. The
majority or minorities of that particular community are able to participate in governance through an orderly and
peaceful way accepted as legitimate in that society .’ 
The above definition indicates one of the elements of democracy, which is the participation of
individuals in the making of decisions concerning their society.27 The issue of popular participation
in decision-making in society, has been the subject of much debate amongst several theorists.
Liberal democratic theorists like John Locke, have suggested that individuals in society have to
surrender their power to a few individuals who govern and make decisions on their behalf.28 This
10
29  Dahl  R A Preface to Democracy (1956).
30  Ekstein  H A  Theory of Stable Democracy (1966).
31  Schumpeter J A Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1943).
32  Ibid p 269.
33  Ibid p 283. 
34  Mitchell op cit note 27 pp 16-17.
35  Pateman C Participation and Democratic Theory (1970) p 22.
limited conception of democracy was also shared by theorists like Dahl,29 Ekstein,30 nd
Schumpeter,31 who like Locke suggested that democracy should be confined to the national or
political sphere. Schumpeter’s views will be concentrated upon. Schumpeter’s criticism of popular
participation in decision-making was that it was based on an empirically unrealistic foundation.
For Schumpeter democracy was a process of arriving at political decisions in which individuals
acquire the power to make decisions through a competition for the peoples’ vote.32 This a proach
to democracy confines the participation of the citizens to the voting for leaders and discussion of
political issues. Therefore for the liberal democratic theorists, there is no central role for
participation in democracy. All that is required is that the populace should elect a few leaders who
will make decisions. Schumpeter goes to the extent of saying that the electorate is incapable of
action other than a stampede.33 This conception of democracy undermines the importance of
participation as a fundamental democratic principle. Perhaps the most relevant theory of
democracy to participation is the radical democratic view. According to the radical view,
democracy should not be confined to the political sphere, but should be extended to both the
economic and social spheres.34 This approach to democracy requires the participation of all
individuals at all levels. The views of the school of participatory democracy, which includes
scholars like Rousseau, Mill and Cole support the radical approach to democracy. For Rousseau
the entire political theory of democracy rests on the individual participation of each citizen in the
decision-making process.35 Unlike Schumpeter, Rousseau advocates direct participation of the
citizens and a representative system. This participation will ensure that the citizens share the
benefits and burdens that confront them, thus contributing to acceptable policy to deal with their
concerns. The logic of democratic participation according to Rousseau is that the individual is
11
36  Ibid p 25.
37  Ibid p 33.
38  Mill J S Collected Works, Robinson J M ed (1965)   p 792 writes: ‘A co-operative organization would
lead to friendly rivalry in the pursuit of a good common to all; the elevation of the dignity of labour; a new sense
of  security and independence in the labouring class: and the conversion of each human being’s daily occupation
into  a school of the sympathies and the practical intelligence.’
39  Pateman  op cit note 35 p 36.
40  Cole G H D Guild Socialism Restated (1920a)   p 12.
forced to deliberate issues with his will in order to avoid the implementation of inequitable
decisions by others.36 In addition to this approach, Mill specifically points to the integrative
function of democratic participation, when he says:
‘Through political discussion the individual becomes consciously a member of a great community and that
whenever he has something to do for the public he is made to feel that not only the common will is his will, but
it partly depends on his exertions.’37 
Mill’s main contribution to the participatory theory of democracy is contained in his view that it
should also cover industry. He came to see industry as another area where the individual could
gain experience in the management of collective affairs.38 Mill saw ome form of co-operation in
the workplace as inevitable, particularly as employees acquired more rights. The most significant
contribution of the three cited scholars is that of Cole. For him industry held the key to unlock
the door to democracy. His theory is based on his view that society is a complex of associations
held together by the will of its members and argues that human beings must participate in the
organisation and regulation of their associations.39 According to Cole,40 the democratic principle
must be applied:
‘Not only or mainly to some special sphere of action known as “politics”, but to any and every form of social
action, and, in special, to industrial and economic fully as much as to political affairs.’ 
The liberal and the radical democratic theories explain the characteristics of democracy which
constitute the basis for employee participation in decision-making. However,  the weakness of
representative democracy as advocated by the liberals, is that it ignores the importance of popular
participation. Meanwhile the radical and the participatory theories of democracy provide a
sufficient philosophical basis for industrial democracy and employee participation in decision-
making in the workplace.
12
41  Constitution of The Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996.
42  Ibid ( Preamble).
43  Ibid Section 23 provides that: (1) Everyone has the right to fair labour practices.
(2) Every worker has the right- 
(a) to form and join a trade union; 
(b) to participate in the activities and programs of a trade
union; and  
(c) to strike.
44  Bolweg J F Job Design and Industrial Democracy  (1976) p 91.
45  Nel op cit note 26 p 6 writes ‘in a wider sense industrial democracy is practiced where workers voice
their opinions and make suggestions to the employer on issues which affect them. The employer gives serious
consideration to these opinions and suggestions, but reserves the right to undertake the final decision-making. In
the narrow sense, it means that both parties share equally in all decisions which affect the attaining of
organizational goals. Workers and employers are then held jointly responsible for the outcome of such decisions.’
South Africa being a democratic state is defined as such by her adherence to the above- mentioned
principles of democracy. However, South Africa could still be described as a constitutional
democracy based on the supremacy of the constitution, as stated in section 2:41 
‘This constitution is the supreme law of the Republic, law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and the
obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled.’
In South Africa it is the constitution which entrenches democratic norms in every sphere of life
as evidenced by the preamble to the constitution42 which states that: 
‘Weÿ. Adopt this constitution as the supreme law of the Republic so as to heal the divisions of the past and
establish a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental justice.’ 
It may be fairly concluded that, in line with the radical or participatory theories of democracy,
democratic values have to be practised in South African workplaces. Section 23 of the
constitution43 fortifies this view by providing for labour relations rights which will encourage a
democratic ethic in workplace relations between employers and employees. Clearly therefore
democratic principles in South Africa should permeate every facet of life so that the meaning of
democracy is fully realised. 
2.3 INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY
In the workplace, democracy is translated into industrial democracy which Bolweg44 defines as:
‘[T]he extent to which workers and their representatives influence the outcome of organisational decisions.’ 
According to Nel45 this definition has two central elements:
13
46  Bendix S Industrial Relations 2ed ( 1992) p 128: ‘As a result of the socio-political and economic
transition and changes in individual values and attitudes, the labour relationship has come to be viewed not merely
as an economic relationship in which one party is an author of decisions and the other the executor of such
decisions, but more as a socio-economic partnership where both parties have equal rights, where the decision-
making process is shared between managers and employees.’
47  Mitchell op cit note 27 p 5.
48  Ibid p 5. 
49  Ibid p 6. Also see Anstey Worker Participation (1990) pp 257-269 on the Anglo-American initiative
on employee shareholding schemes.   
50  Mitchell op cit note 27 p 6.
51  Ibid p 7.
(a) the opportunity of employees to influence decisions, which indicates their power within the
workplace; and
(b) the impact of employees’ involvement in decisions in the workplace, which refers to the
number of organizational decisions they exert influence on and their importance from the
employees’ position.
The concept of industrial democracy is determined by the socio-political and economic
environment prevalent in society at a particular time.46 But one clear consequence it has is the
challenge to managements’ traditional prerogative to manage and make decisions regarding the
workplace and employees.47 Initiatives to implement industrial democracy have been said to be
separated into two groups: ‘control through ownership’ and ‘control against ownership.’48
Control through ownership, provides for the employees to be joint owners with the shareholders
of the company. By so doing the employees are able to have direct control of the workplace.49
The extent of control that the employees will enjoy depends on the percentage of shares they hold.
More shares means more control and fewer shares means less control. Control against ownership,
unlike control through ownership, does not accept that shareholders have the right to control the
workplace.50 This initiative extends the right to control the workplace to the employees through
disclosure of information, consultation, joint-decision making and the creation of employee
forums for this purpose. Another important aspect of this initiative is the level at which employees
are to participate in the decision-making process. This level is dependent upon the directedness
of the control and the matters on which employees are expected to participate in deciding.51 
 
14
52  Van Niekerk A et al ‘Worker Participation: sharing the right to decide’ (1995) 4  CLL p 52 say: ‘For
their part, unions often distrust management initiatives in seeking agreement on co-operative processes  and are
concerned that they will be employed to challenge union power and undermine collective bargaining. They also
fear “co-option” by management.’   
53  Prentice D ‘Employee Participation in Corporate Government:   A critique of the Bullock Report’
(1978) 56  The Canadian Bar Review p 283 writes: ‘ [O]ver the last decade there has been a change of attitude by
the trade union movement to employee participation in corporate management and in 1973 the Trade Union
Congress  published a report favoring parity co-determination, that is, that employees should have equal
representation with shareholder representatives on company boards. The reasons for this change were   probably
(i) a feeling that certain corporate decisions of critical importance to employees were not, and probably could not,
be covered by collective bargaining; (ii) British entry into the European Economic Community, where co-
determination is widespread and accepted by the trade union movements of the relevant member states...’
Although industrial democracy is about the sharing of decision-making in the workplace, trade
unions were for a long time not intent on sharing this responsibility with management and have
constantly challenged it through collective bargaining.52 South African labour relations has also
experienced this undesirable polarisation between labour and capital in particular during the 1980-
1993 period, when labour participated extensively in the political upheavals in the country. This
obviously impacted on the workplace, as collective bargaining and the freedom to strike were
utilized to influence decision-making. 
However the importance of industrial democracy has now been translated into legislation through
the LRA 66 of 1995, of which section 1 provides: 
‘The purpose of the Act is to advance economic development, social justice, labour peace and the democratisation
of the workplace by fulfilling the primary objects of this Act …’ 
It is evident that the LRA seeks to entrench democratisation in the workplace,  in particular,  by
providing for employee participation in decision-making. A comparative study will show that
South African labour law compares well with mature democracies. For instance, in Germany the
government has legally entrenched joint decision-making at the highest level of the enterprise, as
well as participation by employees at the shopfloor. Their system of co-determination and
participation is coupled with the constitutional protection of the right to bargain collectively and
a highly centralised trade union movement. In Britain, due to her commitment to the European
Community, trade unions have moved towards embracing the idea of employee participation in
decision-making at the higher organisational level since they see it as inextricably linked to trade
unionism.53 However, there is no constitutional or statutory entrenchment of these values of
participation.
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Clearly therefore, legislation is the means by which countries have opted to promote industrial
democracy. Not only is special legislation enacted, there is also a constitutionalisation of industrial
democracy as in the case of Germany. Perhaps this indicates the importance that is attached to
industrial democracy.
2.4 PARTICIPATION
From the discussion of theories of political and industrial democracy two concepts have emerged,
namely, participation and representation. Since the thesis is about participation, this concept shall
be discussed. However, before defining participation, it is important to indicate the persons
entitled to participate in a decision-making process. Mitchell54 utilizes the ‘all-affected principle’
in outlining the persons who are entitled to participate in decision-making in any society,
association and organisation. According to this principle, anyone who will be affected by any
decision is entitled to participate in that decision-making process. Since employees are always
affected by the decisions that are taken by management on any aspect of the workplace, it follows
that they should be entitled to participate in the decision-making process.
 
Although there has been a brief discussion of participation under political democracy, it is
important to define what participation in decision-making at the workplace is. According to Nel55
participation approached from the point of view of western democracy refers to:
‘[T]he involvement of one group of employees (usually workers) in the decision-making processes of the enterprise
which has traditionally been the responsibility and prerogative of another group of employees (usually
managers).’56
Sawetell57 also says:
‘[P]articipation is any or all the processes by which employees other than managers contribute positively towards
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the reaching of managerial decisions which affect their work.’ 
In the above definitions of participation there is a recognition of the existence of managers58
whose role is to control and direct the operations of the workplace. The whole point about
industrial participation is that it involves an alteration of the authority structure and the
management prerogative in which employees play no part.59 The International Labour
Organisation maintains that the concept of employee participation in the decisions of the
enterprise is an appropriate approach, because it has the advantage of giving employees influence
in such decisions.60 According to Nel61 the concept of participation primarily consists of three
interrelated elements, which may be manifested in the decision-making process in the workplace.
These elements are :
(a) Influence, which refers to the ability to produce an effect in a direct or indirect way. This effect
should result in a decision which reflects the input of all parties involved in the decision-making
process, which is of paramount importance in participation;62
(b) Interaction, concerns the problem-solving activity of both the employer and employees, which
constitutes the crux of employee participation in the decision-making process.63
(c) Information sharing, means that if the employer wishes to interact meaningfully with workers,
he must make information available to them.64
Therefore, a definition of participation should cover the above-mentioned elements as they
indicate issues which will be identified in the examination of the extent to which the LRA 66 of
1995 enhances employee participation in decision-making.
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Participation in industrial relations manifests itself in two different forms: direct participation65 and
indirect employee participation.66 Indirect participation under the LRA 66 of 1995 would include
workplace forums, mandatory consultation, joint decision-making and information disclosure.
Sometimes indirect participation is supported by representative participation, which encapsulates
collective bargaining.67 Therefore the most appropriate working definition for this thesis is:
‘Participation refers to influence in decision-making exerted through a process of interaction between workers and
managers and based upon information sharing.’68 
This definition is wide enough to cover an evaluation of the extent to which disclosure of
information, consultation during retrenchment, workplace forums, consultation, joint decision-
making, and collective bargaining in the LRA 66 of 1995 will enhance employee participation in
decision-making.
2.5 DECISION-MAKING
Having defined what participation is, it is imperative to briefly outline what decision-making
means. Decision-making is a concept that has been analysed in the field of management by
scholars like Frederick Taylor, who asserted that management alone had the intelligence and
knowledge to organize the work processes in order to obtain maximum productivity.69
Traditionally decision-making was the responsibility of managers who,  according to Henri Fayol,
had the right to give orders and the power to require obedience from every employee.70 Th refore,
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decision-making in the workplace was based on the right of the managers to manage.71 Our
common law also recognised that one of the defining elements of the employment relationship was
the power of control that an employer had over the employee.72 The Appellate Division had gone
so far as stating that the control was not confined to the determination of the product of the
employee’s labour, but also covered the manner in which the work had to be done.73 It is,
however, doubtful that the position of the AD will still be appropriate in light of the technological
developments which encourage specialisation and independence in the performance of tasks.74 The
Industrial Court under the LRA 28 of 1956 could enquire into the exercise of such managerial
rights.75 The fact that the IC could enquire into the exercise of the managerial prerogative shows
that there are limitations to it, which call for a clear understanding of the different areas in which
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it can be exercised, because each of these areas poses its own limitations.76
When employers exercise the management prerogative of decision-making they are involved in
the planning process of the workplace, which requires the selection of a course of action from
among alternatives. Rue et al77 define decision-making as:
‘A process that involves searching the environment for conditions requiring a decision, developing alternatives,
and then selecting a particular alternative.’
In this context, according to Koontz,78 decision-making might be thought of as premising,
identifying alternatives, the evaluation of those alternatives in terms of the goal sought and the
choosing of an alternative. It is clear that the decision-making process requires a rational selection
of a course of action, which has sometimes been seen as problem-solving.79 This process requires
the parties involved to be aware of their goals, to have information about alternatives and to have
a desire to attain a solution. Perhaps an understanding of decision-making which supports the
subject matter of this thesis is offered by Bluestone et al80 when they say that decision-making,
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as opposed to strict bureaucratic control, refers to a limited system of employee participation in
decision-making. This system provides for an expansion of channels by which employees can
voice their concerns thereby providing a role for employees to play in the decision-making
process. 
2.6 EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION AND LABOUR RELATIONS THEORIES
The employment relationship is a product of a diversity of factors which are a reflection of the
socio-economic and political make-up of society. Therefore, for a proper conceptualisation of
employee participation in decision-making, it is imperative to elucidate  the dynamics of labour
relations. The employment relationship, which is an aspect of societal relations, usually manifests
itself as a relationship of power in any socio-economic mode of production and as such are indicia
of the nature of labour law. Labour law could therefore be understood as a mechanism for the
regulation of social power inherent in the employment relationship.81 In describing the power
factor involved in the employment relationship, it is stated that:
‘[O]n the labour side, power is collective power. The individual employer represents an accumulation of material
and human resources, socially speaking the enterprise, is itself in the sense collective powerÿ..’82
  
What labour law does is determine the terrain within which both employers and employees can
coexist in their relationship, without allowing their conflicting interests and power contestation
to be an impediment to the socio-economic growth of a society. There are, however, some
industrial relations theories that explain this employment relationship, the most salient of which
are the Unitary, Pluralist and Radical (Marxist) approaches. These are discussed below.
2.6.1 The Unitary Approach
According to this approach employers and employees are said to have the same interests. This
emanates from their subscription to similar values of the free market enterprise system, respect
for management authority, an emphasis on loyalty and diligence. The ultimate aim of all parties
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is the accumulation of surplus through greater productivity in order for all to get a share. Bendix83
states that:
‘[T]he prerogative of management is accepted and managers who adhere to this approach do not regard challenges
to their authority as legitimate.’
In South Africa this position was held to be valid until the new trade union movement and
judgements of the Industrial Court began to challenge the absolutism of management
prerogatives.84
Since employee participation is all about the limitation of the management prerogative through
for instance consultation, joint decision-making, collective bargaining and other means, this
approach does not support the concept. This is particularly so because managers who adhere to
this theory see any challenge to their authority as illegitimate. This illegitimacy of employee
participation may be founded on the premise that the approach does not acknowledge a diversity
of interests between employers and employees. 
2.6.2 The Pluralist Approach
Contrary to the unitary approach, this approach accepts the conflict of goals between employers
and employees, however, it provides a possibility for the achievement of a balance of both
interests and power in the employment relationship. Bendix85 states that:
‘[T]he freedom of association principle, the process of collective bargaining and some measures of joint decision-
making are accepted as means by which to achieve a balance of power between the various participants.’
This labour relations theory supports the philosophical validity of employee participation in
decision-making as a means to achieve industrial democracy.86 Alth ugh this theory is criticized87
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for not according real power to employees or trade unions, it still recognizes employee
participation in decision-making which accepts a limited managerial prerogative.
2.6.3 The Radical or Marxist Approach
This approach rules out any balance of power between management and employees within a
capitalist system. According to this school of thought the root cause of the conflict lies in the
society that supports the capitalist mode of production. This mode of production results in social,
political and legal structures which favour the employer. Bendix,88  w ites:
‘Proponents of this approach regard collective bargaining as an employer strategy aimed at coercing the working
class into compliance, and even regards workers’ participation in the decision-making process as an attempt at co-
option.’
Clearly under this approach employee participation in decision-making is not seen as beneficial
to the struggle of workers, because it supports the capitalist mode of production, which in turn
favours employers. According to this approach what is desirable is worker control89 hich can
be achieved only after the replacement of the capitalist system by a socialist mode of production.
Having mentioned these theories, it is important to point out that the general approach in
countries like Britain, Germany, France and, of late in South Africa, is to opt for a more
cooperative relationship between employers and employees. Therefore the law will tend to reflect
the interest in cooperative relations between the employer and employees, to the extent to which
it is favoured by the prevailing property ideology and the extent to which each group has access
to political power.90
 2.7 ARE TRADE UNIONS AGENTS OF EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION?
The relationship between employees and employers over the years has been defined by the
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important role of trade unions. The trade unions act as collective representatives of the employees
in the collective bargaining process91 and the question is whether they can effectively promote
employee participation in decision-making. This question can be answered by a brief synopsis of
what the responsibilities of a trade union are. 
Trade unions are representative institutions existing primarily for the purpose of acting on behalf
of employees in their dealings with the employer.92 If trade unions are representative
organisations, the employee members have to inform its decisions and if they are to be said to be
agents of participation then their members must be able to control the decision-making process
within the union. The answer to this lies in the nature of the trade union government. Hawkins93
writes that union government rests on four principles:
‘First, the rank and file members meet in their branches and elect representatives to an annual conference. Second,
the conference decides what the general policy of the union shall be. Thirdly, an elected executive council or
committee is responsible for administering the union’s affairs on a day-to-day basis within the policy guidelines
laid down by the conference. Finally, a chief executive officer, usually called the general secretary, performs such
administrative tasks as are delegated to him by the executive body and supervises the union’s full-time officials.’
The above procedure may not be true for all unions, where instead of the full-time official being
elected, such official may be appointed. It is this division of power that has always posed a threat
to the full participation of members in the decision-making process within the trade union and
militated against trade union democracy. 
Since the nineteenth century, the relationship between unions and their members has been a
subject of social inquiry.94 These enquiries are based on the tension that results from collective
representation through permanent organisations and the question of representativeness and
effectiveness of unions as vehicles for advancing workers’ interests. The starting point for most
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discussions is that trade unions, as organisations, develop their own institutional interest which
ends up conflicting with the needs of their members. However, there are different schools of
thought on this subject. The pluralist, although acknowledging the goal divergence between union
leaders and the membership, is much more prepared to acknowledge that unions and their officials
genuinely serve the needs of members.95 The basis for this pluralist position is a conviction that
employees need unions to pursue their interests.96 Th  Marxists are more radical in their view,
because they see trade unions as having been formed by working people to increase their control
over the conditions of their working lives. On the basis of this they reject the maintenance of
orderly relationships with employers as an overriding priority.97 The Marxists see the failure of
trade unions to represent the interests of employees as based on the fact that once union officials
are elected into office they tend to have material interests which differ from those of their
members, they become susceptible to gradual capitalist reform programmes and the external
forces that determine the priorities of union officialdom.
The foregoing points to the danger posed to employee participation by the use of trade unions in
the process. The tendency of trade union bureaucracy is to concentrate power in a minority of
union members, mainly the leadership and more often than not resulting in an oligarchy.98 The l w
tries to ensure that trade unions honour their duty of fair representation of their members.99 Over
the years the overriding principle of determining the extent to which a trade union represents the
views of its members and the extent to which non-union members are bound by their agreements
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has been based on majoritarianism.100 These problems warrant a critical approach to the analysis
of the extent to which the LRA is an answer to employee participation, particularly because there
is a great involvement of trade unions in the process. 
2.8 DECISION-MAKING IN CORPORATIONS
The brief discussion of decision-making in corporations is confined to companies as defined in
section 1 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 which states that : 
‘Company means a company incorporated under Chapter IV of the Act and includes any body which immediately
prior to the commencement of this Act was a company in terms of any law repealed by this Act.’
The rationale for this limited discussion is that these companies define their interests and have
decision-making structures which can limit the achievement of employee participation in
workplaces under such corporations. 
Rights of corporate control are exercised by the company in a general meeting of members
(shareholders), directors through their vote in a board meeting and executive management
through the executive power delegated to them. This division of decision-making powers is
usually stated in the articles of association of the particular company. However, where equal
powers are concurrently assigned to both the meeting of members and the board of directors, it
would seem that the final say rests with the members as the superior body.101The exercise of this
power to control, is an exercise of true property rights to income and capital.102 Company law
recognises the fact that a company is aimed at making profit, hence the joining together of
shareholders for their personal gain.103 However, shareholders are not involved in the day-to-day
affairs of a corporation. The task of making decisions for the company rests in the hands of
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directors who are directly elected or nominated by the shareholders.
The duty of the directors is therefore to make decisions in the best interests of the company which
is commonly known as the fiduciary duty of directors.104 Directors owe the duty to the company
alone and not to individual members. Even if appointed by a class of shareholders the directors’
duty is to act in accordance with what they consider to be in the best interests of shareholders as
a whole.105 Modern managerial techniques place directors at the hub of the company’s business
wheels. From this position it is their duty to consider and satisfy not only the interests of
shareholders but also those of employees. This therefore means that employee interests could and
should be considered in so far as they contribute to the maximisation of the economic interests
of the shareholders.
Clearly, therefore, employees are not partners with a company’s management in the corporate
governance structure. Accordingly their interests and their participation in the decision-making
process are necessary to the extent to which they will contribute to the maximisation of profits.
However, due to the transformation of society and the advent of labour rights and strong trade
unionism, employees have become a very strong voice. Their views impact on the decision-
making process of a corporation, so that neglect of them may result in employees lawfully
withdrawing their services, thus halting the production of a company. However, Prentice106 says:
‘[A]ny proposal designed to give employees an effective voice in corporate management, will radically alter these
rights and will transform the prevailing legal relationship between shareholders and the board, and between the
board and corporate management.’
Furthermore, giving employees an effective voice in management will severely curtail the
ownership rights of shareholders and they (employees) will become theoretical owners of the
company.
According to South African company law, as in most western capitalistic societies, the law
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recognises and entrenches the power of shareholders to make decisions particularly in sections
179 and 180 of the Companies Act.107 Employees can exercise such power if they are also
shareholders.108 Sections 179 and 180 deal with the annual general meetings of the company.
Section 179(2) in particular deals with these meetings and states that:
‘The general meeting of a company shall deal with and dispose of matters prescribed by this Act and may deal with
and dispose of such further matters as are provided for in the articles of the company and subject to the provisions
of this Act, any matters capable of being dealt with by a general meeting.’
Although the general meeting has powers to determine the affairs of the company, this power is
usually exercised by directors, who are appointed by the general meeting.109 Generally these
powers can also be established in the articles of association of that company. Therefore, even in
South African company law, employees are not regarded as part of the company’s management
structure. Their interests are attended to by company directors under their broader mandate to
manage the company in its best interest. Clearly this requires a new definition of a company’s
interests to encompass the interests of workers and structural re-organisation of corporations in
order to make employees part of a company’s management structure.110
2.9 CONCLUSION
The philosophical concern of political and industrial democracy, and the different approaches to
labour relations, clearly define the different dynamics surrounding the genuine potentiality of
employee participation in decision-making. Furthermore, company law is an important factor in
evaluating whether the LRA 66 of 1995 will achieve employee participation in decision-making.
While labour law is changing and encouraging employee participation in decision-making, it is
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important to reform the interests of a company and its structural organisation. This will ensure
that obstacles to employee participation in such companies are minimised. Another critical point
is the effectiveness of involving trade unions in promoting employee participation in decision-
making. If democracy prevails within trade unions then they will be good agents of employee
participation. However, if they fail to fairly represent the interests of employees and also allow
undemocratic tendencies to prevail within the union structures, they will surely be a threat to
employee participation in decision-making.
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marks a major change in South Africa’s statutory industrial relations system.  Following the transition to political
democracy, the Act encapsulates the new government’s aim to reconstruct and democratize the economy and
society in the labour relations arena. It therefore introduces new institutions that are intended to give employers
and workers an opportunity to break with the intense adversarialism that has characterized their relations in the
past. These institutions aim to promote more orderly collective bargaining and greater cooperation at the workplace
and industrial level, and to provide a pro-active and expeditious dispute resolutions system.’
112  The Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993.
CHAPTER 3
                THE JURISPRUDENTIAL UNDERPINNINGS OF EMPLOYEE                   
PARTICIPATION IN DECISION-MAKING IN THE LRA 66 OF 1995
3.1 INTRODUCTION
The LRA is one of the earliest legislative products of South Africa’s constitutional democracy.111
Therefore, the promulgation of the LRA can be partly attributed to the interim constitution112
which ushered in a new set of constitutional values impacting on every area of the legal system.
However, the LRA should be viewed within its broader historical context, and the present context
is defined by the fact that South Africa’s priorities have shifted from the struggle for political
power to economic and social upliftment of the majority of the people of South Africa. The
success of the foregoing is partly dependent upon curing the chronic malfunctioning of the
country's economic performance. Labour relations, being one of the most essential components
in the improvement of the country's economic performance, has to be transformed. It is within this
context that the Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956 and other labour relations statutes had to be
repealed. However, the contribution of the previous regime of labour legislations to the
understanding of employee participation in decision-making cannot be ignored. 
In analysing the jurisprudential background to employee participation under the LRA 66 of 1995,
the following matters are covered: the historical developments of our labour law; employee
participation under the LRA 28 of 1956 (where the contribution of industrial councils; works
councils; works committees; bargaining outside statutory forums; the duty to bargain and good
faith bargaining, are considered). The analysis also covers the contribution of: the NEDLAC
negotiations; the constitution; international labour law standards and the RDP, to employee
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113  The purpose of the LRA creates a clear understanding of its historical underpinnings.  Section 1 states:
The purpose of the Act is to advance economic development, social justice, labour peace and the democratisation
of the workplace by fulfilling the primary objects of this Act, which are:
(a)  to give effect to and regulate the fundamental rights  conferred by  section 27 of the constitution (being the
interim  constitution which  has been superseded by section 23 of the new constitution.)
(b)  to give effect to obligations incurred by the Republic as a member state of the ILO
(c)  to provide a framework within which employees and their trade unions, employers and employers'
organisations  can:
 (i) collectively bargain to determine wages, terms and conditions of employment and other matters of
mutual interest; and
 (ii) formulate industrial policy
(d) to promote:
 (i) orderly collective bargaining;
 (ii) collective bargaining at sectoral level;
 (iii) employee participation in decision-making in the workplace; and
 (iv) the effective resolution of labour disputes.
114  Locatio conductio operarum was defined in Smith v Workmen's Compensation Commission 1979
(1)SA 51 at 556-57 as a consensual contract whereby a labourer, workman or servant as employee undertook to
place his personal  services for a certain  period of time at the disposal of an employer,  who in turn undertook to
pay him wages or a salary agreed upon in consideration of his services.
115  Wiehahn N E The Complete Wiehahn Report (1982)  at xvii-xxvii.
116  Ibid.
117  Ibid.
118  Ibid.
participation under the LRA. In order to place the jurisprudential background into context, it is
essential to outline the mechanisms through which the LRA will enhance employee
participation.113 
3.2 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS 
The sources of South African labour law are based on the legal precepts of common law under
the locatio conductio operarum,114 the British model of trade unionism, conventional labour
practices as applied in free market economies and political ideologies applied by successive
governments of South Africa.115 From 1652 when the first European settlers arrived, the South
African economy was dominated by agriculture until 1870.116 Domestic workers and agricultural
workers constituted the majority of the labour force.117 Disput s were not infrequent and common
law proved inadequate for the task, thus legislation had to be passed in 1841 to regulate relations
between masters and servants.118
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119  Some legislative products of this era were: Transvaal Industrial Disputes Act of 1909, Mine and Works
and the Native Labour Regulation Act of 1911 and Workmen’s Wages Protection Act of 1914.
Apart from accelerating economic development, the discovery of gold brought about a dramatic
change in industrial relations and exposed the weakness of the system. The workers who flooded
the mines between 1890 and 1913 came mainly from Britain, bringing with them the British
experience of trade unionism. These workers put their experience of trade unionism to work in
their endeavour to protect their skills and trades against a lowering of standards at the workplace.
Consequently the early individualistic labour laws proved inadequate for the regulation of the
more complex and collective relationships which had resulted from the surge in industrial
development. Thus new legislation119 had to be enacted which accommodated aspects of the social
and economic problems associated with the process of industrialization.  
Several amendments and laws on employment followed in ensuing years, resulting in a network
of South Africa's family of industrial legislation. However, three of these Acts are of particular
importance for the present day understanding of the development of employee participation in
decision-making in South Africa-these are: the Industrial Conciliation Act 11 of 1924; the Black
Labour Relations Act 48 of 1953; and the Industrial Conciliation Act 28 of 1956.
3.2.1 Industrial Conciliation Act no.11 of 1924
This Act was a response by the government to the Rand Revolt of 1922 by white mine workers.
Its main contribution was the introduction of collective bargaining, a system of dispute settlement
and the regulation of industrial action. It was the same statute that provided for the registration
of employers’ organisations and trade unions. The Act did not provide for a statutory duty for
both workers and employers to bargain, which would have paved the way for a legally prescribed
employee influence in decision-making at the workplace. However, the Act promoted voluntary
collective bargaining through industrial councils, which only allowed workers to influence
employers on decisions concerning distributive issues. The greatest weakness of this Act was the
promotion of a racially designed system of industrial relations.
3.2.2 Black Labour Relations Act no.48 of 1953
The exclusion of black workers from the Industrial Conciliation Act 11 of 1924, prompted the
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120  Bendix W ‘Workplace Forums: Shadows of a shady past or beacons for reform?’ (1995) 15 IRJSA
p113 ‘[T]his Act bears some resemblance to the Works Constitution Act passed in the post-Second World War
Europe.’
121  Du Toit et al op cit note 111 p 7.
122  Bendix op cit note 120 p 113 writes that: ‘Whereas, however, works councils/committees in these
western European systems formed the lower tier of two-tier systems, the tier granting employees the right to
representation, but not collective bargaining , workers’ committees in South Africa acquired the character of a
trade union substitute for blacks, and this with an evasion by negative definition and omission of bestowing
collective bargaining rights. The two-tier principle , and as such the functional separation between trade unions
and workers’ committees, became somewhat distorted in its transfer to South African conditions.’
123  Du Toit et al op cit note 111 p 8 ‘ However, the system contained seeds of its own destruction. Its
success owed much to an unjust and repressive political dispensation which increasingly used force to maintain
stability. Burgeoning African nationalism and political opposition during the 1950s were suppressed for a time
with the banning of the African National Congress and other organisations in 1961. Independent unions of African
workers effectively ceased to operate when many of their leaders and members were arrested or went on exile.’
Nationalist Party government to create a separate regime for blacks, being the Act under
discussion. In fact, this Act was a product of the Botha Commission of Enquiry appointed in
1948, which recommended the division of unions along racial lines. What is of paramount
significance to employee participation in this Act is that it provided for the establishment of
workers’ committees.120 Although the committees established by the Act could have provided a
sound foundation for employee participation, the problem is that they were confined to reporting
and dispute settlement functions and were operating under intensive government control.121
Consequently these forums were a failure because of the racial motivation for their establishment
and the fact that they were seen as substitutes for trade unions.122 
3.2.3 Industrial Conciliation Act no. 28 of 1956
Three years after the Black Labour Relations Act, the Industrial Conciliation Act 28 of 1956 was
promulgated. It fundamentally maintained the format of the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924.
Although this Act broadened its scope through the inclusion of coloured workers, it still
entrenched the racial divide as did its predecessor.123 However, it was the uprising in 1973 of
unorganised African workers that saw the gradual collapse of the racially exclusive labour
relations system. This further entrenched the adversarialism that characterised industrial relations
during and after the 1970s. This adversarialism militated against effective participatory structures
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124  Ibid p 9.
in the management of the workplace.124
It was not until the reform period in 1977 that the government appointed the Wiehahn
Commission of Enquiry to look into the state of labour law. This commission reported in 1979.
The most important recommendations, which were enacted into law in 1981, were: (i) that
African workers be allowed to join registered trade unions and be directly represented on
industrial councils or conciliation boards; and (ii) the protection of individual and collective rights
through the new Industrial Court via the unfair labour practice concept.
The above recommendations were enacted into the Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956. It was the
legislation of collective rights like freedom of association; the introduction of the Industrial Court;
and the unfair labour practice principle, which was to strengthen collective bargaining and
establish a foundation for employee participation in decision-making. However, it must be stressed
that the 1956 LRA did not expressly provide for employee participation in the making of
production related decisions. 
3.3 EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION UNDER THE LRA NO.28 of 1956
The Act provided for a mixed system of both central and plant-level bargaining forums in the form
of industrial councils and works councils. These forums were also supported by non-statutory
forums, which employers and employees formed voluntarily. Each of the bargaining forums is
briefly discussed below. The contribution made by the Industrial Court jurisprudence surrounding
retrenchment to employee participation, will however be discussed in Chapter 5.
3.3.1 Industrial Councils
Section 23 of the Act created Industrial Councils. These councils enjoyed jurisdiction over all
employers and employees in the areas and interests for which they were registered. For their
establishment they had to be sufficiently representative of the employers and employees in their
respective sectors.
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125  Cameron  E The New Labour Relations Act (1989) p 10 writes that: ‘[F]rom a trade union perspective,
the chief attraction of an industrial council is self evident...industrial councils constituted the only forums wherein
absent an accommodating employer, bargaining relationships could be developed on an enduring basis.’
Meanwhile the intentions of employers are reflected by Thompson C ‘On Bargaining and Legal Intervention’
(1987) 8 ILJ at 5 who writes, ‘They do not negotiate actual wage levels at the council’s forum and their main
interest in proceeding there, is to ensure that broadly oligarchic conditions are maintained in the industry.’
126  SAAME v Pretoria City Council 1948 (1) SA 11 (T) at 17, Dawling J said: ‘The so-called industrial
agreement is not really an agreement or contract, but a form of permitted domestic legislation by which the will
of a statutory body is by a majority vote imposed on all the members of a designated group of employers and
employees, irrespective of any  actual concurrence by the individuals affected, and notwithstanding any positive
disapproval by any such individual.’
According to section 24(1) a council’s first duty was to work to keep industrial peace. This it did
principally through the negotiation, supervision and enforcement of broad-ranging industrial
agreements. The range of matters over which the councils had jurisdiction included: (i) minimum
rates of remuneration and methods of calculating them; (ii) prohibitions of deductions from
remuneration or set off debts; (iii) rules relating to piece-work; and (iv) the establishment of
pension, sick, medical, employment, and provident funds. The councils also played an important
dispute-resolution role in addition to the regulatory function. It is important to note the divergent
reasons between employers and employees for committing to the industrial councils.125 The
councils were formed on a voluntary basis, particularly where employer organisations and union
representatives saw the benefit of regulating mutual needs at this level. Ideally the parties were
supposed to enjoy equal representation on these forums, however, the Act did not provide for this
and the matter was left to be decided by the parties when negotiating the council’s constitution.
   
The contribution of industrial councils to employee participation in decision-making was that they
provided a forum for the interaction between employers and employees at a central level. This
ensured that employees could utilize their collective force to influence decisions at an industry-
wide level. It was also the binding force of the industrial council agreements that enhanced the
influence of employees in the decision-making process.126
3.3.2 Works Councils
The Act also provided for the creation of works councils in section 34A(2), which stated that
works councils:
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127  Some of these functions included: (a) negotiating and concluding agreements with the employer in
respect of  wages and employment conditions. (b) negotiating about matters of mutual importance to the employer
and  employees.
128  See Mlozana v Faure Engineering (Pty) Ltd 1987 ILJ 432 (IC) in which it was held that the
representatives of  employees on a works council must indeed be representative of employees.
Shall perform such functions as may be agreed upon by the employer and employees concerned.127
This provision was a relic from the Black Labour Relations Act 48 of 1953, wherein provision
was made for the establishment of liaison and works committees in respect of black workers.
Works councils were clearly the only plant-level bargaining forums which were expressly
recognised in the Act and could be set up by agreement. The composition of the councils was to
be constituted by an equal number of both employer and employee128 representatives. This
provided for a proper forum wherein employers and employees could negotiate matters.
However, given the vacuous nature of the provision it had no significant impact in shaping labour
relations, particularly employee participation in decision-making. In contrast, in countries like
France, works councils have been utilized to enhance employee participation in decision-making.
The failing in South Africa’s case was due to the fact that the Act allowed employers and
employees to decide on whether they wanted to constitute a works council or not. Furthermore,
jurisdiction for these councils was not clearly outlined. There was nothing to make the works
councils better than the industrial councils and the non-statutory forums whose agreements could
be made binding. The adversarial nature of collective bargaining at the time also militated against
the success of these forums for which co-operative employment relations were required.
3.3.3 Works Committees
Works committees were usually constituted in workplaces that employed more than 20 employees
and where there was no works council in existence. Although the LRA did not provide for the
establishment of works committees, there was no prohibition against their formation. Both
employees and employers could initiate them and they were to be composed of not less that three
and not more than twenty members. Their functions were to: (a) bring to the attention of the
employer the wishes, desires and needs of the employees, and (b) in the absence of a works
council, to negotiate agreements with the employer in respect of wages and other employment
conditions but, if there was such a council, to make recommendations concerning employees’
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129  Morrison v Standard Building Society 1932 (A) 229.
130  Grogan J Collective Labour Law (1993) p 21 writes; ‘For various reasons, many employers and trade
unions prefer to engage in collective bargaining outside the machinery provided by the LRA. In practice, there are
many examples  of private bargaining systems at plant, enterprise and industry level, the biggest of which is that
adopted by the mining industry and automobile manufacturers.’ See also examples of such forums in Anstey M
Worker Participation (1990) pp 213-289.
131  Black  Allied Workers Union (SA) v Pek Manufacturing Co. (Pty) Ltd (1990) 11 ILJ at 1100B-C stated
that: ‘[B]ecause of its unfair labour practice provisions, the Act compels employees and employers in certain
circumstances to bargain collectively...It further compels employers to recognize representative unions by entitling
them to represent such members in such collective bargaining.’
needs.
Although works councils and works committees were voluntary forums, they could acquire legal
personality at common law and were able to conclude legally enforceable agreements concerning
employment conditions.129
3.3.4 Bargaining Outside Statutory Forums
Perhaps non-statutory bargaining forums provided more fertile ground for employee participation
in decision-making. These forums were formed voluntarily by agreement between the employer
and employees, and they could exist both at plant and industry level.130
The process of initiating non-statutory bargaining, commenced with the recognition of a trade
union as a representative of the employees of the employer. It was important at that stage for the
trade union to exhibit its support amongst the employees in the workplace. If the employer was
satisfied that the union was indeed representative, recognition was granted. Sometimes employers
refused to recognise a union as a representative of the employees. Since the right of a
representative union to be recognised flowed from the concepts of freedom of association and the
right to bargain, the Industrial Court could be approached for an appropriate order.131  In line with
the spirit of the Act on collective bargaining, voluntarism in the process was undercut by the
introduction of the unfair labour practice doctrine. This ensured that collective bargaining could
be required and institutionalized where this would further the broader objectives of the statute.
Having entered into a recognition agreement which ensured the possibility of employees as a
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132  There is evidence of such participative structures for instance the ‘Volkswagen Holistic Approach To
Worker Participation’ and ‘Toyota’s Total Worker Involvement’ in Anstey op cit note 130 pp 225-255.
133  Stocks and Stocks Natal (Pty) Ltd v Black Allied Workers Union (1990) 11 ILJ 369 at 374 (G-H) ‘The
Industrial Court in a number of decisions has been called upon to deal with disputes where there had been some
form of undertaking to negotiate...The Industrial Court has at first faintly, but later with greater clarity, recognized
that there was a general duty to negotiate to resolve a dispute of interest.’
134  In deciding that there was no duty to bargain, in BCAWU v Johnson Tiles (1985) 6 ILJ 210 (IC) at
213, Erasmus AM stated that, ‘under these circumstances I am not prepared to hold that these cases are authority
for the proposition that the court can be expected to make an order that a party is to negotiate in good faith.’
135  Metal and Allied Workers Union v Hart Ltd (1985) 6 ILJ 478 (IC); Food and Allied Workers Union
v Speckenham Supreme (2) (1988) 9 ILJ 628 (IC); Stocks and Stocks Natal (Pty)Ltd v Black Allied Workers Union
and Others ( supra); Radio and Television Electronic and Allied Workers Union v Tedelex (Pty) Ltd and Another
(1990) 11 ILJ 1272.
collective to influence the decision-making process, the following usually formed part of the
agreement: (i) a union’s rights to represent employees; (ii) procedures for periodic negotiations;
(iii) union’s rights of access to the employer’s premises; (iv) stop-order facilities; and (v) the
rights and duties of shop stewards. These were the rights which trade unions enjoyed in the
workplace. It is interesting to note that in workplaces where employees and management had a
well-established collective bargaining relationship, these rights enabled the parties to form
participative structures of decision-making.132
3.4 DUTY TO BARGAIN
Having recognised a trade union, the question whether or not employers were under a duty to
bargain with employees was persistently asked. In particular, the question was whether the
Industrial Court could compel an employer to negotiate with his employees.133 Through the unfair
labour practice jurisdiction, the Act prescribed negotiations between employers and employees
in certain circumstances. In fact, the Act merely introduced procedural safeguards to limit
potential industrial strife and enhance the employees’ prospects of influencing decisions that
would affect their material and psychological well-being. Although there was a school of
thought134 that had denied the existence of a duty to bargain, the school that supported the
existence of such a duty finally triumphed.135
While the courts had finally decided that there was indeed a duty to bargain, there was still a need
to enhance the balance of power between employers and employees in the bargaining relationship.
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136  Cameron op cit note 125  p 31writes that: ‘management’s power to implement its decisions
unilaterally with or without the lock-out weapon, is the ultimate moderator of union demands, the unions’ ability
to inflict losses upon the enterprise is what impels the employer to improve its offer.’
137  SA Chemical Workers Union v SASOL Industries (Pty) Ltd and another (1989) 10 ILJ (IC) at 1046
(I-J), Bulbulia, M said, ‘ Lord Wright found that, the right of workman to strike is an essential element in the
principle of collective bargaining. Kahn-Freund argued that if the workers could not, in the last resort collectively
refuse to work, they could not collectively bargain.’
138  Metal and Allied Workers Union v Hart Ltd (1985) 6 ILJ 478 (IC) at 493 (F-I) Ehlers, P stated that, ‘ an
employer can be expected to consult with a representative trade union or other representatives of employees in
circumstances where the employer  is contemplating retrenchment of his workers.’ In fact in Hooggenoeg Andolusites
(Pty) Ltd v National Union of Mine Workers and Others (1992) 13 ILJ 87 (LAC) at 93 (H-I), the court stated that an
employer was expected to have made a comprehensive and complete disclosure of the state of affairs of the company before
effecting retrenchment. The court went on to state that workers should be allowed to suggest alternatives and participate
in the decision-making process at this level.
139  Thompson C  et al  South African Labour Law  vol 1 (1998) A1-186 ( in footnote73).
This is where the freedom to strike was important under the Act.136 It is a fact that there could be
no equilibrium in industrial relations without the freedom to strike. Therefore it was in part due
to the freedom to strike that employees were able to influence the decision-making process in the
workplace.137 Thus the right to strike was a sanction in collective bargaining. In fact, section 65
of the Act contained both absolute and conditional prohibitions on strikes and lock-outs.
The duty to bargain obviously provided for limited participation in decision-making particularly
on distributive matters. This would therefore not be consistent with employee participation which
also entails the ability to influence decisions on production, management and financial affairs at
the workplace. However, it is possible to argue that there was beginning to be participation in
matters which were subject to bargaining apart from distributive matters. 138
3.5 GOOD FAITH BARGAINING
In order to ensure that the duty to bargain provided an opportunity for the employer and
employees to bargain constructively, good faith bargaining was adopted to reinforce the
process.139 Although good faith bargaining is said to have evolved from the collective bargaining
jurisprudence of the USA and Canada, in our jurisdiction it could be inferred from the unfair
labour practice definition in section 1 of the LRA 28 of 1956. Conduct which unfairly affected or
disrupted the employer’s business or detrimentally affected the employer-employee relationship
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140  Section 1 (1)(ii)and (iii) of the LRA 28 of 1956.
141  Rycroft A ‘ The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith’ (1988) 9 ILJ at 202.
142  Cox A ‘The duty to Bargain in good faith’ (1958) 17Harvard Law Review p 1413 writes that in NLRB
v Montgomery Ward and Co.[133F.2d676 (9th Circ.1943)] where seven meetings were held between the
management and the  certified representatives of two different unions the unions read and explained the proposed
contracts all of which were rejected by the Ward. The disagreement covered matters normally settled in routine
fashion as well as more substantive issues. The NLRB held that the Ward had not bargained in good faith saying
that the duty to bargain in good faith is an ‘obligation....to participate actively in the deliberations so as to indicate
a present intention to find a basis for agreement.’ Not only must the employer have ‘an open mind and a sincere
desire to reach an agreement but a sincere effort must be made to reach a common ground, but it need make no
concessions and may reject any terms it deems unacceptable.
143  (1993) 14 ILJ 406 (IC) at 413B.
144  NUM v Goldfields of South Africa (1989) 10 ILJ 86 (IC).
was considered as constituting an unfair labour practice.140 Fu thermore, section 47 of the LRA
28 of 1956 allowed the Industrial Court to make an order as to costs if any party did not take
reasonable steps and did not endeavour, in good faith, to settle the dispute in question. According
to Rycroft,141 the duty to bargain in good faith has two principal functions:
(a) the duty reinforced the obligation of an employer to recognize the bargaining agent; and 
(b) the duty fostered rational, informed discussion thereby minimizing the potential for necessary
industrial conflict.
Unilateral management action was considered to be a breach of good faith bargaining.142
Consequently, managements were encouraged to involve employees in decision-making by also
recognising their representatives. The Industrial Court acted decisively to protect the integrity of
the collective bargaining process by striking down as unfair any action which pre-empted good
faith bargaining. In FAWU v Kellogg SA143  it was held that it has never been the object of the
LRA to encourage unilateral action before collective bargaining, conciliation or discussion of the
matter had taken place. The Industrial Court even went further to hold that, even without an
element of bad faith, unilateral action was unfair.144 Therefore, good faith bargaining to a certain
extent also encouraged employee participation in decision-making, and of particular relevance to
this thesis, in regard to good faith bargaining, are the following: sham bargaining and disclosure
of information. 
3.5.1 Sham Bargaining
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145  SAEWA v Goedehoop Colliery (Amcoal)(1991)12 ILJ 865 (IC) at 860J-861A, where it was stated that:
‘Good faith bargaining requires that negotiators should keep an open mind on all representations made.  While
parties are not  compelled to compromise, a willingness to do so could be evidence of good faith bargaining.’
146  (1986) 7 ILJ 520 (IC) at 542 B-E.
147  Thompson C et al op cit note 139 A1-196.
Sham bargaining refers to engaging in the bargaining process without any good faith but merely
going through the motions of the process. The Industrial Court endeavoured to foster rational
engagement in the process of bargaining, according to which each party was expected to advance
motivations for any position they adopted and further to provide responses to the representations
of other parties. Simply approaching the bargaining process with a closed mind which resulted in
imposing a decision, was considered to be contrary to good faith bargaining.145
        
Although agreement was not prescribed, good faith defined the extent to which employers were
expected to involve employees in the decision-making process. In MAWU v Natal Die Casting146
Fabricius, AM provided a checklist for good faith bargaining as follows: (i) did one party merely
go through the motions without real intent of arriving at an agreement?; (ii) were concessions
made which are indicative of good faith bargaining?; (iii) were proposals made which are
indicative of good faith bargaining?; (iv) were dilatory tactics used?; (v) were onerous or
unreasonable conditions imposed by a party?; (vi) were unilateral changes in conditions made?;
(vii) was a representative by-passed?; and (viii) was sufficient information provided upon request?
This checklist shows that when parties engage in collective bargaining, according to good faith
bargaining the ultimate objective should be an agreement where possible. The preparedness of
employers to engage in a process of negotiations with an open mind to suggestions by employees,
created the opportunity for employees to contribute to the decision-making process. This may
have also contributed to the evolution of principles of employee participation in decision-making.
3.5.2 Duty to Disclose Information
Employers were expected to disclose information to make the process of negotiation or
consultation, particularly on retrenchment,  meaningful. It was suggested that the duty to disclose
information was to be co-extensive with the duty to bargain.147 All information which was
reasonably relevant to advance a particular position or refute other claims in the negotiations
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148  Burmeister v Crusader Life Assurance Corporation (1993) 14 ILJ 1504 (IC): also see further
discussion  in Chapter 4 below.
149  Anstey op cit note 130 p 23-clearly reflected are the obstacles: autocratic management styles, union
suspicion and resistance, racial attitudes, educational levels, inadequate basic wages and  conditions of
employment, ideological differences, the absence of shared values, the volatile socio-political  context, the role
dilemmas for the parties and the sharing of strategic information are all cited as problems.
150  NEDLAC refers to the National Economic Development and Labour Council, a body which is
responsible for the development of legislative policies between government, employers and employees.
process, was to be disclosed.148 
Clearly, therefore, good faith bargaining discouraged unilateral decision-making, sham bargaining,
and encouraged disclosure of information. Therefore good faith bargaining was one of the
foundations for the evolution of employee participation in decision-making. 
 
A fair conclusion on the contribution of the LRA 28 of 1956 is that employee participation in
decision-making through, collective bargaining under the Act, was very restrictive and both
employers and employees did not see the value of co-operation in this process. Hence the Act was
a mix of voluntarism and extensive legal intervention in the bargaining process. Furthermore, the
freedom to strike was a mechanism which was used more often than not to solicit attention from
employers, simultaneously entrenching adversarialism which affected production negatively. It
seems therefore that several factors militated against employee participation under the old Act.
Included amongst these was the lack of readiness amongst employers and employees to co-
operate in the running of the workplace. It would have also been unreasonable to expect an ill-
equipped workforce to properly engage with management in production- related matters and
worse still on major policy issues concerning the running of the workplace. All the foregoing
factors should be viewed within the context of the socio-political and economic dispensation at
the time.149
 3.6 NEDLAC NEGOTIATIONS AND EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION
Employee participation in decision-making under the LRA 66 of 1995 was shaped by the
negotiations that ensued at NEDLAC.150 The mandate of the Ministerial Legal Task Team to draft
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151  The Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993.
152  Du Toit et al op cit note 111 p 29 write: ‘Another issue that proved to be contentious was the
structuring of the statutory employee participation (workplace forums) provided for in the draft bill. BSA supported
the principle of employee participation in the workplace but wanted the participatory process to be open to all
employees and separate from collective bargaining including, a prohibition on strikes over participatory issues.
The union federation fearing  the potential of participatory structures to undermine union organization,  proposed
a union-based system of participation, whereby the composition of the workplace forum shall be the shop stewards
committee. Trade union officials should, furthermore be entitled to attend meetings of a workplace forum.’
153  Ibid p 32.
154  Cheadle H et al Current Labour Law (1994 ) p  94, state that:‘the chapter of fundamental rights in
our constitution is going to have profound effect on all aspects of the law in particular labour law.’
the LRA was guided amongst other things by the interim constitution,151 the government’s
Reconstruction and Development Programme and the relevant International Labour Organisation
conventions. All these sources laid out principles which provided the foundation for employee
participation in decision-making. Several submissions were made by different parties, but the main
ones were from Business South Africa (BSA) and trade union federations like, the Congress of
South African Trade Unions (COSATU), National Congress of Trade Unions (NACTU) and the
Federation of South African Labour Unions (FEDSAL). On the subject of employee participation
in decision-making BSA and the trade unions differed, with BSA demanding that all employees
should be able to participate in the workplace forums, while the trade unions wanted a union-
centred system of participation.152 H wever, after much negotiation, business and employees
agreed on the present form of workplace forums as a means of achieving employee participation
in decision-making.153
3.7 THE CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT AND THE CONSTITUTION
According to section 1(a) of the LRA 66 of 1995 one of the principal purposes of the Act is to
give effect to fundamental rights in the constitution. This reflects the extent to which the
constitution influenced the Act.154 lthough the LRA was enacted under the interim constitution,
the new constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 still provides for labour
rights in section 23. What is clear, is that to the extent that the constitution protects property
rights, freedom of economic activity and labour relations rights, the constitution defines the
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155  Anstey M ‘ Can South African Industrial Relations Move Beyond Adversarialism? Some comparative
perspectives on the prospects of workplace forums in South Africa’ (1995)19(4) SAJLR p 4.
parameters for employee participation in decision-making. Anstey,155 states that:
‘[W]hile it is silent on the issue of worker participation, the boundaries of control or co-determination are to some
extent implicit in these rights. In effect the rights of shareholders are protected but the manner in which these are
exercised is constrained, in part through labour organisations’ powers of bargaining and rights to fair labour
practices.’
In section 3(b) the LRA provides that in the interpretation of the Act there should be compliance
with the constitution. This creates the constitutional context within which the LRA will be
interpreted to establish the extent to which it promotes employee participation in decision-making.
3.8 INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS
Since South Africa is now a full member of the ILO, it is expected that she will adhere to the
standards set by the organisation. It is therefore no surprise that such standards have been
incorporated into the  LRA. Evidence of this is that, according to section 1(b) and section 3(c)
one of the objects of the LRA is to give effect to the obligations incurred by South Africa as a
member of the ILO. What is envisaged is the bringing of the labour laws of South Africa into line
with the various relevant conventions of the ILO. The ILO in the Co-operation at the level of the
Undertaking Recommendation 94of 1952 states that appropriate steps should be taken by member
states to promote consultation and co-operation on matters of mutual interest not within the scope
of issues usually dealt with through collective bargaining. Although this is a recommendation and
therefore non-binding, it is significant as a standard. This demonstrates that the concept of
employee participation in decision-making, also finds expression in international law and may have
influenced  the drafters of the LRA 66 of 1995, and will influence the courts’ interpretation
thereof.
3.9 RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
The importance of rebuilding the country’s economy and developing manpower for this process
was expressed in the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). Part of the
programme was aimed at democratising the state and society. As part of the democratisation
process, labour law had to be reviewed to provide equal rights for employees so that they could
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participate in decision-making in the workplace.  Evidence of this is that Part 4 of the RDP
document at paragraph 4.8.9 states that:
‘Workplace empowerment: Legislation must facilitate worker participation in decision-making in the world of
work. Such legislation must include an obligation on employers to negotiate substantial changes concerning
production matters or workplace organisation within a nationally negotiated framework, facilities for organisation
and communication with workers on such matters, and the right of shop stewards to attend meetings and training
without loss of pay as well as to address workers.’156
In line with the preceding policy position  at 4.8.10 it is stated that in addition to the reform of
labour law, company and tax law must be amended in order to facilitate, for example, access to
company information. It could thus be said that employee participation in the LRA was partly
born of the principles of the RDP.
3.10 EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION UNDER THE LRA 66 of 1995
The LRA 66 of 1995 clearly seeks to augment collective bargaining and enhance employee
participation in decision-making. The preamble of the Act states:
‘To change the law governing labour relations and for that purpose....to promote employee participation in
decision-making through the establishment of workplace forums.’
The meaning of the foregoing is further expressed in section 1(d)(iii), which stipulates that one
of the principal purposes of the Act is to promote employee participation in decision-making in
the workplace. A purposive interpretation157 of the Act would support the fact that employee
participation will not only be promoted through workplace forums, but collective bargaining and
consultation prior to dismissal for operational requirements, will achieve this purpose. After all,
collective bargaining is also recognised as an aspect of employee participation158 and Anstey writes
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that collective bargaining  is the form of participation most evidenced internationally.159
 
Clearly, therefore, the Act reflects a pluralistic approach to employee participation through
adversarial collective bargaining, co-operative interaction through workplace forums, disclosure
of information  and consultation prior to dismissal for operational requirements.
3.10.1 Statutory Forms of Employee Participation
(a) Disclosure of information
The right to disclosure of information is  provided for in sections 16, 89 and 189(3) and (4). The
importance of this right can never be overemphasized, as it constitutes the foundation for the
other forms of  participation. If parties to either consultation,  joint decision-making or collective
bargaining are ignorant of the relevant facts to a matter in issue, there will be no proper
interaction. Thus the LRA supports employee participation by encouraging disclosure of
information.
(b) Consultation prior to dismissals for operational requirements
Section 189 provides for dismissal on the grounds of operational requirements. Its relevance to
employee participation in decision-making, is the extensive consultation necessary for a fair
dismissal and the contribution of the retrenchment jurisprudence to the concern of this thesis.
(c) Collective Bargaining
Collective bargaining is provided for under the LRA-of particular relevance to employee
participation are the principles that shape collective bargaining. Although the LRA does not
provide for an express duty to bargain, through the strike provisions under section 64,  employee
participation in distributive matters160 is going to be strengthened.
(d) Workplace Forums
Chapter 5 provides for workplace forums through which employee participation in production-
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related matters will be expressly promoted by the Act. The workplace forums are able to achieve
this through consultation,161 joint-decision making162 and disclosure of information.163 Although
workplace forums are new structures in our labour dispensation, in other  jurisdictions164 similar
forums have been used to enhance employee participation in decision-making.
3.11 CONCLUSION
The jurisprudential  history of  our labour law shows that employee participation in decision-
making was indirectly facilitated through collective bargaining in the regulation of industrial
relations. From the body of statutes considered in this chapter, it is clear that the legislature
tended to opt for collective bargaining as the only way through which employees could influence
the decisions of employers. However, over the years due to the  militancy of the  labour  force,
particularly of African  trade unions, the legislature had to amend the law in order to deal with this
antagonism and the  constant disruption of  production. Consequently there was provision for the
establishment of forums like works councils, works committees and non-statutory forums. These
forums never achieved the promotion of employee participation but pointed towards the need for
co-operative relations between employees and employers. Perhaps the most significant foundation
to employee participation was the enactment of the unfair labour practice  jurisdiction, which gave
birth to concepts like the duty to bargain, good faith bargaining, disclosure of information, and
consultation prior to dismissal for operational requirements. It  can  thus be said that  under the
LRA 28 of 1956, the Industrial Court developed the  principles  which would later constitute the
foundation for employee participation in decision-making. Furthermore, the Constitution of the
Republic of South Africa, International Labour Law standards and the principles of the
Reconstruction and Development Programme, have all shaped the concept of employee
participation in the  LRA 66 of 1995. 
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CHAPTER 4
 
DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Disclosure of information is one of the means through which employee participation in decision-
making can be enhanced. For participation, either through collective bargaining, workplace
forums or consultation prior to dismissal for operational requirements, to be a rational process
it is necessary for the parties to be informed of the facts surrounding any particular proposal.165
In examining the contribution of information disclosure to participation, the following matters are
covered: the rationale for disclosure, jurisprudence of disclosure in South Africa, disclosure of
information under the LRA 66 of 1995, limitations to disclosure, sufficiency of disclosure and
disputes regarding disclosure. 
4.2 RATIONALE FOR DISCLOSURE
The rationale for disclosure of information is divided into two: the employee-centred aim and the
company-centred aim.166 Employees deem it essential to have information in order to assess
positions they can adopt and to evaluate those which have been adopted by the employer, as well
as the ability of the employer to meet their demands. Employers on the other hand regard the
requirement for disclosure as a further opportunity to  increase their influence and control  in the
workplace.167 Like any  initiative to involve employees in the decision-making process, some
employers view disclosure as a limitation to the management prerogative and fear that it may raise
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171  Jordaan B ‘Disclosure of Information in Terms of The Labour Relations Act’ (1996) 6 (2) LLN pp 1-2,
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the demands made by employees. Research,168 however, has shown that some employers realise
the benefits of information disclosure. The benefits are: (i) improved employee cooperation as
information enhances the employees’ understanding of the organisation and decisions made within
it; (ii) improved collective bargaining by reducing conflict resulting from different information sets
being made available to negotiating parties; (iii) increased  employee involvement in decision-
making because employees have access to the relevant information; and (iv) increased levels of
job satisfaction. The overall significance of  information disclosure to both employers and
employees is that it may promote goal  congruence as employees will understand how their goals
and those of their employer relate.169  
South Africa is not alone in her choice to introduce disclosure of information in the collective
bargaining and consultation process.170 In Britain it has been recognised that disclosure of
information is an integral part of collective bargaining. Lack of information has been shown to
handicap the ignorant party when it comes to agreement in the bargaining or consultation
process.171 In Germany and the Netherlands disclosure of information has been opted for in
particular when it comes to works councils, which are utilised to promote employee participation
in decision-making. Furthermore, the International Labour Organisation has also recognised the
importance of disclosure of information in the process of collective bargaining.172
49
(5) LLN p 2.
173  Crown Cork and Seal v Rheem SA (Pty)Ltd 1980 (3) SA 1093(WLD) and Moulded Components v
Coucourakis and Another 1979 (2) SA (WLD) 466: where there is a consideration of the how confidentiality
should  be applied as a limitation to disclosure of information.
174  Devenish  GE  A Commentary on the South African Constitution (1998) p 80, writing about section
32 (Access to information) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 states that: ‘ Its
inclusion endorses the pervasive theme of accountability and transparency of government and administration that
runs like a golden thread through the entire Constitution and forms part of a new political morality.’
175  Johannessen  L et al ‘A Motivation for the Legislation on Access to Information’ (1995) 112 SALJ
 p 45.
176  Ibid p 46: see also section 32 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996.
177  Perhaps the horizontal application of this right was the motivation for a proactive step to encourage
disclosure of information between employers and employees.
178  Johannessen op cit note 175 p 47.
In this chapter the  focus will be on the disclosure of information based on section 16. Sections
89 and 189(3), dealing with information disclosure are discussed under the chapters on workplace
forums (Chapter 7) and consultation prior to dismissal for operational requirements (Chapter 5),
respectively, for a better understanding of disclosure in those circumstances.
4.3 JURISPRUDENCE OF DISCLOSURE IN SOUTH AFRICA
Although many of the principles of information disclosure in labour law have been developed
under the LRA 28 of 1956, the doctrine of discovery173 and the constitution have also contributed
to the culture of disclosure.174 Johannessen et al175 although writing about the rationale of access
to information under section 23 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of
1993, refer to the important theories behind access to information in a democracy. Since
disclosure of information to employees is an aspect of  industrial democracy, these theories may
be valid also in the context of employment. They identify four rationales supporting legislation
facilitating access to information: (i) access to information is a right  identified in the chapter on
fundamental human rights in the constitution176 and s as such a  part of the human rights culture
of South Africa. It is also significant that the right of access to information applies in horizontal
relationships and is no longer confined to relations with the State;177 (ii) allowing people to obtain
information is essential for full democratic participation,178 and the free flow of information
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supports the participatory form of democracy; (iii) access to information encourages
accountability;179 and (iv) access to information encourages better  administrative decisions.180 Th
foregoing rationales for access to information, reflect the importance of information disclosure
in any constitutional democracy. It can therefore be said that disclosure of information in the LRA
is an extension of these constitutional principles into the employment relationship. 
In South African labour law the right to disclosure of information has developed through the
principle of good faith bargaining and the decisions regarding retrenchment.181 Under the LRA
28 of 1956 the unfair labour practice jurisdiction of the Industrial Court was utilised to induce
parties to the bargaining process to engage in meaningful bargaining. Through this, the Industrial
Court was able to order access to an employer's premises and the disclosure of relevant
information, and could check hasty and arbitrary action. Therefore disclosure of information
constituted one of the rules for bargaining conduct.182Gavin,183 writes that the Industrial Court
is on record as stating that disclosure of relevant information is an integral part of good faith
bargaining. In SACCAWU v Southern Sun Hotel Corporation (Pty) Ltd184  the court stated that:
‘[A]n unconditional refusal to negotiate or to disclose relevant information is subversive of industrial peace; and
the subversion of rational collective bargaining will have one or more of the effects referred to in the definition
of an unfair labour practice in the Act.’
However, the Industrial Court decisions tended to be protective of employers.185 In an attempt
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to  clarify the  instances  when an employer was expected to disclose information, Thompson et
al186 suggested that the duty to disclose information should be co-extensive with the duty to
bargain or consult in the retrenchment context.187 There was, however, a realization that the
uncertain disclosure practices were reflective of the level of employer-employee participation at
the time and that judicial intervention could not necessarily help the process.188 It was felt that the
disclosure of information should be achieved through policy development enshrined in
legislation.189 The Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 attempts to address this.
4.4 DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION UNDER THE LRA
In line with the purpose of the Act to promote orderly collective bargaining and employee
participation, disclosure of information is provided for under section 16.190 According to section
16(1) only a majority union can claim the right to disclosure of information. However, minority
unions may act together in order to attain such majority in a workplace191 and thereby be entitled
to exercise the right to disclosure. Section 16(2) requires an employer to disclose to a trade union
representative all relevant information, but it is not clear whether the employer has to disclose at
the request of the trade union or voluntarily. If one were to apply the principle of good faith
bargaining, parties to the bargaining process would need to be upfront in disclosing information
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in order to facilitate proper bargaining.192 This means that the employer would have to disclose
information to the trade union without being requested. In National Union of Metal Workers of
SA v Atlantis Diesel Engines (Pty) Ltd193  Fagan DJP said in the retrenchment context:
‘Generally speaking, however, it would appear to us that fairness requires that an employer should be open and
helpful in meeting requests for information.’
The above statement  suggests that employees have to request the information from the employer,
however, this does not in anyway stop the employer from disclosing without being requested to.
Although some employers may not be readily forthcoming with information it is significant for
employee participation that employers are expected to be helpful and open about disclosure. In
the United Kingdom there is a statutory obligation to disclose on request.194 H wever, the ideal
position is for employers to be upfront with information and not wait until employees have
requested disclosure.
4.4.1 Relevant Information
Everingham195 suggests that information disclosure targeted at employees should cover the
following information: (i) the financial status of the organisation; (ii) the employees’ information
needs on absenteeism, industrial relations and productivity; and (iii) the employees’ contribution
to planning the organisation’s future. Although this list provides an idea of  information that may
be relevant, it appears to be too limited in scope. A comprehensive list is provided by Grossett196
who draws his conclusions from prominent research in the field of information disclosure to
employees. He suggests that the following information should be disclosed: productivity
information; information on morale; information on wages and benefits; safety information;
information on employee development; demographic information; information on company
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performance; information on wealth sharing; and information on the organisation’s future.197 This
is a rather comprehensive list which may accord with the requirements of section 16. However,
whether or not information is relevant under section 16 is a question of fact to be determined with
reference to the circumstances of every case. Furthermore, the relevance of the information must
be determined by the purpose for which it is sought and it must be pertinent to the issues in hand.
According to section 16(2) the information must be relevant to the duties to be performed by a
trade union representative or shopsteward, according section 14(4) which are: representing
employees in grievance and disciplinary proceedings; monitoring the employer's compliance with
provisions of this Act and any collective agreements; contravention of the workplace-related
provisions; and to perform any other functions agreed to by the trade union representative and
the employer. Furthermore, the information must allow the trade union to engage effectively in
consultation or collective bargaining.198 In the retrenchment context, the Labour Appeal Court
recognised relevant information as that which concerned the retrenchment process.199 In the
collective bargaining context, Du Toit et al200 write that:
‘[I]n the collective bargaining arena relevant information includes all information necessary to adduce, defend or
refute negotiating claims.... information that might, but not necessarily must, advance the other party’s case should
be disclosed.’
Unfortunately our jurisprudence does not provide us with a test for relevance. However, a more
purposive approach to disclosure in line with ensuring a more participative process of bargaining
is desirable.201 Rycroft,202 wrote that in the United States the relevance of information is
determined in two ways namely: the presumptive relevance rule or the substantiation relevance
rule.
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(i) Presumptive Relevance Rule
Initially, according to this rule the trade union had to demonstrate that the requested information
was necessary for it to bargain intelligently over specific matters arising during the course of
negotiations. However, this formulation was departed from in NLRB v Yawman and Erbe Mfg
Co203 where it was stated that the employer had an affirmative statutory duty to supply relevant
information. The employer’s refusal to disclose the information should not be based on the trade
union’s failure to prove relevance of the information.204 The c urt said this kind of disclosure was
similar to that governing discovery procedures, where information must be disclosed unless it
plainly appears irrelevant. According to this test, the employer is expected to disclose  relevant
information even if the  employees are unable to prove relevance. This approach is based on the
notion that  according to the requirements of good faith bargaining, parties to the process are
expected to enter into the process with an open mind and with the purpose of reaching agreement.
In South Africa  there  seems to be a move towards embracing the presumptive relevance rule.
In National Workers Union v Department of Transport205  the issue concerned a disciplinary
hearing and the union asked to see a management report to assist it in  representing a member at
a pending disciplinary hearing. The union relied on section 16(2) for the request of disclosure. In
summarising and giving an opinion on this decision Cheadle et al206  stat d that:
‘The commission somewhat generously accepted the union’s argument that the report in question (the result of
a preliminary investigation into the alleged offence) could be relevant even though the union was unaware of its
actual contents. The employer was not present at the arbitration proceedings, and hence could not raise any
counter-arguments. The employer was ordered to make available the report.’ 
From the above statement, it is clear that as the union was not aware of the contents of the report,
it was in no position to prove relevance. In spite of this lack of proof of relevance, the
commissioner ordered disclosure. This is in line with the presumptive relevance rule and the
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commissioner adopted a generous approach in accepting  the union’s argument of  possible
relevance of the information. It can be argued that relevance should not be given a restrictive but
purposive interpretation.207 Such an interpretation could promote orderly collective bargaining208
and employee participation in decision-making.209
(ii) The Substantiation Relevance Rule
This rule is based on the NLRB v Truitt Manufacturing Co.210case where the US Supreme Court
ordered the employer to allow the union’s certified public accountant to examine the company's
books and other financial data which the employer had said was irrelevant. The court held that
the employer's refusal to substantiate its claim of inability to pay constituted bad faith
bargaining.211 The position in this case means that once the employer enters into bargaining with
the trade union, all information which concerns the issues under discussion must be disclosed to
substantiate a claim. The substantiation rule seems to have also found a place in our labour law.
In Construction and Allied Workers Union v Avbob Funerals212  where the employer  having
recognised the union for collective bargaining purposes, refused to divulge any financial
information to back its claims of inability to pay more to the employees. In ordering the employer
to disclose to the union its income statement and balance sheet the commissioner said:
‘An employer cannot come to the bargaining table and then simply refuse to make a counter  offer on the basis
of poverty without justifying that response and providing relevant information to back up this position.’
Disclosure will be denied in the case of absolute irrelevance and the substantiation rule means
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relevance is to be determined by the propositions being made by the employer. Under this rule
therefore, once the employer adopts a certain position in the consultation or bargaining process,
such employer is expected to provide relevant information to substantiate his claims.
In the United Kingdom the ACAS(Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Services) code on
'Disclosure of Information to Trade Unions for Collective Bargaining Purposes' at paragraph 10
states that:
‘To determine what information will be relevant negotiators should take account of the subject-matter of the
negotiations and the issues raised during them, the level at which negotiations take place, the size of the company,
and the type of business the company is engaged in.’
The UK position is very similar to that in the LRA, where relevance is determined by the subject
matter of the  negotiations.
Although section 16(2) and 16(3) provide an idea of what relevant information could be, a
comparative analysis provides one with further rules for determining the relevance of information.
There is a method already being used by arbitrators in making their decisions. It is, however, not
clear whether the arbitrators are persuaded by the US developed principles in their decisions. The
interesting point with regard to the US developed tests of relevance is that they are not dependent
on the employees discharging the onus of proving relevance, but they require of the employer to
be upfront with relevant information. If a combination of the criteria of determining relevance as
stated in section 16(4) and the presumptive relevance and substantiation relevance rules is
adopted, the scales  of  justice will be in favour of promoting disclosure and hence informed
employee participation in decision-making. 
4.4.2 Limitations to Disclosure
According to section 16(5) the employer is not required to disclose information that is legally
privileged; that cannot be disclosed without contravention of law or an order of court; that is
confidential; and private and personal information unless the employee consents to such
disclosure.
(i) Legally Privileged Information
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The general rule regarding legally privileged information according to the Appellate Division as
stated in Bogoshidi v Director for Serious Economic Offences213 is that only confidential
communications between attorney and client made for the purpose of obtaining legal advice, are
privileged. However, Jordaan, suggests that in labour law: 
‘[I]ndustrial relations advice as well as information obtained for example for collective bargaining strategy
purposes, should also be considered to be legally privileged.’214
It is clear that this limitation refers only to information concerning the strategies to the bargaining
process and not necessarily the information constituting the basis for the process of bargaining
and consultation.
(ii) Prohibitions Imposed on the Employer by any Law or Order of Court
This refers to information that is prohibited by law from disclosure. For example, certain
information that may harm national security if disclosed. This would apply more in the defence
industry where information on production and finance related matters may obviously affect
national security. For instance the Companies Act 61 of 1973 section 15A(1) provides that:
The Minister may-
(a) by notice in writing prohibit any company from disclosing or from stating on or in any document of the
company;
(b) on the written application of a company to the Registrar, exempt it, subject to such conditions or restrictions
as the Minister may deem fit, from the obligation to disclose, or to state on or in any document, particular
information or a particular fact concerning the affairs or business of the company, or that of any of its subsidiaries,
which the company would otherwise be required under this Act to disclose or to state on or in any document.215
Furthermore, where there has been an order of court prohibiting disclosure based on the right of
a third party, to do the contrary would constitute contempt of court. This accords with the usual
limitations to disclosure of information which are not confined to labour law.
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217  Grogan  J ‘Equal Justice: union access to executive hearings’ (1997) 13 EL  p 79 writes that: ‘section
79 is likely to give impetus to union demands for access to information to which none but senior managers were
previously privy. And of such information, none is likely to be more fiercely disputed than information pertaining
to themselves. Their salaries and perks are obvious examples.’
218  Brand op cit note 170 p 253. 
(iii) Private Personal Information
This refers to information pertaining to a particular individual in his or her private capacity which
is not related to the employment relationship and is not public knowledge. This is based on the
right to privacy protected by the constitution of the Republic of South Africa.216An example of
information that would fall into this realm would be a person's medical records but not, it is
suggested, a person’s salary.217 After all, information on salaries would appear in the financial
records of a company. However, if the employee consents to the disclosure then such information
may be disclosed. This makes the provision a reasonable limitation.
(iv) Confidential Information that may cause Substantial Harm to an Employee or Employer
The disclosure requirement is not open-ended. Firstly, according to section 16(4) the employer
must notify the trade union representative or the trade union in writing if any information
disclosed in section 16(2) and 16(3) is confidential. Secondly, according to section 16(5)(c) an
employer is not required to disclose confidential information which may cause substantial harm
to an employee or employer. What is envisaged concerning information about an employee, may
be similar to the information that is private and personal to the employee. However, in so far as
harm to the employer is concerned, guidance may be sought from the British ACAS code.218At
paragraph 15 it is stated that substantial injury may occur if, for example, certain customers would
be lost to competitors, or suppliers would refuse to supply necessary materials, or the ability to
raise funds to finance the company would be seriously impaired as a result of disclosing certain
information. 
The issue of confidentiality highlights the conflict of interests between employees and employers,
where the former asserts its right to know and the latter the protection of its property right in the
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that the arguments against providing full information fall into two broad categories. First, the possible leakage of
confidential information may endanger the competitive position of the enterprise, and second, information is a
source of power - providing unlimited information to workers and the trade union may undermine management’s
position in collective bargaining.’
220  For instance in  Warner-Lambert Co v Glaxo Laboratories Ltd 1975 RPC 354, where the plaintiff had
sued for alleged infringement of two patents relating to steroid compounds and their manufacture. The defendant
claimed secrecy in the alleged infringing process. The Court of Appeal resolved the conflict of interests of the
parties by ordering a controlled measure of discovery to selected individuals upon terms ensuring that there should
neither be use nor further disclosure of the confidential information to the prejudice of the defendant, and yet so
that the plaintiffs would have a free full degree of disclosure as would be consistent with adequate protection of
any trade secrets of the defendant. This case elaborates on the balancing act which the courts have had to play in
the determination of confidentiality disputes.  See also Lord Denning MR in Dick v Rid Thames Board Mills
(1977) 3 All ER 677 (CA) p 687D-E.
221  1980 (3) SA 1093 (WLD).
222  Ibid 1100 A-C.
information.219 Principles regulating the disclosure of confidential information can be traced back
to the doctrine of discovery of documents in particular in the United Kingdom. In circumstances
where one party requires the discovery of certain documents and the other argues that the
information is confidential. There are two principles in conflict: the party claiming confidentiality
relies upon the fact that it has a property right in the confidential documents. The information is
confidential in the sense that a reasonable businessman might wish to keep it to himself and that
it should not be available to a competitor for possible misuse and that its proprietary rights should
be protected. The party claiming discovery relies upon the principle that no limits should be placed
upon their procedural rights to make full use of information in the other's possession in order to
present their case without being hampered at all.220 
Disclosure of information in labour relations is not unlike discovery in the context of litigation.
South African cases on discovery which also refer to the principles governing disclosure could
therefore be apposite. In Crown Cork and Seal v Rheem SA (Pty) Ltd221 the issue was whether
a court may place limitations upon a litigant's ordinary rights of untrammelled inspection and
copying of documents discovered by his opponent. The applicant claimed that the documents
contained trade secrets which may be misused. In answering this question Schultz AJ222 stated
that:
‘[A]lthough the approach of the court will ordinarily be that there is a full right of inspection and copying, I am
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225  Ibid at 652 C.
226  Section 16(14).
of the view that our courts have a discretion to impose appropriate limits when satisfied that there is a real danger
that if this is not done an unlawful appropriation of property will be made... but it is to be stressed that care must
be taken not to place undue or unnecessary limits on a litigant's right to a fair trial....’
This case affirms an earlier position within the same jurisdiction by Botha J223  where he stated
that the court should try to strike a proper balance between the conflicting interests of the parties.
Although the principles on disclosure here apply to the process of discovery in litigation, there
appears to be no reason why these principles cannot apply to the duty to disclose information in
collective bargaining and consultation. The National Union of Metalworkers v Atlantis Diesel
Engines case224 provides an indication of how the matter of confidentiality in labour law may be
handled. In that case it was stated that the employer was not expected to disclose information that
was confidential and which may harm the employer’s business interests, for instance  trade
secrets.225 What this means is that confidential information may be disclosed, but if such
information will cause harm to the employer’s business interest,  the employer is not expected to
disclose. This approach to the handling of confidential information points to the relationship
between section 16(4) and16(5), which is that although confidential information may be disclosed
under subsection (4), confidential information that may harm the employer’s interest or an
employee cannot be disclosed.
The above jurisprudence indicates that section 16(4) and 16(5) are a codification of the balancing
of interest theory of disclosure. However, unlike the case where the employer can withhold the
confidential information, the employer is still required to disclose the information but notify the
trade union representative in writing that it is confidential. Clearly, however, the trade union
representative or trade union may not disclose the information to the world at large. A breach of
confidentiality, may result in the withdrawal of the right to disclosure of information in that
workplace.226 This presents a problem in employee participation in decision-making, because trade
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unions are under a duty of fair representation in relation to their members.227 The question is
whether disclosing information to general members of the trade union will amount to a breach of
confidentiality. It is suggested that trade union members should also have access to the
information as they are the trade union and not a different constituency from their representatives.
What is critical is that the trade union as a whole should not use the information to harm the
interests of the employer.228
4.5 SUFFICIENT DISCLOSURE
Section 16(2) and 16(3) together with the limitations in subsection (5) define the parameters for
sufficient disclosure under section 16. It would seem that even in the Atlantis Diesel Engines
case229 the LAC utilized the limitations to determine sufficiency of disclosure. In an attempt to
define what sufficient disclosure is, Roth AM observed that:
‘It seems to me to be lawful, just and equitable that management should be obliged to disclose only such
information as would reasonably enable employees to consider the consequences that information held for
them.’230
Du Toit et al criticised the foregoing statement for not being in line with the purposes of the new
LRA, when they wrote:
‘With respect, the learned member has stated the test too conservatively. The policy of the new law stretches
beyond this cautious reticence. The effective interaction required by section 16 must be construed in light of the
Act’s objectives to promote orderly collective bargaining and employee participation in decision-making in the
workplace. Goals of this kind aim not only at employee equity and benefits but also at enhancing efficiency and
the promotion of common interest through joint problem solving. The narrowly formulated test of the learned
member overlooks these considerations. Besides the greater the extent of discussion, the greater the prospects of
a harmonious and efficient workplace.’231 
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Clearly, therefore, in determining the sufficiency of disclosure the purposive interpretation of the
LRA will be very crucial and the objectives of the Act extend the boundaries more than ever
before. This is fundamental to making the processes of collective bargaining and consultation
meaningful and hence supporting employee participation in decision-making.
4.6 DISPUTES REGARDING DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION
Disputes about the disclosure of information are to be referred to the CCMA for conciliation232
failing which the dispute should be resolved through arbitration.233 According to section 16(10)
the commissioner must first determine if the information in issue is relevant or not. This brings
about the issue of the onus. The trade union party will usually have to prove the relevance of the
information while the employer may plead either irrelevance or limitation of disclosure on any of
the grounds stated in section 16(5).234 If the commissioner decides that the information is relevant
and that it is information contemplated in subsection (5)(c) and (d), the employer must balance
the interest of disclosure of information and the likely harm that might ensue. This is called the
balance of harm test, which finds its origins in the jurisprudence of discovery. In determining the
appropriateness of disclosure, the courts would strike a proper balance between the conflicting
interests of the parties concerned. Jordaan235  states that:
‘[T]his balance of harm test involves a weighing up by the commissioner of the harm which disclosure is likely
to cause to the employer, against the ability of the shop steward to perform his or her duties in terms of section 14
(4) or the ability of the union to engage effectively in consultation.’
If the commissioner decides that the balance of harm favours the disclosure of information, such
could be on certain conditions designed to limit the harm likely to be caused to the employee and
employer.236 In making a decision on the basis of subsection 12, the commissioner may take into
account any past breach of confidentiality at the workplace and may on the basis of this
assessment refuse disclosure of the information stated in the arbitration award. Although section
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238  In Van Niekerk  v Pretoria City Council 1997 (3) SA 839 (TPD) at 848 (A-C) where the issue
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information by relying on section 23 of the Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993.
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could obtain the information through discovery (848D). Cameron J stated that respondent’s argument was an
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hands of the employer without having to rely on the LRA.
16(5) may appear to provide protection for employers, close analysis reveals that in fact it
provides employees with grounds to challenge the employer’s refusal  to disclose information. If
an employer refuses to disclose information because he claims that such information is protected
from disclosure according to section 16(5), section 16(6) gives the employees an opportunity to
prove the relevance of the information and challenge the basis upon which the employer seeks to
protect the information under section 16(5). Employees’ right to challenge a refusal to disclose
information indicates that section 16 is consistent with the aim of ensuring that employees are not
in the dark when they participate in the decision-making process. Clearly, employers have limited
grounds upon which they can refuse to disclose information which can be seen as a limitation on
management prerogative in favour of employee participation in decision-making. 
4.7 CONCLUSION
It is interesting to note that there may be other additional mechanisms to section 16, which may
be utilized to obtain information from the employer. For instance, the Constitution of the Republic
of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 provides for a right of access to information at section
32(1)(b)237 which may be sought to exercise the right to engage in collective bargaining in section
23(5) of the constitution.238 Other channels would include using information available to
shareholders which can be obtained by an astute trade union. However, section 16 and other
provisions of the LRA limit and regulate the right to information and the Labour Courts may not
readily use procedural sections and other laws to extend the rights to disclosure.
It is very significant that the right to disclosure of information has been provided for in the Act,
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because it will ensure that employee participation in decision-making is set on the right
foundation. All the other mechanisms of participation which are provided for, rest on the
availability of information which will empower employees to participate constructively in the
decision-making process. It must be remembered that in labour relations perceptions play a vital
role. Employees may not trust the employer’s position because the employer is perceived to have
all the information about the establishment at his disposal. Disclosure is therefore vital if the
perceptions of mistrust are to be reduced so that collective bargaining and consultation are not
delayed by perceptions founded on ignorance. This also implies that it will be important for
employers to be forthcoming with information, if information disclosure is indeed going to
support employee participation in decision-making. A study done by Grossett239 in 1997 reveals
very interesting trends on the perceptions of management to disclosure of company information
to employees. The aim of the research was to investigate the implications of disclosure of
company information to employees and establish the extent to which the LRA would meet its
main objectives of facilitating collective bargaining and promote employee participation in
decision-making. The research reveals that information which is viewed as sensitive240  by
management is poorly disclosed while less sensitive information241 was well disclosed. It is
interesting to note that the study reveals that employers are not prepared to disclose information
on remuneration received by directors.242 The reasons apparently are that such information is
sensitive and may be misinterpreted and that issues on remuneration are private and will serve no
purpose if revealed to the public. The reluctance to disclose such information, which is usually at
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the centre of the financial viability of a company, points to the problem of perceptions that has to
be overcome by both employers and employees. Clearly, employers will have to learn to utilize
the statutory limitations to disclosure instead of reluctance based on their own perception of what
is good and not good to disclose. Employers are also said to be reluctant to disclose information
on mergers and take-overs. This is ironic because employees are to be consulted on these matters
under section 84(1)(d). 
Employees on the other hand are said to have a problem of not understanding the information
disclosed and this is largely blamed on the high level of illiteracy amongst them.243 It is hoped that
the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998244 will assist in the acquisition of skills by employees,
which will help them to understand information disclosed. Furthermore, this poses a challenge to
trade unions to train their members for employee participation and, after all, nothing stops the
employees from employing the services of an expert to assist them in analysing the information.
In spite of the factors which may militate against ready disclosure of information on the part of
employers and the risk of information being misinterpreted by employees, the disclosure of
information will result in improved industrial relations and hopefully translate into employee
participation in decision-making.
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CHAPTER 5
 
CONSULTATION PRIOR TO DISMISSALS FOR OPERATIONAL
REQUIREMENTS.
5.1 INTRODUCTION
Amongst the three grounds for dismissal, none is as relevant to employee participation as the
dismissal for operational requirements. Section 189 of the LRA regulates the dismissal for
operational requirements sometimes known as retrenchment. This section provides for extensive
consultation before such dismissal may be effected and it is the extensive consultation which
makes retrenchment relevant to employee participation in decision-making. Another reason for
its relevance may be found in the rationale for the extensive consultation of employees on
dismissal based on operational requirements and not in the other kinds of dismissals. The first
aspect of this rationale is that one of the purposes of the LRA is to promote employee
participation in decision-making in the workplace245 and retrenchment is one of those subjects for
which workplace forums are to be consulted on.246 The second lies in the nature of this type of
dismissal, section 213 defines operational requirements as:
‘[R]equirements based on the economic, technological, structural or similar needs of an employer.’
From the above definition it is clear that this dismissal is based on the economic needs of the
employer and not on the fault of the employee.247 This raises a threat to the job security248 of
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with a particular employer: see Hendry v Adcock Ingram (supra) at 92 A-C and Visser v South African Institute
For Medical Research (1998) 9 BLLR 979 (LC) at 980G.
249  Grogan JWorkplace Law 3 ed (1998) p 159 writes: ‘ while employers have an undoubted right to do
so for economic, technical or structural reasons, this form of termination, generally known as retrenchment has
the same social and economic ill-effects as other dismissals, often on a greater scale. In addition, dismissal on the
ground of the employer’s economic needs differs...in the sense that employees affected are economically active and
may have impeccable service and are still able to do so.’
250  Section 27(1).
251  Landman A ‘Unfair Dismissal: The new rules for capital punishment in the workplace’ (1996) 6 CLL
p 52.
252  Atlantis Diesel Engines (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA (1995) 1 BLLR 1 (AD) at 5 A where it was stated that:
‘[C]onsultation satisfies principle because it gives effect to the desire of employees who may be affected to be
heard,....where retrenchment looms employees face the daunting prospect of losing their employment through no
fault of theirs. This can have serious consequences and threaten industrial peace. Proper consultation minimises
resentment and promotes greater harmony in the workplace.’
253  LRA 28 of 1956.
254  Section 1 (1)(i) of the LRA 28 of 1956 provided for a definition of unfair labour practice and the
termination of an employee’s employment for operational requirements was deemed to be unfair unless such
employees which has to be balanced with the right that employers have to dismiss for operational
requirements.249 Since employees have been granted protection against unfair labour practices by
the constitution,250 consultation becomes important in ensuring fairness in retrenchment.251 As it
was succinctly put by Smalberger JA, consultation promotes industrial peace.252 In fact, it was
through the retrenchment jurisprudence developed under the LRA 28 of 1956 that most of the
principles of employee participation were developed, emphasising the relevance of this enquiry.
In examining the relevance of consultation prior to dismissal for operational requirements, the
following matters are discussed: the nature of consultation under section189; commencement of
consultation; sufficiency of consultation; parties to be consulted; substantive fairness and topics
for consultation; and disclosure of information.
5.2 NATURE OF CONSULTATION UNDER SECTION 189
Consultation under section 189 has its foundation in the jurisprudence developed under the LRA
28 of 1956. Section 46(9)253 gave the Industrial Court the power to make determinations arising
out of unfair labour practice disputes.254 It was on the basis of the unfair labour practice
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evaluation of the fairness of retrenchment: see Shezi and Others v Consolidated Frame Cotton Corporation (1984)
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255  (1993) 14 ILJ 642 (LAC) at 650 A-C. 
256  (1994) 15 ILJ 1274 (A) at 1252 C-D where the Judges of Appeal said: ‘[C]onsultation requires more
than merely affording an employee an opportunity to comment or express an opinion on a decision already made.
It envisages a final decision being taken by management only after there has been consultation in good faith.’
257  (1997) 9 BLLR 1186 (LC) at 1201D-E.
jurisdiction that the Labour Appeal Court pronounced on the nature of consultation in
retrenchment where in National Union of Metal Workers of SA v Atlantis Diesel Engines (Pty)
Ltd255 the court said the following:
‘It simply means that an employer who senses that it might have to retrench employees in order to meet operational
objectives must consult with the employees likely to be affected at the earliest opportunity in order to advise them
of the possibility of retrenchment and the reason for it. The employees or their representatives must then be invited
to suggest ways of avoiding termination of employment, and should be placed in a position in which they are able
to participate meaningfully in such discussions. The employer should in all good faith keep an open mind
throughout and seriously consider the proposals put forward.’ 
The foregoing view of what consultation under retrenchment means, was later endorsed by the
Appellate Division in Atlantis Diesel Engines v National Union of Metal Workers of South
Africa.256 Section 189 may therefore be seen as a codification of the interpretation of consultation
under the foregoing cases. However, consultation required under section 189 has been interpreted
as going further than what was stated in the Atlantis Diesel cases. In Chemical Workers Industrial
Union v Johnson and Johnson ( Pty) Ltd257 Zondo J said:
‘Whatever the legal position was under the old Act before and after Atlantis Diesel Engines, I am of the opinion
that the duty to consult under the new Act quite clearly goes beyond an employer simply having to give employees
or a representative trade union an opportunity to make representations which the employer is free to accept or reject
with or without proper consideration and with or without good reason. In my view this conclusion is inevitable if
one has regard to the specific provisions of section 189(6) in general but those of s189(1), (2), (5) and (6) in
particular.’
The nature of consultation in this section therefore seems to require both the employer and
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debate, as Van Niekerk SM et al in NUMSA v Atlantis Diesel Engines (Pty) Ltd (1992) 13 ILJ 405 (IC) adopted
a two stage approach to retrenchment, the first consisting of the actual decision to retrench which was for
management only and the second which was the implementation of management’s decision at which consultation
is necessary. However, Fagan DJP in the LAC in NUMSA v Atlantis Diesel Engines supra note 255 rejected the
two-stage process, because to him there was no dividing line between the decision to retrench and the
implementation of that decision.  according. In fact the AD in Atlantis Diesel Engines supra note 252 stated that
once the possible need for retrenchment is identified and before a final decision to retrench ( being when an
employer perceives or recognises that the business is falling or ailing, considers the need to remedy the situation,
identifies retrenchment as one possible remedy) consultation should commence. The impression is created that the
employer’s perception should be established on a ‘subjective’ basis. However, there is clearly a need for prompt
notice which cannot be served by a subjective evaluation which is not limited by some objective standard of
reasonableness.
261  (1998) 19 ILJ 314 (LC).
employees who will be affected to seriously engage each other on the decision to retrench,
particularly because this process has to be exhaustive.258 This is a further inroad into managerial
prerogative and a recognition that employee participation in decision-making is important in
retrenchment.259
5.3 COMMENCEMENT OF CONSULTATION 
Section 189 (1) states that when an employer contemplates dismissing one or more employees,
consultation must commence. The stage at which employees are involved in decision-making is
very important in determining the effectiveness of consultation. According to the Act, consultation
should take place before a final decision is taken.260 The LC has provided an indication of when
consultation is to begin in two recent decisions, in Ellias v Germiston Uitgewer (Pty) Ltd t/a
Evalulab261 where the applicant had been dismissed by the respondent without timeous
consultation as required by section 189, thereby denying applicant an opportunity to make
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suggestions on means to avoid or provide alternatives to dismissal. On the issue of procedural
fairness the court referred to decisions based on the LRA 1956, and particularly to the decision
of the AD in Atlantis Diesel Engines case which emphasized the need for consultation once the
possible need for retrenchment was identified and before the final decision to retrench was taken.
The court decided that the respondent had failed to consult timeously with the applicant as was
prescribed by section 189. A case which provides a test for when consultation should commence
is Opperman v Speck Pumps SA (Pty) Ltd.262  There the applicant had been retrenched after
respondent had decided to out-source some of its production activities. Applicant attacked some
of respondent’s production activities and his retrenchment on the basis that a proper procedure
had not been followed.  In deciding that the dismissal was procedurally unfair, Revelas J263 said:
‘Section 189 (1) of the LRA requires the employer to consult with an employee when he or she “contemplates”
retrenching that employee. To determine at what stage the decision to retrench was taken or when it was
contemplated, is indeed a difficult task and I do not believe that the test to determine that question is a subjective
one.  I believe it is an objective test.’264
It is evident that management is still expected to exercise its management prerogative of initially
evaluating and deciding what options they have. However, the decision whether to opt for
retrenchment is not entirely theirs, because as soon as the option of retrenchment becomes
relevant, it is obligatory to involve employees in the decision-making process through consultation
until the final decision is taken. Even if there is no agreement, the very fact that employees are
involved in exploring some options is very significant in limiting the management prerogative and
enhancing participation in decision-making in the workplace. A case in point in this regard is MCI
Staff Committee and Others v Midland Chamber of Industries,265 where the respondent, a service
organisation registered as a section 21 company, made an application for the winding-up of its
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operations as their books showed a deficit. They were then duly liquidated. The respondent
thereafter informed the affected employees that retrenchment was unavoidable and requested the
affected employees to appoint a committee to represent them during the consultation process.
Eleven meetings were held after which retrenchments were effected. One of the points raised in
the application was that their retrenchments were unfair because the respondent had failed to hold
bona fide consultations. The court held that, the retrenchments of the individual applicants were
unfair in that the respondent failed to give proper notice of the impending retrenchments, to
involve it in the consultation prior to the decision to liquidate, and to pay severance benefits.
Passing judgment, the presiding officer Brand SM266 commented on when consultation should
begin and what constitutes sufficient notice to commence consultation:
‘The question of when notice should be given or should have been given by the employer must therefore be
determined not only by a subjective interpretation of the employer’s perception which is not limited by some
objective standard of reasonableness..... It would therefore not be fair to judge the sufficiency of the notice without
referring to the extent and scope of the consultation process. Management and the workforce should put their heads
together before retrenchment becomes a reality because that is the best time to address the reasons for possible
retrenchment and to seek alternatives to it.’
In this case the employees were only involved in the consultation process after the decision to
retrench had already been taken and as such this affected the fairness of the consultation process.
Early involvement of affected employees before retrenchment becomes a reality, is the correct
point to commence consultation.
5.4 SUFFICIENCY OF CONSULTATION
It is important to state from the outset that section 189 establishes a relationship of rights and
duties, where employees have a right to be consulted and the employer a duty to consult.267This
clearly spells out that consultation under this section cannot be circumvented under any
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circumstances.268  A case that can illustrate this point is Van Der Merwe and Others v McDuling
Motors269 where the applicants, complained that they were unfairly dismissed in the sense that they
were retrenched from their employment with the respondent and that the procedures required by
the LRA were not complied with.  Although the respondent had been aware of the duty to consult
with the representative trade union prior to retrenching its employees, it had merely written to the
trade union to inform it of its intention to do so, and had not replied to its request for information.
It then entered into private negotiations with its employees, including the applicants, and
purported to conclude an agreement with them. In his judgment, Landman J stated that:
‘I think I should say at the outset, as I said in the case of Anna Bekker (Vogel) v National Air (1998)2 BLLR (LC),
that situations can be envisaged where a short cut can be taken and where an employer and employees who are
going to be subject to retrenchment may simply agree that this is the end of the matter, that it is a foregone
conclusion and simply reach a settlement agreement. However, as was said in that case, the court is reluctant to
come to such a conclusion, particularly where section 189(1)(c) of the Act requires there to be proper consultation
between the employer and the union representing employees who may well be retrenched; where that section
requires information to be discovered in writing; where it requires representations to be considered, and if
retrenchment cannot be avoided, for it to be effected according to agreed criteria or where they have been agreed
by fair and objective criteria.’270 
Landman J elaborated on the aims of the LRA in relation to consultation, when he stated that:
‘The aim of the LRA is to protect the rights of inter alia employees and to ensure that fair labour practices are
followed. One of the ways of ensuring this is by seeing to it that employees are properly represented at grievance
procedures, at disciplinary inquiries and in potential retrenchment situations. I am convinced that had the
applicants been properly represented by the union they may have negotiated better packages than these that were
paid to them.’271 
Therefore, employers and employees are expected to consult unless employees waive their right
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to be consulted.272
In determining the sufficiency of consultation, there should be a preference for a purposive
interpretation of section 189, which requires constructive participation in consultation and mutual
respect from both employees and employers inter se.273  This approach stems from section 189
which states that the consulting parties must attempt to reach consensus.  This section requires
both parties to make an effort to reach an agreement where possible, which shows that sufficient
consultation should be a two-way process.274  The two-way approach was adopted in Benjamin
and Others v Plessey Tellumat SA Ltd275 where in deciding that the dismissal was procedurally
and substantively fair, the presiding officer noted that the employee representatives had adopted
a negative attitude towards consultation, as they did not put forward any counter-proposals on
the application of the selection criteria. In this regard Basson J stated that:
‘Consultation, of course, remains a two-way street where both parties must give their full cooperation in the quest
for consensus on these very sensitive matters. After all, section 189(2) of the Act makes it clear that both consulting
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parties must attempt to reach consensus on matters such as the method for selecting employees to be dismissed.’276
If any party fails to participate constructively in the two-way process of consultation, that party
has itself to blame for the outcome.277 All that this shows is that the consultation process must be
goal-oriented and that co-operation must be more prominent in the process although a little dose
of adversarialism should not be ruled out. Certainly in these circumstances employee participation
is going to thrive.
The question therefore is when can an employer decide that sufficient consultation has been
reached, particularly if there is no agreement in the consultation process after several attempts at
reaching consensus.  This can be answered through an analysis of the most recent decisions of the
Labour Court on this matter.
In Chemical Workers Industrial Union v Johnson and Johnson (Pty ) Ltd278 where respondent,
a subsidiary based in South Africa, faced stiff competition from other competitors in the market.
Management consequently conducted a study which indicated that they had to utilize better
technology and stop production of one of their products. As such a number of their employees
had to be retrenched. Management then commenced consultation with the applicant union.
Initially applicant was requested to consider the implications of the state of affairs of respondent.
Several meetings were held in an attempt to commence consultation, but applicant insisted on
being given an opportunity to consult its constituency in order to obtain a mandate to be part of
the consultation process. After several requests by the respondent for the consultation process to
proceed, applicant wrote a letter to respondent requesting financial information. This information
was made available for inspection by a party agreeable to both parties and the report was
thereafter accepted by both parties. The applicant then requested that there be a moratorium on
retrenchment, which respondent rejected.  From that point on there was no consultation with the
respondent. Seeing that applicant was insisting on the moratorium on retrenchment and refused
to consult further, respondent proceeded to select the employees to be retrenched and decided
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on the severance package and the timing for the dismissal.
The issue before the court was that the dismissal of applicant’s members constituted an unfair
dismissal as per section 185 of the LRA 66 of 1995. The basis for this was that respondent had
failed to follow a fair procedure before dismissing the workers. According to the applicant,
respondent failed to consult with the applicant on the selection criteria as well as on the severance
pay.
In his judgment Zondo AJ endeavoured to explain what consultation under section 189 means.
The judge was of the view that the provisions of section 189(1) should not be read in isolation
but must be read together with the rest of the subsections. Section 189(2) is important in relation
to what the duty to consult prior to retrenchment entails.279 Th  court then held that, since
respondent had not consulted the applicant on the selection criteria and severance payment, it had
failed to discharge its duty to consult. On the issue of sufficient consultation Zondo AJ said:
‘I am of the view that an employer must endeavour to reach consensus with the other consulting party as to when
the consultation would begin and by when it should have been completed so that everyone knows the time frame.
In the end the employer is the party that drives the consultation process because it knows by when the business
would be seriously prejudiced if neither a viable alternative to retrenchment nor the retrenchment was
implemented.  For that reason the final decision as to when the consultation process ends rests with the employer
if no agreement has been reached on that. But in that event, it is incumbent on the employer to take necessary steps
to leave the other consulting party in no doubt as to when the employer intends to make all decisions that need to
be made to deal with the financial or economic situation or survival of the enterprise so that should the other
consulting party fail to utilise the opportunity prior the deadline, it cannot later complain if the employer proceeds
to make those decisions without its input.’280
In this case Zondo AJ shows that sufficient consultation means the holistic application of section
189, so that failed consultation on other aspects (for instance the selection criteria and severance
package in this case) of the section may result in failure to consult.  However, if the affected
employees refuse to proceed with consultation because they feel that retrenchment can be
avoided, while the employer feels otherwise, the employer can continue with the retrenchment
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process.  In these circumstances the employer is expected to keep the employees informed about
the unfolding process and the door open in case the employees wish to return to the consultation
process.
This seems to have been the case in National Education Health and Allied Workers Union v
University of Fort Hare281 where there was an urgent application for an interdict on the basis that
the respondent had not complied with the provisions of section 189(1) to189(4) read with section
16 of the LRA 66 of 1995. The facts in this case are that respondent found itself in financial
difficulties which threatened its very survival. Realizing this, the respondent gave workers on its
campus an invitation to come and discuss the restructuring process of the respondent.
Representatives of applicant in the first meeting requested to consult with its constituency to
obtain a mandate. At the next meeting after consultation with the constituency, there was no
discussion on substantive matters of the retrenchment process, as the parties disagreed on who
was to chair the consultation process. Applicant told the respondent in no uncertain terms that
if there was no agreement on the chairperson, then it would not participate in the consultation
process. Although respondent attempted to persuade the applicant to return to the consultation
process several times, this was not to be. Respondent then proceeded with the consultation
process together with the other employees who were not members of applicant. One
distinguishing factor from the Johnson and Johnson case is that respondent in the present case
informed the applicant of the unfolding process which adhered to section 189(2) in that all the
issues in this subsection were to be discussed. Furthermore, the respondent was committed to
disclosing information to the applicant upon request in terms of section 189(3) read together with
section 16.
The court then held that since the respondent was in serious financial problems and that it was
imperative that the process of restructuring be started and be finalised in the shortest possible
time, in the circumstances, it had discharged its duty to consult. In this case, as in the Johnson and
Johnson case, the workers had not participated in the decision on the selection criteria and
severance payment. The distinguishing point is that the workers were kept informed of the
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decision the employer was making on every matter for consultation.  The opportunity was open
to them to participate in the consultation process and they chose not to. As was stated by Zondo
AJ in Johnson and Johnson case, the employees only have themselves to blame if they do not
participate in the consultation process when given an opportunity.
In this case Zondo AJ suggested that sufficient consultation may be achieved even where
employees refuse to be party to the consultation and the employer simply outlines the process in
compliance with the provisions of section 189(1) to 189(4). What is important is that the
employer must address all the matters outlined in section 189(2).
In United People’s Union of South Africa and Others v Grinakers Duraset282 the applicant
alleged that the respondent did not comply with section 189 because it did not honour a collective
agreement, and failed to consult with the first applicant or with the employees about the
retrenchment in general or the selection criteria in particular. It was further argued by the
applicant that the employer had no good reason to retrench the applicant members, and failed to
comply with a further agreement that it would re-employ them as and when jobs became available.
One of the bases for this application was that the respondent failed to consult over the selection
criteria and the severance pay. From the facts it is clear that there was mention of the LIFO
principle in the meetings that the parties held although, ultimately the respondent decided without
the applicant on the selection criteria. Grogan AJ in distinguishing this case from the Johnson and
Johnson case says that the employer was in that case taken to task on the very same issue as was
before this court. The difference as he observed was that the respondent in this case ultimately
decided to apply a retrenchment procedure that had been given to the first applicant. Grogan AJ
proceeded to state that once the employer has consulted as required by the law, the ultimate
decision to retrench falls within the competence of management. One interesting point that
Grogan AJ makes is that both parties to the consultation process must attempt to reach consensus
on the various matters enumerated under section 189(2). This dispels the one-sided notion that
it is the employer who has to meet the needs of the employees. In fact in his judgment Grogan
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AJ 283 went on to say:
‘[T]he obligation to consult placed on the employer by section 189 places a correlative duty on the other consulting
party to co-operate in the attempt to reach consensus before the employer exercises its right to take the final
decision.’
This confirms the view by Zondo AJ that when employees are given an opportunity to consult by
an employer according to section 189 and they refuse to participate, and the employer then makes
the final decision, they have themselves to blame for not participating in that decision. 
From these decisions it becomes apparent that sufficient consultation is achieved if the employer
consults in accordance with section 189(1)to 189(4) read together with section 16. Where there
is disagreement leading to employees refusing to consult, the employer can proceed with the
retrenchment process without the employees. But it is important that the employees be informed
about the process and decisions being taken and that the door be left open for the employees to
return to the consultation process. This is in line with the exhaustive nature of consultation
required under section 189. Clearly, therefore, employees have an obligation to co-operate as
much as possible in the consultation process. This should not suggest that adversarialism is not
to be expected. However, employees should guard against engaging in dilatory tactics which
usually result in employees having to accept decisions which are very detrimental to them.
5.5  PARTIES TO BE CONSULTED
Section 189(1) clearly identifies the parties to be consulted in a hierarchical order with each
excluding its successor if it is applicable.284 Section 189(1)(a) provides that the employer is
required to consult any person in terms of a collective agreement and section 213 defines a
collective agreement as:
‘[A] written agreement concerning terms and conditions of employment or any other matter of mutual interest
concluded by one or more registered trade unions.’
Furthermore section 23(1)(a) grants collective agreements legal force in so far as parties to it are
concerned. It follows then that the entity to be consulted under a collective agreement is almost
inevitably the trade union party to the agreement.  A case in point here is SA Polymer Holdings
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(Pty) Ltd t/a v Llale and Others285 where the question was raised by the appellant's counsel, as
to whether an employer who consults or negotiates with the union recognised as the
representative of a bargaining unit over a pending retrenchment also needs to consult with
individual members who are not union members within that unit.286  T e court ruled that the
employer was only duty bound to give notice to the non-union members at risk of retrenchment
and that these employees should be offered an opportunity to make whatever representations
could have been made on their behalf to avert the decision. This position does not seem to accord
with section 189(1)(a) if given a literal interpretation. However if a purposive interpretation is
adopted, such employees may be consulted since one of the purposes of the Act is to promote
employee participation in retrenchment proceedings.  Therefore the views expressed by the Judge
in the SA Polymer Holdings case, should be preferred as they make consultation necessary of non-
unionised employees who might be affected by retrenchment. Although the LRA is based on the
principle of majoritarianism287 the unfairness that may result from the non-consultation of the
employees who are not union members is limited by the purposive interpretation of the Act which
amongst other purposes seeks to promote employee participation in decision-making. 
 
Section 189(1)(b) provides that in the absence of a collective agreement, the employer must
consult a workplace forum and this is also supported by section 84(1).288 However, the
workplace forum must be consulted if the workers likely to be affected are employees as defined
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by section 78(a).289 Section 79(a) provides that the forums must seek to promote the interests
of all employees in the workplace. Although the workplace forums should serve the interests of
all employees in the workplace, there is always a possibility of the forum being dominated by the
majority trade union which initiated it, thus practically ensuring that only their members benefit
from the consultation process.290 This would create a problem particularly where a minority trade
union has a collective agreement with the employer, according to which they would have to be
consulted as per section 189(1)(a).  Du Toit et al point out to the anomaly that may be caused
by this section, when they write:
‘While the intention to give primacy to collective bargaining is commendable, the section may lead to anomalous
results. For example, in a workplace with a workplace forum there may be a minority trade union which is entitled
to be consulted in terms of a collective agreement. Section 189(1) can be interpreted to mean that consultation
with a minority trade union will be sufficient because the duty to consult with the workplace forum arises only
in the absence of a collective agreement. In terms of section 84(1)(e), however, the workplace forum is in any
event entitled to be consulted about proposals relating to retrenchments. The letter of the statute may seem to
require the employer to go through two separate consultation exercises. In practice, this may be unworkable and
a joint consultation process with union representatives together with the workplace forum should be sufficient.’
291
The above statement may also provide an answer to the fate of senior managerial employees who
do not fall within the scope covered by workplace forums, in that they would have to be
consulted jointly with the workplace forum if they are also to be affected.
In the absence of a workplace forum section 189(1)(c) provides that an employer must consult
any registered trade union whose members are likely to be affected by the proposed dismissal.
From this provision it does not appear that any degree of representativity is required before
consultation can commence, the only requirement apart from registration is that members of the
union must be affected.292 According to this section, in the absence of a workplace forum, the
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employer must consult not just with any trade union but one whose members are likely to be
affected by the proposed dismissals. This interpretation raises a problem because, how is
‘affected’ to be interpreted.  It is possible that a trade union may advance its own reasons to
prove that its members will be affected. After all the employer will not know exactly who will
finally be affected until the consultation process has begun and alternatives discussed. So that
until the consultation process has begun, all employees may claim that they will be affected.
Section 189(1)(d) states that in the absence of a trade union,293 the employer must consult
employees likely to be affected or their representatives nominated for that purpose. The only
difficulty with this section is the unqualified use of the term 'representative', the question being
whether a legal representative is included in the definition. The Eastern Cape Division of the
Supreme Court attempted to answer this question in Ibhayi City Council v Yantolo.294 The court
in this case dealt with a certain clause in staff regulations which was to the effect that an
employee, at a disciplinary enquiry, had the right to be heard 'either personally or through a
representative'. Concerning the meaning of representative, the following was stated:
‘[A]s there was no rule of natural justice or rule of practice in labour matters that determined that the word
representative where it was not qualified, had to be interpreted to mean lay representation only, there was no
reason  so to restrict the meaning of the word as it was used in the staff regulations’.295
However, upon further reading of the Act, the following are representatives under section 189
(1) (d) a legal practitioner, a co-employee, a member or an office-bearer of that party’s trade
union. After all, what is important is that the representative must have been nominated for that
purpose and must have been authorized to represent that employee specifically in the
retrenchment proceedings.
There appears to be uncertainty when it comes to the application of section 189(1). For instance,
subsection (1)(a) does not specify whether the employer is also required to consult with affected
employees who are not covered by a collective agreement. Likewise, a similar question arises in
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respect of subsection (1)(c) as to whether the employer who consults the trade union must also
consult with non-unionised employees likely to be affected by the proposed retrenchment.
However, since the Act is very clear on the fact that all dismissals must be fair procedurally and
substantively, a purposive interpretation should dictate that all employees likely to be affected
must be consulted.296 The purposive interpretation of the duty to consult with all employees who
may be affected by the retrenchment gives meaning to the fairness which consultation is supposed
to achieve. Therefore, if section 189(1) is to enhance employee participation in decision-making,
this interpretation should be adopted. In fact, in the UK, an employer is expected to consult
representatives of each recognised union according to section 188 of the Employment Protection
Act of 1975 and it applies whether an employee is a union member or not.297
5.6 SUBSTANTIVE FAIRNESS AND TOPICS FOR CONSULTATION
The procedural fairness of a dismissal for operational requirements is linked to the substantive
fairness of such decision.298 The link is a further motivation for the parties to the consultation
process to consult properly. In fact the employer has all the more reason to seek the participation
of the employees in the decision to retrench. The LAC has long shown that the court can inquire
into the fairness of a dismissal.299  This is in part due to the recognition of technological
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advancement, the development of employee participation and other policies in the workplace
which favour greater democratisation in the workplace.300 There is also a realisation that
employees have a lot to contribute particularly in the termination of their employment, in CWIU
v Sopelog301 the court held that while it was not unfair for an employer to conclude that
retrenchment was prima facie necessary, it should not take a final immutable decision to retrench
and thereby close its mind on the question prior to consultation. The purpose of consultation is
to explore options identified by the employer, to solicit further options from the employees and
their representatives, and to consider them seriously. Failure to consult properly may lead to
failure to canvass the need or reasons to retrench and to substantiate the fact that there was a
reason to retrench. The fact that substantive fairness of retrenchment is linked to the consultation
process is another indication of the importance of employee participation in decision-making. The
link between substantive fairness and procedural fairness is further established by the topics for
consultation.
Section 189(2) provides for the topics for consultation. This section indicates that employers and
employees are given an opportunity to engage in exhaustive consultation which may result in the
retrenchments not being carried out or if carried out, that better packages for employees may be
negotiated. The importance of this section is that it indicates the nature of the decisions which
employees have to participate in, demonstrating the real extent of employee participation in
decision-making.
5.6.1. Appropriate means to avoid dismissals (s 189(2)(a)(i)
The Act grants an opportunity for both employers and employees to seek solutions which will
result in the avoidance of dismissals.302 In this regard workers are expected to make
representations regarding alternatives to the employers' proposals.  This ensures that an employer
does not consult with a resolve that retrenchment is definitely going to happen. Rather there is
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an expectation that the employer should keep an open mind and seek ways with employees to
avoid retrenchment.  This gives a very strong focus to the consultation process, as it militates
against the notion that the employer has the right to make the final decision to retrench based on
his subjective assessment of the state of the company.303
5.6.2  Appropriate measures to minimise the number of dismissals (s189(2)(a)(ii))
If  the alternatives of the employees are not acceptable, there should be means to minimize the
number of dismissals. This may result in a decision to dismiss an absolute minimum of employees.
The significance of this section (189(2)(a)(ii) is that even if the workers cannot agree with the
employer on avoiding the dismissals, they could still be influential in ensuring that as few workers
as possible are dismissed. After all there is a general duty on an employer to minimize the
possible termination of employment.304
5.6.3  Appropriate measures to change the timing of the dismissals (s 189(2)(iii))
When the employer initiates consultation with employees, an indication of the timing of the
dismissals will be reflected. It should be possible for the timing of dismissals to be changed so
as to allow suggestions of alternatives and analysis of information made available to the
employees in the consultation process. Thus the employees may request an alteration in the
timing of the retrenchment. It may well be the case that the change in timing provides for
extensive consultation which may result in a solution to the dismissals, thereby saving workers
their jobs or there being a positive change in the success of the business. In employee
participation timing is very important, because it may allow genuine consultation to take place
and for greater influence on the employer's decision.
5.6.4  Appropriate measures to mitigate the adverse effects of the dismissals (s 189(2)(a)(iv))
This provision presupposes that at the point that retrenchment is seen to be the inevitable option
both employers and employees should attempt to secure means which will mitigate the adverse
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306  In explaining the importance of disclosure in the retrenchment context, Grogan op cit note 249 p167
writes that: ‘There can be no question of adequate consultation over a proposal if one of the parties is left in the
dark about the reasons for and the facts which justify it. In the retrenchment context, employees or their
representatives will clearly not be able to make sensible suggestions about the matter over which the LRA enjoins
consultation unless they have sufficient information to appraise or challenge the employer’s proposals or to
formulate alternatives.’
effects on the employees. These may include alternative employment and a right of preferential
recruitment when suitable vacancies arise.305 This kind of an agreement is buttressed by item
2(1)(d) of Schedule 7, which provides that it would be a residual unfair labour practice for an
employer who fails or refuses to reinstate or re-employ a former employee in terms of any
agreement.
The section further provides for consultation on the method for selecting the employees to be
dismissed section189(2)(b) and the severance pay for dismissed employees section189(2)(c).
The Act, through the above topics, gives meaning to the consultation process ensuring that
substantive issues are negotiated and employees are able to influence the decision-making
process on a range of issues which go to the core of dismissal for operational requirements.
Therefore, according to section 189(2), before the employer could finally decide on
retrenchment, his decision would have been affected by the input of employees which is ideally
supposed to be the consequence of employee participation in decision-making.
5.7 DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION
Disclosure of information has already been discussed under chapter 4 and most of the comments
made on the subject apply in this context. However, section 189(3) provides for disclosure of
information under dismissal for operational requirements.306  This section provides that the
employer must disclose in writing to the other consulting party all relevant information and goes
on to outline the following specific information which must be disclosed: the reasons for the
proposed dismissals; the alternatives that the employer considered before proposing the
dismissals, and the reasons for rejecting each of those alternatives; the number of employees
likely to be affected and the job categories in which they are employed; the proposed method for
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307  NEWU and Others v Mintroad Saw Mills (Pty) Ltd supra note 268 at 166J-167A-C, Grogan AJ states
that this requirement does not mean that the employer must also physically deliver over all supporting documents
of which the other party may demand sight.
308  Ibid at 167B, Grogan AJ states: ‘ To my mind, disclosure of potentially confidential documents on the
employers’ premises and subject to the condition that copies can only be made with permission satisfies sec.189(3),
as read with section 16.’
309  (1997) 5 BLLR 589 (LC) at 597 F-H.
selecting which employees to dismiss; the time when, or the period during which, the dismissals
are likely to take effect; the severance pay proposed; any assistance that the employer proposes
to offer to the employees likely to be dismissed; and the possibility of the future re-employment
of the employees who are dismissed. This section goes to prove that the employer’s reasons for
proposing retrenchment must be evaluated in order to establish substantive fairness of the
dismissal.
In the first instance, the information to be disclosed must be in writing.307 Th s mea s that mere
verbal disclosure will not suffice. Although the section outlines the information to be disclosed,
it does not necessarily limit disclosure to that information. For a proper understanding of section
189(3) it must be read with section 16(3) and section 16(5).  The employer is entitled to decline
disclosure of the following categories of information: legally privileged information, confidential
information likely to cause substantial harm,308 private and personal information relating to an
employee and information which may not lawfully be disclosed.
5.7.1 The appropriate standard of relevance
It has to be acknowledged that even in the absence of bad faith on the part of the employer, the
information it selects to disclose may not support a different conclusion from the one to which
it arrived at prior to consultation. Consultation based on information supplied by one party will
only motivate that particular party's point of view whereas a general disclosure of information
may yield a different result. In articulating what relevant information is under retrenchment
Mlambo AJ in NUMSA and Others v Comark Holdings (Pty) Ltd309 observes that:
‘Because an employer is always privy to all necessary and relevant information it should not only disclose
information which it deems relevant. It should disclose all information requested by the consulted party subject
to the limitations enunciated. To enable employee representatives to fulfill their duty to seek alternatives through
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311  For limitations on disclosure see Chapter 4 above.
312  Op cit note 281.
313  Atlantis Diesel Engines case (AD) p 2 C-D supra note 252 where the AD correctly stated that:
‘consultation was aimed at explaining the reasons for the proposed retrenchment, hearing representations
concerning possible ways of avoiding retrenchment or softening its effects and discussing alternatives, consultation
does not however, require an employer to bargain and the ultimate decision to retrench was the responsibility of
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meaningful and effective consultation, it is necessary to give them an opportunity to consider not only the
information which, in the employer’s view, supports the view that no alternatives to retrenchment exists, but also
other information which the employer has not considered to be relevant but which might be....’
A certain degree of specificity in the request for information by employees is expected, as
employees cannot make a generalised request for information as was stated by Grogan AJ in the
United People’s Union of South Africa case.310 
The principle of determining relevance of information in retrenchment allows an exploration of
economic alternatives which are less harmful to employees.  Such information should be
determined according to whether it is relevant to establishing the need for retrenchment as per
conception of need accepted by either party, but subject to the limitations stated in section 16
(5).311 A union cannot however claim a right to information unreasonably in order to delay a
bona fide retrenchment exercise as was the case in NEHAWU v University of Fort Hare.312  
5.8 WHO MAKES THE FINAL DECISION?
Section 189(5) and189(6) further define the content of the duty to consult in retrenchment, in
terms of which the employer must allow the other consulting party an opportunity during
consultation to make representations. The employer is expected to consider and respond to the
representations, even if it does not agree and reasons for so deciding must be provided.  These
sections support the position that in spite of the strong sense of purpose in insisting on
consultation, it is evident that the ultimate decision will be taken by the employer.313
 
Management still has the right to make the final decision after having consulted, clearly
preserving some management prerogative. The Act seems to suggest that as soon as the
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consultation process has been completed in good faith and the employer still remains convinced
that retrenchment is the option, the employer can take the decision. However, if the decision of
the employer is unfair the Labour Court can enquire  into both the substantive and procedural
fairness of the decision.
5.9 CONCLUSION
An analysis of the whole of section 189 shows that the LRA has provided another opportunity
for employees to participate in the decision-making process. Although consultation under the
section clearly does not require agreement, it is very important to note that the position of the
employees in this process is strong because they have a right to be consulted. Unless they clearly
waive that right to be consulted, the employer has a duty to consult them. To make the
consultation process more focussed and meaningful, it has to be exhaustive and the employer has
to keep an open mind throughout the process. Since employee participation in decision-making
requires co-operation between the parties, employees are also expected to adopt a constructive
approach to the consultation process because it is not a one-sided affair. Employees only have
themselves to blame if they adopt a destructive attitude to the process. That substantive fairness
of the decision to retrench also depends on procedural fairness, provides another motivation for
employers to support employee participation in decision-making. Employers are not only
expected to consult with the employees, but are also required to disclose information in the
consultation process, which eliminates the unnecessary problems of consultation based on
positions which are ill-informed. To the extent that the employer is expected to give reasons for
rejecting the alternatives suggested by the employees, the LRA gives strong support for the
development of employee participation in decision-making.
However, the employer still makes the final decision as part of his management prerogative. But
in doing so, the employer should have provided enough opportunity for the employees to consult
so that his decision may not be attacked for reasons of unfairness. After all it is impossible for
the employer’s decision not to reflect the effect of the extensive consultation with the employees.
All the above provides clear evidence that consultation prior to dismissal for operational
requirements may lead to the achievement of employee participation in decision-making. An
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314  Grogan J Workplace Law 3 ed (1998) p 222 writes that: ‘Collective bargaining may be defined as the
process in terms of which employers and employee collectively seek to reconcile their conflicting goals through
a process of mutual accommodation. Its dynamic is demand and concerns, its objective agreement.’
315  ‘Collective bargaining represents an important, perhaps the most important, means of participation
in  industrial life for many employees. It also carries with it seeds for more sophisticated and participatory forms
of workplace and social regulation...It also serves to broaden and reinforce the base of democratic pluralism’:see
Thompson C et al South African Labour Law vol. 1 (1998) p A1-1.  
316  In Metal and Allied Workers Union v Hart Ltd (1985) 6 ILJ 478 (IC) at 493 H-I: ‘[T]o bargain means
to haggle or wrangle so as to arrive at some agreement on terms of give and take...’
317  Du Toit D et al The Labour Relations Act 1995 2 ed (1998) p 251.
analysis of the whole of section 189 shows that the LRA has generously provided the
opportunity for employees to participate in decisions to retrench. To the extent that the
employees will be able to influence the employer’s decision, employee participation in decision-
making is enhanced.
CHAPTER 6
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION
6.1 INTRODUCTION
Collective bargaining314 is the oldest form of employee participation in decision-making the world
has known,315 although based on adversarialism which is supported by power relations.316 It is
because of the adversarial nature of collective bargaining that there is a school of thought which
holds that collective bargaining has limitations and should be supplemented with more
participative processes in order to achieve real employee participation.317 However, theories of
collective bargaining can clarify the relationship between collective bargaining and employee
participation.
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318  Piron J Collective Bargaining in South African Labour Law (1976) p 4.
319  Ibid Piron writes that this theory has its origin in the history of the United States labour, when the
price list took the place of collective agreements. This list contained the price to be paid for different jobs.
Firstly, according to the marketing theory,318 the relationship between the employer and
employees is regulated by a collective agreement. The employees supply their labour power in
terms of the agreement. This means that employees sell their labour through a common agent
being the trade union and terms and conditions of employment are worked out collectively by
the employees and employers. This turns collective bargaining into a sale of a commodity being
labour power.319
The weakness of this theory is that it does not address the continuing relationship between the
employer and employees. It would seem after the conclusion of the agreement the parties then
disperse. However, another way of understanding this theory is that the collective agreement is
taken as a contractual agreement that will regulate the terms of the employment relationship and
will be binding for a certain period. If the agreement expires the parties can renegotiate a new
agreement which will also cover new situations as they arise. Since the collective agreement will
operate in an institution, continuous interaction between the employer and employees is
necessary to address problems that may arise from the terms of the collective agreement. Usually
this institutional dynamic of collective bargaining is addressed by the creation of joint
management and employee committees, where shop stewards and employers meet to discuss
matters of mutual interest which are covered by the collective agreement. These structures which
regulate the dynamic nature of collective bargaining and joint discussion of matters of mutual
interest which are expressed in collective agreements, explain the relevance of employee
participation in decision-making.
Secondly, according to the constitutional government theory, a collective agreement is the
constitution of the industrial government (constituted by both employers and employees) and
governs the territory which is the workplace covered by the collective agreement. This theory
views collective bargaining as the process of writing the constitution. Accordingly the
constitution conforms to the doctrine of separation of powers in which the legislature is the shop
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and grievance committees. These forums attend to the day-to-day affairs of the workplace and
make decisions which are valid to the extent to which they are consistent with the collective
agreement. Management operates as the executive arm of the government, since it has the right
of initiative. This means that management can change methods of production and personnel
related regulations within the framework of the collective agreement. The judiciary becomes the
joint tribunals and arbitration forums. This provides for a forum wherein the employees can table
their grievances in case their rights are infringed. This elevates the workplace into a semi-state.320
This theory conforms with the self-government concept which legislators have opted for when
it comes to industrial relations. The weakness of the theory is that it creates the impression that
management has an extensive prerogative to take decisions unilaterally. However, in practice
management has the right to make decisions but employees have to be consulted and in some
instances joint decision-making is necessary on matters of mutual interest. 
Finally, according to the joint-management theory, collective bargaining is a method of joint
decision-making. Employees share the management power in the areas which are covered by
collective bargaining. Although management still has the power to manage the establishment and
issue orders, employees have to be consulted and in some instances joint decision-making is
required. This theory reflects the commonality of interests between employers and employees.
Employee participation, in the form of consultation, information-sharing and joint decision-
making, falls within the scope of this theory. The weakness of this theory is that it does not give
enough cognisance to the divergent interests of the parties. These divergent interests limit
collective bargaining from achieving employee participation, hence the reason why collective
bargaining is characterised by adversarialism.
The foregoing theories summarise the participation element in collective bargaining. The golden
thread that runs through these three theories is the fact that management and workers have to
engage each other in decision-making, one way or another. This creates an opportunity for
employees to influence the decisions of the employer. It may be the power element which is used
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321  Section 1(d)(ii).
322  Section 1(d)(iii).
323  The drafters of the Act in the Explanatory Memorandum Government Gazette No.16259 of 1995 p
121 explained the problem when they wrote: ‘ The fundamental problem with the existing law is the lack of
conceptual clarity as to the structure and functions of collective bargaining. The LRA, since its inception as the
Industrial Conciliation Act in 1924, has favoured a majoritarian system of industrial-level bargaining in the form
of industrial councils. In the past this policy has been undermined by the exercise of the Minister’s discretion and
the Industrial Court’s jurisprudence. The lack of commitment to an orderly system of industry level bargaining
is also reflected in the patchwork registration of industrial councils. There are councils that span more than one
industry, others that cover only part of an industry, some a single employer. The exclusion of black workers from
the industrial  bargaining system for the past 55 years of this dispensation spanned a separate tradition of
bargaining at the level of the workplace, a development that the LRA did not address except through the resort of
the unfair labour practice jurisdiction of the Industrial Court. The result of these developments is that there is no
existing statutory framework which can properly accommodate and facilitate an orderly relationship between
bargaining at the level of industry and at the level of the workplace.’ The foregoing statement points out that the
system of collective bargaining prior to the LRA was not clearly defined and as such resulted in no clear
jurisdiction for industrial-level forums and plant- level forums. Such a system was not supportive of employee
participation in decision-making, as the agenda for cooperative management and for the adversarial was mixed
up. If an orderly system of bargaining was to be achieved the collective bargaining agenda had to be separated into
plant- level matters and a centralised system of collective bargaining.
for achieving agreements in collective bargaining that negates the co-operative element that is
characteristic of employee participation.
In analysing the contribution of collective bargaining to employee participation in decision-
making under the LRA the following matters are covered: centralised bargaining;
majoritarianism; the role of trade unions and the duty of fair representation; voluntarism,
bargaining units; bargaining levels and the duty to bargain. 
6.2 CENTRALISED BARGAINING AND EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION
In order to understand the relevance of collective bargaining to employee participation, it is
important to highlight the fact that the LRA shows a preference for centralised bargaining
through the attempted separation of bargaining structures and participation structures. This is
evident from the purposes of the Act, which state that it is to promote collective bargaining at
sectoral level321 and employee participation in decision-making at plant-level.322 It is therefore
important to understand why the drafters preferred this structure if the contribution of collective
bargaining to employee participation is to be understood.323
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325  Appolis J ‘The New Labour Relations Bill and Centralized Bargaining’ (1995) 19 (2) SALB pp 47-48
writes: ‘a voluntarist collective bargaining system is premised on the capitalist law of the jungle where the
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standards are maintained and advanced. Through centralized bargaining unions can also ensure that wage rates
and minimum conditions are standardized and extended to other workers within the industry or sector....capitalist
competition for profit means competition between workers for wages. For workers, one advantage of centralized
bargaining is that competition between workers is minimized. The lack of compulsory centralized bargaining will
force wages down.’
326  Patel op cit note 324 p 51.
A clear understanding of how centralised bargaining is relevant to employee participation may
also be obtained from understanding the arguments for and against it. In the drafting of the LRA,
trade unions showed a strong preference for centralised bargaining, Du Toit et al write that :
‘The unions argue that centralised bargaining: (i) is the best means of establishing industry-wide minimum and
fair standards; (ii) allows for an effective use of skilled union and employer negotiators; (iii) leads to one
collective agreement in each sector concluded by skilled negotiators, avoiding a plethora of poor quality collective
agreements with potential for litigation; (iv) strengthens the capacity of bargaining agents; (v) develops social
benefit funds that are meaningful and cost effective; and (vi) leads to a proactive style of unionism in which
common employer-employee interests are advanced, as opposed to a narrow, defensive and reactive approach.’324
The union arguments were ideologically motivated, as workers saw a voluntarist system, with
a weak preference for centralised bargaining, as based on the capitalist mode of production which
benefits the wealthy in society. Workers see centralised bargaining as offering an opportunity for
them to act together in influencing the decisions of employers in order to increase their
benefits.325
Employers on the other hand rejected the very notion of centralised bargaining as they argued
that it promotes strikes and undermines economic growth. In articulating the views of employers
Patel326 writes:
‘The second set of employer arguments challenge the operations of centralised institutions. Those arguments
contend that: (i) centralised bargaining removes negotiations from the key actors at plant level, namely the
shopstewards and managers; (ii) it denies access to the bargaining forum for trade unions which have strong plant
representation but lack an industry majority; (iii) it lacks flexibility in that disputes are often declared for an entire
industry and strikes take place even when the more profitable sectors of the industry are able and willing to pay
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329  In Chapter 7 it will be shown that bargaining councils will also influence the agenda of workplace
forums. 
330  Summers C ‘Workplace Forums from a Comparative Perspective’ (1995) 4 ILJ p 807 makes a
comparative analysis with the German and Swedish models which are nearly identical with the South African
model, when he says: ‘In Germany economic terms are bargained at the industrial or sectoral level. Bargaining
may be bitter  and end in strikes, but neither plant level managers nor plant representatives...are involved in the
confrontational  bargaining.  The adversarial bargaining of the collective agreement leaves little or no residue of
hostility to undermine cooperation at the plant level. The same is true in Sweden. Collective agreements
establishing economic terms are centrally negotiated. Workplace problems are resolved by local management and
local union officers. The antagonism generated by bargaining do not carry over to the day-to-day discussion of
workplace issues.’ In contrast the United States maintains collective bargaining at plant-level. The same
management and workers who negotiate collective bargaining must deal with production related matters like plant
safety and product quality. Adversarialism is thus carried over to daily plant relations.
more than the average offer of the employers; and (iv) the tendency to dual bargaining exposes employers to a
double risk of strike action.’
The views of employers present a strong preference for a plant-level system which would allow
them to determine what happens in their workplaces together with their employees. This will
protect the employers from the collective force of employees at central level which may limit the
scope of the employers’ decision-making capacity.
Although opting for a centralised system of collective bargaining, the drafters ensured that they
maintained the voluntarist principle, by making the formation of bargaining councils327 voluntary
but offering inducement for centralised bargaining.328 The participation agenda is not lost because
collective bargaining will continue at plant-level and workplace forums will engage in both
consultation and joint decision-making with the employer at plant level. The centralised
bargaining element of the LRA will provide supporting force to employee participation in
decision-making at the workplace, as it allows employees to jointly influence the decisions of
employers at industry-wide level.329 This is clearly a plural model of achieving employee
participation since both collective bargaining at central level and workplace forums in the
workplace, seek to achieve a limitation of unilateral management decision-making and the
maximisation of the employees’ benefits. South Africa is not alone in this plural approach to
employee participation in decision-making, as countries like Germany and Sweden have similar
models.330
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(1993) 14 ILJ 305.
The prevalent approach seems to be that countries, in an effort to enhance employee participation
in decision-making, combine collective bargaining and co-operative processes like consultation
and joint decision-making. The issue is not whether collective bargaining can achieve
participation or not, but in which level certain issues may best be solved to enhance participation.
Perhaps one major concern with this approach is the ability of the system to maintain a separation
of matters for centralised bargaining and plant-level bargaining. However, it is fair to say that
indeed, collective bargaining is a form of participation with an adversarial approach and this is
supported by the approach of the South African LRA, as well as German and Swedish models.
6.3 THE RELEVANCE OF MAJORITARIANISM 
Collective bargaining under the LRA is also underpinned by the principle of majoritarianism.
Unions which represent a majority of employees enjoy more rights.331 Th  Act also provides
certain rights for sufficiently representative unions.332 However, there is no doubt that a majority
unions will be in a better position to influence the employer than minority unions.333
The question in relation to employee participation in decision-making is, what is the position of
minority unions and their members? The Act adopts a plural approach in this regard by also
providing that minority unions can act together in order to become a majority or sufficiently
representative and thereby enjoy more rights.334 
Majoritarianism has been criticised for many reasons, particularly that it limits the right of an
individual employee to bargain with the employer as such;335 is disr ptive of ordinary collective
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bargaining relations; will encourage union rivalry336 and that it is an infringement of freedom of
association.337 The foregoing reasons are an indictment on the choice for majoritarianism.
However, there are jurisprudential reasons in our labour law justifying the preference for
majoritarianism. Firstly, the notion of an individual right to negotiate has been rejected in our law
because it lacks authority and is regarded as unenforceable even at common law.338 Secondly,
freedom of association only protects the rights of an individual employee to belong to a trade
union but does not entail freedom to bargain.339 Wh t this means is that collective bargaining
contemplates individuals acting together. 
The relevance of the majoritarian system to employee participation is that it will encourage
minority unions to mobilize employees in order to be influential and the competition it provides
between rival unions will ensure that unions do not lose sight of their immediate goal of
representing the interests of employees.340 Th  fact that the employer is not compelled to bargain
with a minority union after bargaining with a majority trade union341 do s not mean that its
members will not benefit from agreements concluded, because such collective agreements can
be extended to bind even non-parties. Although it may seem that for employee participation to
succeed there must be maximum participation even of minority unions, practical considerations
dictate that majoritarianism is preferable. Collective bargaining as a method of joint decision-
making warrants some practical system to decide which unions are to be involved in negotiations
and which are not.342 Although majoritarianism may limit the number of trade unions that will be
engaged in employee participation through collective bargaining, it will ensure an orderly system
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organization.’ In Amalgamated Engineering Union v Minister of Labour 1949 (4) SA 908 (A), Centrilivres JA
distinguished between three possible functions of a trade union: (1) that of spokesperson of its members(at 912);
(2) to represent  the interests of employees(at 913); and (3) to represent its own interest a person separate from its
members(at 914-915).
344  Section 80(2) states that ‘Any representative trade union may apply to the commission in the
prescribed form for the establishment of a workplace forum.’ See further discussion below in Chapter 7.
345  Section 96 provides for the registration of trade unions and there is no requirement of
representativeness before registration.
of collective bargaining and also limit union proliferation. This shows the need for a balancing
act in the competing objectives of the LRA. 
6.4 TRADE UNIONS AND EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION
The philosophical appropriateness of involving trade unions in employee participation was
discussed in Chapter 2 in order to initiate a critical analysis of the role of trade unions in the
subject matter of this thesis. What follows is a discussion of how some principles of labour law
may ensure that trade unions play an important role in employee participation in decision-making.
The main function of a trade union is to regulate relations between employers and employees,343
and as such the trade union is a major player in collective bargaining. Although the LRA has
attempted to transfer production-related matters from union-management bargaining to
workplace forums, the truth is that unions are still going to be major players in the workplace
through shop stewards and participation in the workplace forums. 344
It is a prerequisite that the union should be registered in order to enjoy the rights enshrined in
the Act.345 It is not enough to conclude that since the trade union represents employees, that the
employees are participating in decision-making, because it could be the case that the union
leadership deviates from membership aspirations. It is therefore important to understand how the
members are able to influence the decision-making process within the union so as to ensure that
trade union bargaining with the employer is indeed employee participation in decision-making.
6.4.1 The Union and its Members’ Mandate
The relevant questions to ask, is whether the trade union representatives can do as they please
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in negotiations with management, and to what extent can members question agreements entered
into by the leadership?346 Every trade union should have a constitution which defines aims,
objectives and rules and which outline what may be lawfully done on behalf of the trade union.
Section 95(5)(j) provides that the constitution of a trade union should define the respective
functions of each union representative. This section would hopefully provide for the authority
which trade union representatives have when bargaining with the employer. Furthermore, section
95(5)(h) states that the constitution should provide for how decisions within the union are to be
made. This ensures that union leaders do not negotiate beyond a resolution taken by the union
membership. The question therefore is, what happens if the union representatives in the course
of their negotiations deviate from their mandate?
Once a union is registered it becomes a body corporate with functions determined by its
constitution, which means that if trade unions act beyond their mandate in the bargaining or
consultation process their actions may be ultra vires and thus null and void.347 To the extent that
the Act provides that the constitution of the trade union must provide for functions of union
representatives, they are expected to refrain from unauthorized actions.348 Th  definition of a
trade union in section 213 encompasses the fact that the basic function of a trade union is to
represent its constituency. This implies a legal relationship which subjects the union to the
control of the membership. To the extent that employees within a certain workplace can appoint
a union as an agent for bargaining with the employer, they should be entitled to determine what
the union may do on their behalf.
The doctrine of fair representation was developed by the US courts. In Ford Motor Co. v
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350  In Steele v Louisville and N.R. Co. 323 U.S. 192 at 198-199 it was stated that the authority of
bargaining representatives however is not absolute and their statutory obligation to represent all members of an
appropriate unit requires them to make an honest effort to serve the interest of all members without hostility to any:
see Tunstall v Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen 323 U.S. 210 at 211 and Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen
v Howard 343 U.S. 768. 
351  Du Toit op cit note 346 p 1169.
352  Ibid p 1172.
Huffman349 where the court was concerned with a situation where the union entered into a
collective agreement with the employer and still needed that agreement to be ratified by the
membership. The following was stated:
‘Any authority to negotiate derives its principal strength from a delegation to the negotiators of a discretion to
make such concessions and accept such advantages as, in the light of all relevant considerations, they believe will
best serve the interests of the parties represented. A major responsibility of negotiators is to weigh the relative
advantages and disadvantages of differing proposals. A bargaining representative under the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, often is a labor organisation but is not essential that it be such. The employees
represented often are members of the labor organisation which represents them at the bargaining table, but it is
not essential that they be such. The bargaining representative, whoever it may be, is responsible to, and owes
complete loyalty to the interests of all whom it represents.’350 
In explaining the duty of fair representation in our labour law, Du Toit351 writes:
‘[E]ven if this does not arise from common-law agency, it does imply a legal relationship which remains to be
clarified by the courts (or the legislature) but which will presumably be subject to some form of control by the
employees whom the union is deemed to represent.’ 
In the LRA it is not clear whether employee members of a trade union which is a party to a
collective agreement can contest the validity of such an agreement if it does not represent their
interests. The LRA in section 24(1) provides for a procedure of resolving a dispute concerning
the interpretation or application of a collective agreement. The section provides that this should
be resolved through conciliation and if the dispute still remains unresolved, it should be taken to
arbitration. The question is whether this section would also apply in circumstances where
members of the trade union party to the collective agreement (to whom the agreement is binding
as per section 23(1)(b) ), are questioning the application of the agreement for the reason that
their representatives acted beyond their mandate. Du Toit352 answers this by saying:
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statutory bargaining and the limits of union authority’ (1994) 15 ILJ p 39. See also Remolesane and Another v
Andrew Mentis and Another (1991) 12 ILJ 329(LAC) and Don Products (Pty) Ltd v Monage and Others (1992)
13 ILJ 900 (LAC).
354  Marievale Consolidated Mines Ltd v President of Industrial Court (1986) ILJ 152 (T); Mine Surface
Officials Association of South Africa v President of the Industrial Court and Others (1987) 8 ILJ 51 (T); Natal
Banking and Allied Workers Union v BB Cereals (Pty) Ltd and Another (1989) 10 ILJ 870 (IC).
355  Tsebe and Others v Pelman Motor and Diesel Engineering SA (Pty) Ltd (1992) 1 LCD 99 (IC); FAWU
and Others v Association of Bakeries (1992) 1 LCD 36 (IC); Ntsangani and Others v Golden Lay Farms Ltd
(1992) 13 ILJ 1199 (IC).
356  (1994) 15 ILJ 1398 (IC).
‘The ideal solution, from the trade union point of view, would be for the membership to resolve the problem by
means of constitutional procedures. Legally this is enshrined in the principle, derived from the rule in Foss v
Harbottle, that an ordinary member of an association may not bring an action against the association if the act
complained of could be ratified by a simple majority vote.’
The implication of the above statement could be that before the members can even contemplate
proceeding according to section 24(1), they would have to allow the internal democracy of the
union prescribed by the constitution to apply. If the majority of the union members reject what
the union leadership has agreed upon with management they must express such rejection as per
the constitutionally prescribed procedure. The Industrial Court developed jurisprudence on limits
to union authority.353 Most significantly the Industrial Court had in several instances decided that
it was not bound to enforce contractual provisions of which the enforcement would be an unfair
labour practice against the employees.354 The Industrial Court indicated that it would generally
adopt a non-interventionist approach to challenges of collective agreements, because such
agreements are the outcome of collective bargaining which was the prime method of resolving
labour disputes under the LRA 28 of 1956.355However in one of the cases the Industrial Court
indicated the point at which it could be prepared to intervene in a challenge to a collective
agreement by union members. In Collins v Volkskas Bank (Westonaria Branch) - A Division of
ABSA Bank Ltd356 where the applicant employee had fallen pregnant and was legally obliged to
take a minimum of three months maternity leave in terms of section 17 of the Basic Conditions
of Employment Act 3 of 1983. However, in terms of a collective agreement entered into by the
union of which applicant was a member, the applicant was prohibited from taking the leave
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within a period of two years after the termination of a prior period of maternity leave.
Applicant’s pregnancy fell within this condition and thus respondent forced applicant to tender
her resignation in order to take the statutory maternity leave. In the application, the applicant
claimed that the grounds upon which her maternity leave was turned down were unfounded and
that the proviso in the collective agreement was contra bonos mores and infringed on her basic
human rights and that her forced resignation constituted an unfair labour practice. Commenting
on whether the court could intervene in a challenge to a collective agreement, Marcus AM stated
that:
‘In my view, only if such an agreement results in a manifestly gross unfair labour practice being perpetuated
against an individual member or employee, would this court possibly be justified in intervening or striking down
the provisions of a collective agreement. Even then it would be slow to do so, since this would amount to judicial
intervention in the outcome of the collective bargaining process, an area which is generally regarded as falling
outside this court’s unfair labour practice jurisdiction.’357
Applying the aforementioned principle of intervention, the court did not consider the policy to
be so manifestly unfair as to justify its intervention because there was a commercial rationale for
placing a limitation on maternity leave. It is very doubtful that this decision would stand under
the LRA 66 of 1995 because it is obvious discrimination and would be a residual unfair labour
practice according to item 2(1)(a) of schedule 7. The most important indication from this case
is that employees could contest the validity of collective agreements in case of an unfair labour
practice in spite of the restrained approach of the IC in the past. 
Perhaps a better indication of whether the Labour Court under the LRA 66 of 1995 would be
prepared to intervene in a challenge to a collective agreement would be found in SACCAWU v
Garden Route Chalets (Pty) Ltd358 where members of applicant were challenging a collective
agreement which excluded them from being provided with transport when other employees in
the workplace were being provided with transport to work. The applicants contended that the
fact that they were not being provided with transport was a discriminatory application of the
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unlawful terms of collective agreements resulting in discrimination: see Kowalska v Freie und Hansestadt
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collective agreement and thus an unfair labour practice.359 One of the issues raised by the
respondent was that applicants had waived their rights to invoke remedies in item 3 of Schedule
7 in the collective agreement, which provides grounds to challenge an unfair labour practice. In
resolving this dispute the commissioner indicated that such statutory rights could not be excluded
by the collective agreement, as it was not the intention of the LRA that such rights could be
excluded.360 In resolving the issue of whether the employer’s conduct in not extending the
transport benefit to the applicants was in breach of item 2(1)(b), the commissioner held that it
was the task of the arbitrator to safeguard the constitutional and statutory rights to equality and
fairness361 and thereby decided that the reasonable solution to the matter was to extend equal
benefits to the applicants just like other employees.362
Although the foregoing cases do not deal directly with the duty of fair representation, they
highlight the fact that agreements entered into by union representatives with the employer could
still be challenged if they resulted in an unfair labour practice. The fact that this challenge is
possible according to the LRA will ensure that union representatives will represent the interests
of their members in a way that will ensure that no unfairness results from their representations.
These indirect measures of making union representatives accountable for their decisions with
employers will be supportive of employee participation, as the interests of union members will
inform the conclusion of collective agreements. Furthermore, union representatives will be forced
to consult with their members from time to time and thereby involving greater numbers of
employees in decision-making. 
6.5 BARGAINING UNITS
The ability of a union to influence the decisions of an employer is partly dependent on
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363  Grogan op cit note 314 p 209 ‘A bargaining unit is that part of a workforce or workplace in which a
union claims recognition and in respect of which it negotiates.’
364  Brassey M et al The New Labour Law (1990) p 154.
365  (1993) 4 (9) SALLR 158 (IC) at p 165 (H-I).
366  The IC at some point asked itself if it was entitled to decide on the question of appropriate bargaining
units. In Amalgamated Engineering Union of SA and Others v Mondi Paper Co. Ltd (1989) 10 ILJ 521, the court
decided that only the parties could agree to change the bargaining unit to suit the applicant. The court held that,
to prescribe for the parties is something it could not do. However in subsequent decisions the IC affirmed the
position that it cannot sit back and refuse to determine alleged unfair refusal to bargain until the employer agreed
on the issue of bargaining units. If the court could sit back, an employer could simply propose a bargaining unit
to which he knows the union is unlikely to agree to. See Black Allied Workers Union (SA) v Pek Manufacturing
Co (Pty) Ltd (1990)11 ILJ 1095.
367  Workplace in Section 213 is defined as ‘the place or places where the employees of an employer work.’
See also further discussion on the meaning of workplace in Chapter 7 below.
establishing a bargaining unit363 which is evidence of representivity. The 1956 LRA did not
provide for how bargaining units were to be determined364 and as such the determination of
bargaining units was left to the parties to negotiate in a collective agreement. This was very
important for trade unions to do as was explained in Banking, Insurance and Assurance Workers
Union v Mutual and Federal Insurance Co Ltd,365 where Louw AM said:
‘The composition of a bargaining unit will not only determine on behalf of whom bargaining will take place, but
will also determine which employees are to receive protection from an agreement that may emanate from
negotiations between parties. The question of the appropriate bargaining unit underlies the union's demand to
negotiate wages and conditions of employment and forms such an inextricable part thereof, that it would be
nonsensical to grant an order to negotiate without first determining on whose behalf negotiations are to take
place.’ 
 
It is in the designation of a bargaining unit that a trade union clearly defines to the employer the
employees on behalf of whom it seeks to enter into negotiations. The influence of the trade union
in a particular workplace is based on it being able to agree on a bargaining unit with the
employer.366 The question of bargaining units under the LRA 66 of 1995 no longer depends on
a particular unit of the workplace but a trade union has to exhibit support in the entire
workplace.367 The LRA makes it clear that there are different thresholds of representativeness
when it comes to the enjoyment of different rights. For instance, for the enjoyment of
organisational rights from sections 12 to 16 the trade union has to be sufficiently representative
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373  SA Clothing and Textile Workers Union v Sheraton Textiles (Pty) Ltd supra at 1419 B-F.
of employees employed in a workplace.368 The Act does not however define what sufficient
representativeness means. In some cases sufficiently representative means a substantial enough
number to warrant being dealt with.369 In one of the decisions on the matter of what sufficiently
representative means, the CCMA was able to provide direction. In SA Clothing and Textile
Workers Union v Sheraton Textiles (Pty) Ltd370  where the issue was whether the union should
be granted the organisational rights of access and stop orders provided for in sections 12 and 13
of the LRA 66 of 1995. The applicant had 29.7% membership in the respondent’s workplace.
Deciding on the matter the commissioner stated the following:
‘In terms of section 21(8)(b) an arbitrator, when deciding whether or not a union is sufficiently representative for
the purposes of granting organizational rights, is obliged to have regard to the nature of the workplace, the nature
of the rights sought, the nature of the sector and the organizational history of the workplace371....the expression
“sufficiently representative” is not defined in the Act. Nor was it defined under the old law. In the past, courts
have emphasized that sufficiently representativeness ought not to be determined solely with reference to
numbers.372 Generally a union should be considered sufficiently representative if it can influence negotiations,
the financial interests of those engaged in the industry or peace and stability within the industry or any section
of the industry. The arbitrator is required to have regard to the interests represented by a union and not exclusively
the numerical representativeness of employees. Some indications of the numerical threshold, in so far as it is
relevant, is provided in section 39(1) of the Act where it sets a 30 % membership base as the figure required by
unions wanting to establish statutory councils at sectoral level.... at the same time the arbitrator is obliged to
minimize union proliferation and any financial or administrative burden on the employer.’373 
The commissioner proceeded to decide that the union virtually had a 30% representativeness in
the workplace and is a major player representing significant interests in the industry and on these
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a majority union amongst non-senior managerial employees.
bases, the union was sufficiently representative.374
What the foregoing case indicates is that, in the determination of what sufficiently representative
means, a purposive approach will be adopted to ensure that the interests of workers are not
disregarded particularly where there is no other trade union in the workplace. Union proliferation
will be another consideration. This approach is very supportive of employee participation in
decision-making as it ensures the influence of trade unions which are not a majority but have
interests to protect. In fact the influence which the trade union has in that workplace is a factor
to consider, particularly where there is no other active union. In some circumstances the Act
requires majority representation, for instance, under section 14 for the enjoyment of rights under
sections 16 to20. In this instance minority unions can act together in order to achieve majority
representation. This means that while a trade union may be recognised as a bargaining agent by
law, it still has to go further to prove that it has a constituency large enough to entitle it to enjoy
other rights in the Act. In some instances the Act defines a unit within the workplace and not in
the whole workplace.375
Although the legislature has sought to simplify the determination of bargaining units, trade
unions will still have to prove their representativeness in a workplace to enjoy certain rights. The
Act however requires the parties to agree on their own, but if they fail they cannot automatically
proceed to court for the resolution of their differences. Under section 21 the parties have to
submit their dispute to the CCMA and in section 21(8) the commission is given guidelines in the
determination of bargaining units. The commission must seek to minimise the proliferation of
trade union representation in a single workplace. In section 21(8)(b) the Act has adopted the
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North American criterion of establishing the bargaining unit.376 If the trade union is not satisfied
with the advisory award, it may engage in industrial action according to section 64(2)(d)(i) as
refusal to bargain also includes a dispute about appropriate bargaining units.377
According to the LRA 66 of 1995, the more representative the trade union is in a particular
workplace the more rights it enjoys. Through this the union acquires a stronger position when
it comes to bargaining with the employer. The ability of the union to show that it is
representative within a particular workplace, makes the employer aware of the threat to
production being disrupted in case of an industrial action. This makes the employees in that
particular workplace quite influential. The problem with the LRA is that minority unions may find
themselves in a disadvantageous position of not enjoying other rights.378 T is place  the
employee members of that union at a disadvantage because its status may affect the extent to
which they will be able to participate in the decision-making process. However, the LRA tries
to solve this problem by providing that minority trade unions can act jointly to achieve the
required threshold of representivity and so enjoy more rights.379 It may be that in order to avoid
this problem of having to prove different thresholds of representativeness, the trade union may
conclude a collective agreement wherein entitlement to certain rights will be included as per
section 18. Alternatively trade union parties to a bargaining council will automatically enjoy some
of the rights regardless of representativeness according to section 19.380
6.6 BARGAINING LEVELS
107
381  Under the LRA 28 of 1956 it was accepted that employers had a duty to bargain with employees.
However, the level at which bargaining was to take place, became a problem which was complicated by the fact
that it was accepted that collective bargaining should always assume a voluntary character in order to be effective.
The courts were however occasionally called upon to adjudicate on disputes concerning bargaining levels: see
Metal and Allied Workers Union v Hart supra note 317, United African Motor and Allied Workers Union v S
Thomson (Pty)Ltd (1988) 9 ILJ 359, SA Wood Workers Union v Rutherford Joinery (Pty) Ltd (1990) 11 ILJ
659.The debate turned on whether the Industrial Court could compel parties to bargain at the plant-level or at
sectoral level: see SEAWU v BRC Weldmesh (1991)2(8) SALLR 57 (IC).
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The LRA 66 of 1995 attempts to solve the problems of bargaining levels experienced under the
previous Act381 through indicating an explicit preference for centralised bargaining.382 It is
interesting to note that there is actually nothing to stop the employer and the trade union from
bargaining at plant-level. It therefore remains to be seen whether collective bargaining has been
absolutely removed from plant-level or not. It will also be interesting to see if this preference for
sectoral bargaining will succeed. The need for it to succeed is very important seeing that there
is no longer a legally enforceable duty to bargain and as such the voluntary embracing of this
process by the parties concerned is essential. Failure to commit to the process voluntarily will
invite the willing party to compel the unwilling party to commit to the process through power
play.383 Once the structure has been put in place it will also be important to ensure that parties
are able to reach qualitative agreements.
Enforcement of and compliance with the agreements concluded also become important whether
done through industrial muscle or judicial intervention. Finally, the success of this process will
also depend on the scope of operation of centralised bargaining which is linked to the ability of
the state to extend the agreements reached to non-parties. This would definitely benefit
employees in the sense that those workers who may wish to abstain from being part of the system
for various reasons may still benefit. It would also ensure that those who otherwise choose to
opt out, feel the pinch of non-participation and are motivated to join. This is also linked to the
willingness of the parties to the bargaining councils, to admit new parties who are interested in
joining in. These are the factors against which the success of the system should be measured. 
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385  Section 28. Perhaps the fact that the bargaining councils can increase the matters which fall within
the jurisdiction of workplace forums, signifies the important role they have in the success of employee participation
under the LRA.
6.6.1 Bargaining Councils
Bargaining councils are the primary institutions for collective bargaining.384 Under section 28 of
the LRA bargaining councils are given powers to cover a wide range of issues in collective
agreements these may include wages, and terms and conditions of employment. The bargaining
councils may also perform a dispute resolution function, develop policy, enforce collective
agreements and confer on workplace forums additional matters for consultation. 385They may
also determine the issues which may not be the subject of a strike or a lockout at the workplace.
Bargaining councils also have jurisdiction over issues which may entail even greater benefits for
the employees. It is possible to argue that collective bargaining and participation of employees
in distributive matters will stand or fall on the success of bargaining councils.
 
6.6.2 Collective Agreements
The binding nature of collective agreements reached in a bargaining council is very important as
this is the determining factor of the extent to which employees will be able to bind the employers
to agreements on which they (employees) have had a lot of influence. Section 31(a) of the LRA
makes it clear that parties to the bargaining council who are also parties to the collective
agreement are bound by the collective agreement. This section is open to two interpretations, the
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first being that parties to the bargaining council will automatically be parties to the bargaining
council agreement and the second being that only parties to the bargaining council who have
agreed to be party to the agreement will be bound by such.386 The latter interpretation would lead
to an absurd position because it would mean that parties who fail to obtain what they want in the
process could refuse to be bound by the collective agreement. Furthermore, it is doubtful
whether such an interpretation would be sustainable in practice after all, the binding force of the
agreement can be extended to non-parties through section 32. The former interpretation seems
to be the correct one, because it accords with the purpose of the Act at section(1)(d)(i), which
is to promote orderly collective bargaining and the latter would detract from the purposes of the
Act. 
The foregoing raises the question of how decisions in these councils are to be taken. According
to Section 30(1)(e), the constitution of the bargaining council has to provide for the manner in
which decisions may be taken. Under the LRA 28 of 1956 at section 27(7) a decision of the
council could be taken by a two-thirds majority of those eligible to vote. This would mean that
even those members of the industrial council who might have wanted to opt out of the
agreement, would be bound by it because it was a decision of a council of which they are
members. This could be an ideal interpretation of section 31(a) of the new LRA as it would avoid
a situation whereby parties would refuse to abide by decisions of the council because they have
not had their way in the bargaining process. After all, it is the duty of the bargaining council to
enforce the collective agreement. If there is a dispute on the issue of the binding nature of the
collective agreement, it can also be resolved through conciliation and if unresolved, through
arbitration according to section 51.
Members of the trade unions and employers’ organisations party to the collective agreement are
also bound by the collective agreement to the extent that the provisions of the agreement apply
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388  Section 32(1). Such non-parties have to be identified in the request. It is also important that at the
meeting of that particular bargaining council, a trade union which has a majority of members in the council, must
vote in favour of the extension. This could be a problem in ensuring that all employees and employers conclude
that agreement. However, the Act solves the problem by granting the Minister the power to extend a collective
agreement in spite of the absence of the majority factor, so long as the parties are sufficiently representative and
the Minister  is satisfied that failure to extend the agreement may undermine collective bargaining at sectoral level
(section 32(5)). 
389  Section 56.
390  Section 56(6).
to the relationship between such party and the members of such other party.387 In the absence of
the duty to bargain it is significant that the Act makes the bargaining council agreements
applicable at all levels, further enhancing the influence employees will have in the bargaining
process.
 
A bargaining council may also request the Minister to extend the application of a collective
agreement to non-parties who fall within the scope of registration of that particular bargaining
council.388 The fact that these collective agreements can be extended to cover even employers
who are not members of the council is an added advantage to employee participation in decision-
making in that even reluctant employers will find themselves caught within the net of the
decisions of bargaining councils.
Finally, outsiders may apply to the council for membership. This creates a door through which
outsiders who realize that they are losing out by non-participation can become members.389 If,
however, the council refuses to admit such a party, the applicant can apply through the Labour
Court, which is competent to admit such a party.390
6.6.3 Statutory Councils
In an attempt to calm the fears of big trade unions that bargaining councils on their own would
not achieve centralised bargaining, the legislature provided for the creation of statutory
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councils.391 A statutory council can be created within a sector and an area.392 The initiation of
these councils is voluntary and can be formed by trade unions and employers' organisations which
are representative, meaning representing about 30 percent of their constituency in a particular
sector.393
The functions of statutory councils are but a shadow of those to be performed by bargaining
councils and wage-related matters are not among them. Section 43 provides for the following
functions: dispute resolution; promotion and establishment training and education schemes; the
establishment and administration of social security schemes; and the conclusion of collective
agreements on these issues. It is also possible for the statutory council to include increased
functions in its constitution. This could include performing some of the functions to be performed
by bargaining councils. Generally most of the comments made about bargaining councils apply
equally to statutory councils and as such need not be repeated. It is clear that statutory councils
are a stepping stone towards the formation of a bargaining council. According to section 48,
statutory councils may register as bargaining councils.
According to section 1(d)(i), the Act definitely attempts to create orderly collective bargaining.
This it does by demarcating different levels of bargaining. There is an attempt to clear the plant-
level of any collective bargaining and to introduce cooperative governance through workplace
forums. Bargaining councils and statutory councils provide an opportunity for employees to
combine their strength as a collective in order to influence the decisions of the employers in a
particular sector. The advantage of this is that employees are not competing with each other, as
their primary objective is to achieve as many favourable benefits from their employment as
possible. This common objective is a great unifying force which can survive many differences.
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p 117 write that: ‘a voluntarist policy would allow the two sides [of industry] by agreement and practice to develop
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395  Reality is that the employer through the property rights has power which even employees as a
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396  In support of voluntarism, the LRA 24 of 1956 provided for industrial councils and conciliation boards
which were forums where issues of mutual interest between the employer and the employees were regulated. In
order to ensure that voluntarism was protected, section 1 of this Act provided that amongst other things, any act
Meanwhile employers at central level are not exactly a united force as they are usually competing
with each other. This is because they do not make the same profits and as such they cannot
afford to give their employees the same benefits. Even though the bargaining councils may set
minimum standards, some employers cannot afford those very minimum standards. Since profit
is the fundamental reason for the formation of business enterprises, it would be very hard for
employers to sacrifice their individual business realities. It therefore becomes clear that
bargaining at sectoral level creates more chances for employees to participate in decision- making
in a very significant and influential way. 
6.7 VOLUNTARISM 
Although the LRA creates the structures for collective bargaining, their successful operation is
to a certain extent left to employers and employees to determine voluntarily. In labour law
voluntarism refers to the voluntary self-regulation of the workplace by the independent social
partners of management and labour, and shows the primacy of collective bargaining over legal
enactment.394 According to voluntarism, employers and employees realize that they are partners
who cannot ignore each other when important decisions in the workplace are being made. The
parties realize that although their relationship is based on power, a certain element of co-
operative governance of the workplace is necessary without the intervention of the law or the
courts.395 
The LRA 66 of 1995 introduces a change in industrial relations from its predecessor396 by
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which affects employees unfairly or promotes labour unrest may be declared an unfair labour practice. Due to the
fact that  the unfair labour practice definition was broad the courts sought to avoid legal intervention in collective
bargaining so as to promote voluntarism and at times the court ended up doing exactly that which it sought to
avoid:see BCAWU v Johnson Tiles (Pty) Ltd (1985) 6 ILJ (IC) and Ntuli and Others v Litemaster Ltd (1985) 6 ILJ
508 (IC) and MAWU and Others v Siemens Ltd (1986) 7 ILJ 547 (IC). Employee participation was embodied
within voluntarism as employees and employers were expected to negotiate matters of mutual concern. However
the Industrial Court soon had to intervene in the collective bargaining relationship through the section 43 status
quo remedy, which was available to maintain an existing or restore a pre-existing state of affairs.  This relief was
appropriate where a party offended against the collective bargaining process or threatened to defeat the ends of
employment justice. Unilateral imposition of conditions could be challenged through the status quo remedy, thus
giving a balance of power in  employer-employee relations. Whenever the court granted the status quo remedy,
it induced the parties to engage in serious negotiations in order to settle their differences: see Consolidated Frame
Cotton Corporation Ltd v The President, Industrial Court and Others (1986) 7 ILJ 489 (A) at 494H and 495D and
Garment Workers Industrial Union and Another v Scotford Mills (Pty) Ltd (1986) 7 ILJ 45 at 52 F. This evidently
limited voluntarism but  provided a background to the understanding of the relevance of voluntarism to employee
participation in decision-making in the LRA 66 of 1995.
397  Section 11.
398  Unlike the freedom to strike, the right to strike means that an employer who unreasonably interferes
with this right can be challenged in the Labour Court for such infringement. This will ensure that the power of
employees to act as a collective in influencing the decisions of the employer is guaranteed. However the Act
maintains a categorization of matters on which employees can strike and those they have to resolve through
conciliation or arbitration. Protected strike action must be preceded by a conciliation process as per section 64(1).
reorganising the collective bargaining process. Section 1(c) provides that the purpose of the Act
is: 
To provide a framework within which employees and their trade unions, employers and employers' organisations
can:
(i) collectively bargain to determine wages, terms and conditions of employment and other matters of mutual
interest; and
(ii) formulate industrial policy
The Act does away with the unfair labour practice jurisdiction through which the courts could
intervene in the bargaining relationship, and allows the parties to the employment relationship
to determine matters of mutual interest on their own. Furthermore, the Act no longer provides
for a duty to bargain. However, the Act bolsters collective bargaining by granting organisational
rights in Chapter 3 to registered trade unions which are sufficiently representative.397The Act
also recognises that industrial action is an integral part of collective bargaining, by providing for
the right to strike in section 64.398
Collective agreements are also given prominence in section 23 as employers and employees can
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399  Section 65(1)(a).
400  Section 27.  
401  This section defines what refusal to bargain may mean, for instance, refusal to recognize a trade union
as a bargaining agent, a withdrawal of recognition of a collective bargaining agent etc.
402  Section 64(4).
403  Under the British Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1992, section 179, there is no provision for
the courts to intervene in collective bargaining. Trade unions have to bargain in order to improve all aspects of
their members’ interests. Even when they agree with the employer, such agreement is not legally enforceable.
Where the  parties do not agree, the necessary legal recourse does not exist under the statutory law or common law.
In Australia all aspects of collective bargaining are subject to compulsory arbitration. If employers and employees
are involved in any dispute, arbitration provides a binding resolution. Workers are denied the strike weapon.
However, as a necessary by-product of the move towards decentralized bargaining, the Industrial Relations Reform
Act 1993, has provided a right to strike under regulated circumstances.
enter into agreements on how they will regulate matters of mutual interest. As evidence of
preference for voluntarism, the Act even provides for the possibility of trade unions and
employees to enter into an agreement that excludes the right to strike in respect of particular
issues.399 The Act also provides for centralised bargaining which seems to be the favoured level
of bargaining.400 The advantage is that workplaces which belong to the same manufacturing
sector, may set standards of workplace conditions at central level and thus minimise the
disruption of production in the various workplaces. For employees this is advantageous as they
can derive strength from working as a collective in that particular sector. 
However, the Act also introduces an element of compulsion in certain circumstances. If an
employer refuses to bargain with a trade union, such trade union can embark on strike action
according to section 64(2).401 If the employer makes unilateral changes in the workplace,
employees through strike action may also force the employer to restore the status quo so that
proper bargaining can take place.402 Although the Act has not provided for the duty to bargain,
employees through strike action can compel an employer to bargain with them without having
recourse to the courts, which is in line with what happens in other jurisdictions.403 The Act also
provides for the residual unfair labour practice jurisdiction, through which the conduct of
employers is guided. Failure to observe item 2(1) of Schedule 7 may result in an action in the
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404  Item 3(4) of Schedule 7.
405  Grogan op cit note 314 p 245 ‘Specifically reserved for the Labour Court are disputes concerning inter
alia: the application and the exercise of association rights, the refusal to admit a party to a bargaining council,
strikes, lockouts, breaches of picketing rules and protest action, strike dismissals, automatically unfair dismissals
on the grounds of operational requirements; discrimination under the residual unfair labour practice definition.’
406  Section 158(1)(a)(iii). This confirms that voluntarism cannot cover all the dynamics of collective
bargaining hence the necessity for the Labour Courts to intervene in collective bargaining. A reasonable
intervention coupled with voluntarism ensures that employee participation through collective bargaining is
constantly evaluated. Any of the parties who seeks to be an obstruction in the process of bargaining should be dealt
with and that is where the Labour Court is important.
407  The relevance of the duty to bargain in employee participation in decision-making can never be over-
emphasized. A background to the duty to bargain has already been discussed in chapter 3.
Labour Court. 404
 
Although voluntarism seems to be very evident in the Act, when one reads the powers that are
granted to the Labour Court405 intervention in the bargaining relationship is inevitable. For
instance, the court may order the performance of any particular act which order, when
implemented, will remedy a wrong and give effect to the primary objects of this Act.406
The very nature of voluntarism supports the interaction between employers and employees in the
collective bargaining process without compulsion. To the extent that the LRA provides for a
framework within which the parties can solve matters of mutual interest, without fear of
compulsion by the Labour Courts, they will be encouraged to recognise each other as partners.
Furthermore, since the Act grants employees organisational rights and the right to strike, their
power is bolstered and voluntarism encouraged. It is in this relationship of mutual recognition
that employee participation in decision-making is supported and collective agreements are
evidence of such.
6.8 THE DUTY TO BARGAIN
As shown in the discussion on voluntarism, the LRA makes no express provision for a duty to
bargain. However, it is essential to consider the position of the LRA on the duty to bargain and
its impact on employee participation. The duty to bargain407 is at times known as the duty to
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408  Scheepers v Vermeulen 1948 (4) SA 884 (O) at 992 it was held that agreements to negotiate or to agree
are unenforceable. Such an agreement is too vague to enforce as it depends on the absolute discretion of the parties.
Nor does our law recognize an obligation to negotiate.
409  In FAWU v Spekenham Supreme (1988) 9 ILJ 628 (IC) at 636-7 A-B Fabricius AM et al stated that:
‘[H]aving regard to the fact that fairness is now the overriding consideration in labour relations in South Africa,
it is time for the court to find firmly and unequivocally that in general terms it is unfair for an employer not to
negotiate bona fide with a representative trade union.’
410  (1990) 1(10) SALLR 18 (IC).
411  In Mutual and Federal Insurance Co Ltd v BIF and A Workers Union 1996 (3) SA 395 (AD) Vivier
J made an analysis of where the right under the LRA of 1956 derived its life. He said that the notion of the
employee’s individual right to negotiate derives its existence from paragraph (j) of the unfair labour practice
definition in section 1 of the Act, which protected the right to associate. However, Cheadle H‘One man one
bargaining Unit’ (1990) 7 (2) EL p 37, departs from the notion that the right to bargain is attached to an employee
as an individual. He writes that, inferring the right to bargain from the right to associate may find justification in
the notion that collective bargaining is the central purpose of association in labour relations. Therefore the right
to bargain is only available to employees when they associate, making it a collective right and not an individual
right as the Industrial Court believed it to be. Although the reasoning by Cheadle makes sense, the Industrial Court
chose to adopt a completely different approach, deciding that each employee has a fundamental individual right
to bargain with his employer and that this forms the basis for the union’s right to bargain, however insignificant
its representivity may be. The right to bargain was therefore not dependent on the collective of employees but was
held to flow from the individual right of each employee, which could be delegated to the union; see National
Banking and Allied Workers Union v BB Cereals (Pty) Ltd and Another (1989) 10 ILJ 870 (IC) and Radio
Television Electronic and Allied Workers Union v Tedelex (Pty) Ltd and Another (1990) 11 ILJ 1272 (IC).
negotiate. Under the common law there is no duty to negotiate.408 Although this was the position
of the common law, the LRA of 1956 made collective bargaining the only way through which
industrial unrest could be minimised. The duty to bargain was seen as part of the promotion of
collective bargaining.409 Through the duty to bargain, parameters were set within which collective
bargaining was to be expected thereby extending the scope of influence which employees had on
decisions in the workplace. The nature of this duty to bargain was defined in Radio Television
Electronic and Allied Workers Union v Tedelex Manufacturing (Pty) Ltd and NUMSA410 where
it was stated that the right to negotiate was a legal right which did not differ from any other legal
right and as such was to be exercised in circumstances where it would be fair to do so. This
meant that the duty to bargain was not absolute. What is significant is that it was accepted that
there was a legally enforceable right to negotiate in appropriate circumstances.411
The LRA 66 of 1995 adopts a different position which was clearly articulated by the team that
drafted the Labour Relations Bill, wherein it stated that ‘a notable feature of the draft Bill is the
117
412  Explanatory Memorandum op cit note 323 p 121.
413  Jordaan B ‘The Duty To Bargain Under the Draft LRA’ (1995) 4 (8) LLN at 1 writes that: ‘It will
become apparent from this that the Bill does not adopt a complete “hands-off” approach to collective bargaining.
While its philosophy is to reshape the underlying legal environment to increase the ability of workers themselves
to influence its outcome, some of its provisions may have the effect of severely restricting the ability of the parties
to determine the outcome of negotiations.’
absence of a statutory duty to bargain.’412 It would seem that the team had to choose between
three notable models on this issue of the duty to bargain. The first model was a system of
statutory compulsion to bargain. In this model the levels and topics of bargaining would be
statutorily determined by statute. The second model would allow for limited intervention by the
courts to determine the appropriate level of bargaining and bargaining topics. The third option
would allow the parties to the bargaining process to determine their own bargaining
arrangements. The drafters chose the third option as they felt that the other two models would
introduce rigidity in the labour market, which needed to continuously respond to a changing
economic environment. The question to be answered, is how far the Act compels bargaining in
light of the voluntarism and the hands-off approach it has preferred.413
6.8.1 Organisational Rights and Freedom of Association
Although the LRA does not expressly provide for a legally enforceable duty to bargain with a
trade union, it grants extensive rights to trade unions which may be seen as effectively imposing
a duty upon the employer to bargain. The rights are as follows: (i) freedom of association
(section 4); (ii) trade union access to the workplace (section 12); (iii) deduction of trade union
subscriptions or levies (section 13); and (iv) disclosure of information (section 16). The
foregoing rights are supported by the right to strike in sections 64 and 65.
The significance of all these rights is that they bolster the strength of trade unions in collective
bargaining, provided they are able to meet the required threshold for their enjoyment. Against
such a strong position employers may not be able to wish away the necessary participation of
trade unions in the decision-making process. This creates a measure of compulsion on employers
to negotiate with the trade unions or risk disruption of production through industrial action.
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414  Section 9.
415  Jordaan op cit note 413 p 3.
416  (1991)12 ILJ 599 (IC).
417  (1993) 14 ILJ 362 (LAC).
Certainly in these circumstances there is a measure of a duty to bargain and the creation of fertile
ground for the development of employee participation.
Limited judicial intervention and arbitral intervention to enforce the freedom of association and
organizational rights are provided for in chapter 2 and 3 of the LRA. In so far as the
organisational rights are concerned, instead of the trade union approaching the courts for the
exercise of such rights, the union is required to notify the employer in writing that it seeks to
exercise one or more of the rights conferred by the Act. The exercise of such rights may be
subject to such conditions as may be imposed by the employer from time to time. According to
section 22, if there is a dispute concerning a trade union seeking to exercise any of the rights,
such dispute has to be referred to the CCMA, failing which it has to be resolved through
arbitration. Industrial action and court intervention on the resolution of these issues are
prohibited.
On the other hand, freedom of association disputes fall within the jurisdiction of a bargaining
council if there is one, then the commission and then the Labour Court.414 Jordaan415 makes
mention of the effect of the wide formulation of the freedom of association provision. According
to him this could have far-reaching consequences for collective bargaining. He predicts that it
would bolster the possibility of the existence of a duty to negotiate with employees and further
protect employee participation in decision-making. This can be illustrated by reference to CWIU
v BP South Africa416 and OK Bazaars v SACCAWU.417In these cases the courts accepted the
proposition that an employer may, subject to certain provisos, offer inducements to employees
or threaten forfeiture of bonuses in order to avoid or halt a strike action. The LRA now provides
in section 5(3) that:
‘No person may advantage, or promise to advantage, an employee .... in exchange for that person not exercising
any right conferred by this Act or not participating in any proceedings in terms of this Act.’
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418  In NUM v ERGO (1991) 12 ILJ 1221 (A) where Goldstone JA quoted the following statement of US
law with approval: ‘The law is clear that an employer may, after bargaining with the union to a deadlock or
impasse on an issue, make unilateral changes that are reasonably comprehended within his pre-impasse proposal...
another formulation is that after impasse is reached in good faith, the employer is free to institute by unilateral
action changes which are in line with or which are no more favorable than those it offered or approved prior to
impasse.’
419  In A Mauchle (Pty) Ltd t/a Precision Tools v NUMSA (1995) 4 LCD 226 (LAC) the court held that
workers do not have a vested right to preserve their working conditions completely unchanged as from the moment
when they first begin work, only if changes are so dramatic as to amount to a requirement that the employee
undertake an entirely different job, may a worker refuse to do the job in the manner required.’
420  Ibid.
This section may have the effect of prohibiting an employer from using financial incentives to
prevent or curtail strike action. This means that the employer will have to choose between facing
a protected strike action on disputes of interest or to bargain with employees in order to reach
an agreement and avoid the costly disruption of the production process. This will surely enhance
the need for the employer to bargaining with the trade union. 
6.8.2 Unilateral Change of Terms and Conditions of Employment
In the past an employer was permitted to introduce changes in terms and conditions of
employment once negotiations had deadlocked.418 Employees in these circumstances could not
stop the employer from implementing its decision, after having participated in the decision-
making process without winning concessions. This was based on the principle that employees
do not have a right to maintain their working conditions unchanged.419
Under the LRA 66 of 1995 the position changes. According to section 64(4) an employee or a
trade union can refer a dispute about a unilateral change to terms and conditions of employment
to a council or commission for a period of 30 days. The employer is not permitted to implement
the changes for the same period or can be compelled to restore the terms and conditions that
existed previously, until such time that the dispute over the actual or intended changes have been
channelled through the statutory or agreed dispute resolution mechanisms. This would mean that
in the Precision Tools case,420 the employer would have been temporarily stopped from
implementing the changes until such time that the dispute over the actual or intended changes
was resolved or pending strike action. Unilateral implementation of changes in terms and
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421  Thompson, C et al note 315 p 122 state that recognition refers to the acceptance by the employer of
a union as the representative of a defined group of employees for collective bargaining or other related purposes.
conditions of employment would be challenged even after a deadlock had been reached. The
intention of this status quo provision is to ensure that an employer does not implement changes
without having made an effort to negotiate with the employees concerned.  The impact of section
64(4) may be far-reaching should the expression “terms and conditions of employment” be
interpreted so as to encompass not only agreed upon terms and conditions of employment but
also employment practices generally. This section also adds weight to the duty to negotiate and
ensures that employers do not get away with changes without the participation of employees in
decision-making.
6.8.3 Refusal to Bargain
In order to further ensure that the employer negotiates with employees, section 64(2) provides
for a protected strike action upon the refusal by an employer to bargain. The strike action is to
be preceded by an advisory award, the purpose of which is to evaluate the justification for the
refusal to bargain and make recommendations to the parties. A refusal to bargain includes:
refusal to recognise a trade union as a collective bargaining agent; a refusal to agree to establish
a bargaining council; a withdrawal of recognition of a collective bargaining agent; a resignation
of a party from a bargaining council; and a dispute about: appropriate bargaining units,
appropriate bargaining levels or bargaining subject. However, only the refusal to recognise a
trade union as a bargaining agent is discussed here, because of its significance to employee
participation. The other matters have been covered in the previous sections on bargaining units
and bargaining councils, to the extent to which they are relevant.
The issue of recognition421 f a trade union as a bargaining agent is very important to employee
participation in decision-making. The importance arises from the fact that if an employer refuses
to recognise a trade union, collective bargaining and consultation will not occur. Consequently
employee participation through collective bargaining will be affected. Section 64(2)(a)(i) of the
LRA classifies refusal to recognise a trade union as a collective bargaining agent, as a refusal to
bargain. Although the Labour Court can no longer avail the union with a remedy in this regard,
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422  In Stocks and Stocks (Natal) v BAWU (1990) 11 ILJ 369 (IC), the employer sought an interdict against
a strike on the grounds that it was unfair. The court discussed whether it was defensible for an employer to refuse
to negotiate with a union which has not yet been recognized by it. De Kock SM held that the obligation to negotiate
wages turned not on whether the employer had agreed to recognize the union, but on whether it ought to have
recognized the union. The presiding officer went on to state that the registration precondition was improper and
that a duty to bargain should not be dependent on a majority of employees, whether generally or in a particular
category, involved in the dispute. However, the judgement was criticised on the basis that, if the representivity of
a trade union was disregarded, this could result in the proliferation of trade unions who will seek to negotiate with
the employer  which might prove to be too expensive for the employer. Employers cannot, however, be allowed
to avoid the bargaining process through the unreasonable refusal to recognize a union.
423  Section 64(2).
424  Ibid.
425  Lacob Z ‘Memorandum on the draft Labour Relations Bill’ (1995) De Rebus p 368.
the union can engage in a protected strike in order to be recognised.422 However, as already
mentioned, the strike has to be preceded by an advisory award.423 In making the determination,
arbitrators should seek guidance from the Industrial Court decisions, where in the Stocks and
Stocks case,424 it was shown that recognition was central to the issue of bargaining. It is possible
that the legislature realised this importance and made this one of the reasons upon which trade
unions could engage in a protected strike. The strength of the trade union to engage in strike
action will determine whether recognition will be forthcoming or not.  Employers, on the other
hand, may not want production to be disrupted due to an issue preliminary to collective
bargaining and rather recognise the trade union as a bargaining agent. The fact that trade unions
can strike in order to be recognised, introduces an element of compulsion on the employer to
accept the role of the trade union in the decision-making process. Once the employer has
recognised the trade union, the achievement of employee participation will be facilitated. 
The foregoing discussion of the duty to bargain suggests that the legislature confined itself to a
choice between a legally enforceable duty to bargain and none at all. Although the Act goes a
long way towards protecting the rights of employees and trade unions to engage in collective
bargaining, it falls short of protecting the process of bargaining itself. While there may be
something to be said for the absence of a legally enforceable duty to bargain, the wisdom of
entirely excluding the courts from the process must be questioned. It seems to be retrogressive
for an Act which aims to promote, amongst other things, labour peace. Lacob425 observed that
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426  Ibid p 368. See also Benjamin P ‘Reforming Labour: Lessons from the USA’ (1995)19 (2) SALB p 50.
427  In light of the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labour Court in section 157 on matters under the LRA, the
decision of the AD may be persuasive and not binding on the LC.
428  (1998)1 ALL SA 363 (A).
the task team that drafted the LRA argued that in a changing economic environment it is best to
leave bargaining to the parties themselves to sort out without providing for a duty to bargain.
Notwithstanding this, his view is that the intervention of courts tended to encourage bargaining
between employers and employees. In fact, the intervention of the courts assisted the parties in
reaching agreement and resolving disputes, thereby avoiding industrial conflict. He continues to
write that:
‘The absence of a duty to bargain creates a vacuum, all of the mechanisms embodied in the LRA are of use if the
parties agree to negotiate with each other. If they do not, industrial action of one sort or another will inevitably
be the only recourse that any party will have to compel another to negotiate on any particular issue.’426 
Furthermore, the absence of the duty to bargain makes a mockery of the rights of employees to
bargain collectively as provided for in section 23(5) of the Constitution of the Republic of South
Africa. Employees at the lowest level in the employment strata who desperately need to bargain
in order to improve their conditions in particular will be on the receiving end. There is, however,
a decision of the AD on the subject of the duty to bargain which may be of assistance in
determining the extent to which employers may be expected to bargain with their employees.427
In South African Society of Bank Officials v Standard Bank of South Africa428 where the
appellant sought an order declaring the respondent’s refusal to negotiate with the trade union in
respect of all terms of employment of the bank’s “M” grade employees (who fall in the
managerial category) to be an unfair labour practice. The issue before the court was whether the
bank was obliged to engage in collective bargaining with the union regarding the terms and
conditions of employment of all managers occupying “M” graded positions. Although the issue
had arisen under the LRA 28 of 1956, the court surveyed foreign law on the duty to bargain and
observed that our law did not provide for an express duty to bargain. The legislature under the
LRA 28 of 1956 had left this to the Industrial Court to decide on under the unfair labour practice
jurisdiction. Commenting on the LRA 66 of 1995, Scott JA observed that the Act did not
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429  Ibid p 368.
430  See Business South Africa v COSATU and NEDLAC (1995) 18 ILJ 474 (LAC) and Ceramic Industries
Ltd v NACBAWU and Others (1997) ILJ 671 (LAC).
431  Mutual and Federal Insurance Co Ltd v Banking Insurance, Finance and Assurance Workers Union
1996 (3) SA 395 (A) 404 C-E.
432  Du Toit et al op cit note 317 p 137 make reference to Du Toit in ‘Labour and the Bill of Rights’ The
Bill of Rights Compendium, Butterworths (1997) at 4B, where in commenting on the absence of a general duty to
bargain they write: ‘The absence of a duty to bargain in the Act effectively means that parties have to resort to
power play in order to enforce a right which is guaranteed in the constitution. Du Toit submits that the rights
contained in section 25 of the constitution fall within the ambit of section 8(2) of the constitution, and therefore
apply both vertically and horizontally. If so, section 23(5) may be read as introducing a duty on a contemplated
bargaining partner to enter into good faith bargaining . He argues that, while it is not possible to compel collective
bargaining over terms and conditions of employment in terms of the Act, it may be possible to seek a High Court
order to enforce section 23(5) of the Bill of Rights.’
provide for a duty to bargain, but made an important statement in his obiter dictum, which may
assist in determining the extent to which an employer is expected to bargain with employees.
Scott JA stated that:
‘In each case, therefore, whether there is a duty on the employer or not depends upon whether on a conspectus
of all the circumstances,... the failure or refusal to engage in collective bargaining with the union representing
a particular bargaining unit will amount to an unfair labour practice, where that bargaining unit comprises
employees at the lower end of the organisation’s hierarchy, a refusal on the part of the employer would ordinarily
constitute an unfair labour practice’.429 
 
The foregoing judgment adopts a purposive interpretation of collective bargaining and this
approach would be encouraged under the LRA as has already been done by the LAC.430 A
purposive interpretation would entail considering which of the purposes of the Act may be
threatened by the employer’s refusal to negotiate with the trade union. Certain circumstances will
have to be taken into account, particularly because the consequences of bargaining do not only
concern trade union members but also non-union members and the need for efficient
management.431 Furthermore, the constitutionality of excluding the duty to bargain is
questionable because section 23(5) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa provides
for the right of every trade union and every employer and employer’s organisation to engage in
collective bargaining. It may be that employees may have to approach the High Court to enforce
their constitutional right.432
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6.9 CONCLUSION
The above discussion on collective bargaining and its relevance to employee participation in
decision-making, shows that the LRA has provided a very dynamic system which bolsters the
strength of trade unions in the bargaining process. Although the Act is vulnerable to facilitating
the growth of adversarialism, in many respects the LRA is also going to promote employee
participation in decision-making. Firstly, the preference for centralised bargaining, although its
success has still to be seen, is very significant as it will allow employees to combine their strength
in order to be an influential force in negotiations thus encouraging employee participation.
Secondly, majoritarianism is important because it will encourage employees to join trade unions
and unions to act together in order to obtain more organisational rights and thus become
influential. The greater the number of employees in trade unions the greater the increase of
democratic participation in labour relations. Thirdly, trade unions are obviously important agents
in collective bargaining, and although trade union representatives have discretion on how to meet
their members’ interests, if the duty of fair representation flourishes in the system, accountability
will be enhanced. Furthermore, the fact that employees generally can challenge collective
agreements that are unfair in nature will ensure that unions will strive to satisfy the interests of
employees as they express them from time to time. Fourthly, since the collective bargaining
machinery is based on voluntarism, interaction amongst employees and employers through
negotiations, will be encouraged. It is important that this should be with as little compulsion as
possible, providing ground for the growth of mutual trust as parties agree to decisions they have
all contributed to. Although voluntarism may be the basis for the absence of the duty to bargain,
there is no justification for the express exclusion of the duty to bargain. Voluntarism and the duty
to bargaining could co-exists because an employer would not be expected to agree with the trade
union. The limitation of court intervention has sufficed in the quest to facilitate voluntarism.
Finally, although the Act wants to promote employee participation in decision-making or
cooperative governance, the occurrence of industrial action on non-substantive issues may
increase the conflictual culture which militates against the growth of employee participation. It
therefore remains to be seen how the system achieves employee participation without being its
own enemy. 
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433  Du Toit D et al The Labour Relations Act 1995 2 ed (1998) p 251.
434  The Explanatory Memorandum on the Draft Bill Government Gazette No. 16259 of 1995 p 136 states
that, ‘In creating a structure for on-going dialogue between management and workers, statutory recognition is
given to the realization that unless workers and managers work together more effectively they will fail adequately
to improve productivity and living standards.... workplace forums expand worker representation beyond the limits
of collective bargaining by providing workers with an institutionalized voice in managerial decisions.’
435  Du Toit op cit note 433 p 136.
436  Balfour C Participation in Industry (1973) pp 185-193 and pp 197-202, in Germany the works
councils have developed through many Acts over the years. Under the Works Constitution Act of 1952 members
of the  councils are to be elected by the employees in companies with certain designated numbers of employees.
The works councils have clearly defined roles distinct from trade unions (sec.75). The employer is expected to
consult with the works council on a variety of subjects before action is taken, coupled with this is the requirement
that the employer has to disclose information to the works councils. The employer and the works councils have
to refrain from activity within the establishment which may imperil industrial peace. The works councils are also
provided with the rights of co-determination. In the Netherlands, works councils are regulated by the Works
CHAPTER 7
WORKPLACE FORUMS
7.1 INTRODUCTION
Workplace forums are perhaps the most significant innovation the LRA has created and they are
largely the reason why employee participation in decision-making is now an important aspect of
the South African labour law discourse. In explaining the underlying motivation for the provision
of workplace forums in the LRA Du Toit et al433 write:
‘It represents a shift from the tradition of collective bargaining between employers and trade unions over all
matters of mutual interest towards a division of labour between trade unions and workplace forums in
representing employee interests. The underlying aim is to mitigate South Africa’s legacy of conflict-ridden
industrial relations and promote economic growth by creating a second channel for more cooperative interaction
between management and labour alongside the institutions of collective bargaining.’434
In reading the explanatory memorandum, there is clear evidence that the drafters of the LRA
were highly influenced by similar structures in Europe. In the 1970s managements across Europe
realized that if there was going to be a move from mass to flexible production, employees would
have to be involved in decision-making.435 This realization gave rise to a system of employee
participation which has manifested itself in the form of works councils in countries like Germany
and the Netherlands.436 Works councils are the equivalent of workplace forums under the LRA
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Council Act of 1979. Workplaces employing 35 or more employees are expected to establish works councils. The
works councils have to be consulted on a variety of matters and they also have rights of co-determination.
Employers are also obliged to provide them with information.  Undoubtedly, workplace forums were adapted from
the structure of works councils in European countries like Germany and the Netherlands, with some variations.
437  Section 1(d)(iii) states that the LRA seeks to advance economic development by fulfilling the primary
objectives of the Act, one of which is to promote employee participation in decision-making through workplace
forums. In Western Europe democratization of workplaces was also a motivation for the establishment of works
councils: Bendix W ‘Workplace Forums: Shadows of a shady past or beacons for reform’1995 (15) IRJSA p108
writes: ‘ The core thought of the Western European philosophy of industrial democracy....is the democratization
of work life by employee representation and employee participation in workplace control and the daily decision-
making process in the enterprise which as it has been argued, convincingly affects their life as well as that of
managers, owners, shareholders if not more so...’
438  Kahn-Freund O Labour and the Law 2 ed (1977) pp 1-17.
which were introduced as a means not only to increase production but also by the need to
democratise workplaces.437 The creation of workplace forums emphasises the shared
responsibility between government, employers and employees for effective industrial relations.
While government has created a statutory framework for employee participation, it will be the
responsibility of employers and employees to utilize the mechanisms for employee participation
provided by the Act. Although industrial relations is inherently conflictual,438 the creation of
workplace forums indicates the possibility of cooperation between employers and employees. 
It is therefore the aim to examine the way in which the LRA has provided for workplace forums
by means of discussing the following matters: the perspectives of both employers and employees
of workplace forums; the establishment of workplace forums; different models of workplace
forums; mandatory consultation; joint decision-making; and the disclosure of information to
workplace forums.
7.2 EMPLOYEES’ AND EMPLOYERS’ PERSPECTIVES
The views of both employees and employers towards workplace forums are essential if the
structure of workplace forums in the LRA is to be understood. The structure of the forums is
reflective of the compromises between the two groups during the drafting process.
7.2.1 Employees’ Perspective
127
439  Lehulere O ‘Workplace Forums: Co-determination and workers’ struggles’ (1995) 19 (2) SALB p 42
writes: ‘at an ideological level there is an objection to workplace forums, co-determination undermines the struggle
for socialism, because, instead of preparing workers for the struggle against capitalism, it promotes the idea that
the capitalists and workers have common interests. It therefore leads to the co-option of the working class. The
alternative to co-determination is workers’ control. Unlike co-determination, workers do not attempt to jointly
manage the problems of capitalism. In this way, workers’ control forms part of the struggle for socialism.’
440  Von Holdt K ‘ Workplace forums: undermining unions’ (1995) 19(6) SALB p 60. 
441  Du Toit et al op cit note 433 p 42.
442  The Star Wednesday 11 the May 1996 p 2.
443  Lehulere op cit note 439 p 43.
Some employees saw workplace forums as posing a threat to the struggle towards achieving
workers’ control in the workplace.439 In addition to this problem Von Holdt440 writes that the
main problems with the forums are that:
‘They attempt to separate collective bargaining issues from production issues, they weaken rather than strengthen
unions, they create two forums in the workplace, threaten to fundamentally undermine the tradition of worker
representation through shopstewards that has been built over two decades of union struggle.’
In the above statement there is a sense that workplace forums are going to inhibit the further
unionisation of the South African working class because, with forms of representation that are
independent of unions, there will be no incentive for workers to join unions.441 
Although employees view these forums critically, they are realistic in their appreciation of the
advantages that such forums are likely to bring. According to a broad-based research report,
labour sees the purpose of workplace forums as the broadening and institutionalisation of
employees’ rights in order to achieve workplace democracy.442 Lehulere443 writes that workplace
forums will act as an incentive for unions to devise strategies to organise white collar workers,
in the sense that unions can nominate some members of this strata of workers to the forum as
part of winning them over. Furthermore, there is a perception that workplace forums will
introduce some vibrancy and a democratic culture within the working class in the shopfloor.
There is also an expectation that the levels of debate may be raised within the working class since
the different unions will be forced to develop positions on key questions facing employees.
The views of employees show that they realize both advantages and disadvantages in the
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444  Du Toit et al op cit note 433 p 253 express this point when writing that the employers’ view is that
workplace forums may restrict the employers’ prerogative to manage and also introduce some inflexibility in the
decision-making process.
445  Ibid p 2.
workplace forums, which may be evidence of the critical approach with which they will approach
workplace forums.
7.2.2 The Employers’ Perspective
There are two main dominating view points on workplace forums amongst employers. The more
common view is that these forums are yet another nail in the coffin of the management
prerogative.444 This makes sense since the more rights employees have to participate in decision-
making, the greater the possibility that the decision-making process will take longer. The second
view acknowledges the decision-making rights of employees, and does not see workplace forums
as a threat to their management rights.445 Instead they see these forums ideally as structures
where responsibility can be shared.
A summary of the perspectives of employees and employers to workplace forums indicates that
it will be important for the parties to adopt a very constructive approach to the forums. If the
more radical positions are adopted, the intentions of the legislature will not see the light of day.
7.3 THE FUNCTIONS OF WORKPLACE FORUMS
The functions of a workplace forum are provided for in section 79 of the LRA which states that:
A workplace forum established in terms of this Chapter -
(a) must seek to promote the interests of all employees in the workplace, whether or not they are trade union
members;
(b) must seek to enhance efficiency in the workplace;
(c) is entitled to be consulted by the employer, with a view to reaching consensus, about the matters referred to
in section 84; and
(d) is entitled to participate in joint decision-making about the matters referred to in section 86.
Section 79 sets out four functions for workplace forums, two of which are general obligations
owed by the workplace forum to employees and the employer and the other two are rights which
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447  Cheadle H et al Current Labour Law (1995) p 75 write that: ‘it is for the above reason that the
composition of the workplace forum must be by way of a direct election of members by th employees in the
workplace (section 82(1)(c)). However if a representative trade union is recognised by the employer for the
purposes of collective bargaining in respect of all employees in the workplace, then the trade union may choose
the members of the workplace forum from among its elected representatives in that workplace.’
448  Section 78(b).
the forums can claim from the employer.446 This section may seem clear, but workplace forums
not constituted in terms of this chapter may not be bound to perform all the functions provided
for. For instance, if a workplace forum is formed on the basis of a collective agreement, section
80(8) provides that the provisions of this chapter do not apply, which may mean that the
workplace forum will not promote the interests of all the employees in that workplace. This may
result in only members of the parties to the collective agreement benefiting. However, if section
80(8) is read together with section 23(1)(d) it will be clear that even though a workplace forum
has been formed on the basis of a collective agreement, it could still promote the interests of all
employees in the workplace. Furthermore, there is nothing to prevent the parties from including
any of the provisions of section 79 in their collective agreements.
In the first place a workplace forum must seek to promote the interests of all employees in the
workplace whether or not they are members of the trade union.447 Th  composition of the
workplace forum is very important in this regard, since this will possibly determine the ability of
the forum to advance the interests of all employees in the workplace. Since workplace forums
can only be initiated by trade unions, there is always a threat to the ability of the forum to address
the interests of all employees in the workplace versus the interests of the union’s members. This
is why it is important that the trade union concerned must be a majority union448so as to ensure
that the union will have the ability to represent the democratic views in that particular workplace.
In order to ensure that the workplace forum is kept accountable for the agreements it reaches
with the employer, an employee who feels aggrieved by an agreement may challenge its validity
in terms of section 94.
One may ask why, if workplace forums are required to represent the interests of all employees,
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450  In a German case, Federal Labour Court, 1 ABR 94/7, International Labour Law Report (30 th
September-1 st October 1975) p 331, it was stated that: ‘Executive staff, because of their close relationship with
the employer, have been deliberately excluded from the operation of the Works Constitution Act. They are entitled
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Spanish  case In re Confederation of Managerial Staff, International Labour Law Reports ( 30 the September- 1st
October 1988) p 449 where it was held that: ‘ the exclusion of senior managerial staff from participation, as
selector or candidate, in the election of workers’ representative organ in the undertaking as provided for in Art 16
of Royal Decree 1382/1985 was reasonable, given that the particular nature of the employment relationship of such
staff deprives it of the independence necessary for the effective defense of trade union aims. Accordingly there was
no  infringement of freedom of association, and, as a consequence, no violation of the principle of hierarchy
norms.’
451  In the Collins Dictionary of the English Language 2ed (1986) efficiency is defined as: ‘the quality or
state of being efficient [functioning or producing with the least waste of effort].’ In an attempt to indicate what
efficiency may entail, Du Toit D ‘Corporatism and Collective Bargaining in a Democratic South Africa’ (1995)16
ILJ p 792 writes that: ‘The only imperative identified with the functions of workplace forums is that of seeking
to enhance efficiency in the workplace. Such an explicit directive will be binding on a court in a way that a general
statement of intent by the Minister is not. The implication is that economic efficiency must take precedence over
the requirements of democracy and that, if “efficiency” as understood by the courts demands it, workers’ rights
to be involved in decision-making must be curtailed.’
senior managerial employees are excluded from their scope.449 Th s may look like a contradiction
in the purpose of the LRA to promote employee participation in decision-making and
democratising the workplace. However, in this regard the LRA follows on jurisprudence
developed in countries like Germany and Spain. In Germany the exclusion of senior managerial
employees was seen as reasonable because their inclusion would deprive the works councils of
their effectiveness in the protection of junior employees’ interests.450 Although the exclusion of
managerial employees avoids unnecessary contradictions in the workplace forums, it is hoped
that such managerial employees will be able to negotiate with the employer in order to establish
participatory structures beyond the LRA. This is necessitated by the fact that they may
experience as many problems as the other employees, which can be solved cooperatively and they
also need to be involved in the democratisation of the workplaces.
Secondly, the workplace forum must seek to enhance efficiency in the workplace. Efficiency in
the workplace has not been defined and it still has to be seen how it is going to be defined.451 
Whereas workplace forums are intended to facilitate co-operative governance of the workplace,
the possible introduction of adversarialism on the matters falling within the jurisdiction of
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p 813 where it is written that: ‘it is very significant that the new Labour Relations Act does not exclude the
possibility that employees may embark on strike action if agreement on a matter meant for consultation cannot be
reached.’
453  Works Council Act of 1979, Chapter 2 , Article 2 section 1. It may be that efficiency in section 79(b)
of the LRA will mean proper functioning of the workplace in all its objectives as in the Dutch model or it may
reflect that workplace forums may not engage in activities that will imperil peace in the workplace as in the case
workplace forums may in fact impede efficiency in the running of the workplace. The greatest
threat to this objective is the fact that employees are not prohibited from engaging in industrial
action on issues of consultation.452 It is very difficult to see how workplace forums will avoid
such problems when the employee members of the forum decide to engage in industrial action
as employees and not as members of the workplace forum. However, on issues of joint decision-
making, the workplace forum and employees may not engage in industrial action. Clearly though,
where a workplace forum exercises its rights in a way that affects efficiency negatively, the
employer should be able to bring an action in terms of section 94(1)(d), before the CCMA. The
employer would have to request the CCMA to decide whether the forum is acting in compliance
with its function of enhancing efficiency in terms of section 79(b). 
The overall significance of section 79(a) and (b) is that the workplace forums are to serve the
interests of employees as a whole in a particular workplace. This means that if the workplace
forum deviates from this objective then it is no longer performing its functions. Furthermore, the
possibility of challenging the decisions of the workplace forum through section 94, also
strengthens the control that even non-union employees of the workplace have over the forum.
This other function (that of enhancing efficiency) indicates that the relationship between the
workplace forums and the employer is based on the parties sharing the right to decide on
production matters which are at the centre of efficient running of the workplace. This fortifies
the importance of cooperation in the functioning of workplace forums. 
The foregoing position in the LRA compares with the Dutch model under the Works Councils
Act of 1979 which provides that the purpose of the works councils is to promote consultation
with and representation of persons employed in the enterprise and in the interest of a proper
function of the enterprise in all its objects.453 The German model offers an example of a
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454  Knudsen H Employee Participation in Europe (1995) p 38.
455  Halbach G et al Labour Law in Germany: an overview (1994) paragraph 136. The duty to maintain
industrial peace does not apply to industrial action between members of a trade union and an employer. The works
council must not call for participation or non-participation in a trade union strike. The individual works council
members who belong to a trade union may participate in union strikes: participation in a strike is unlawful in so
far as advantage is taken of the position of a works council member, for example, if financial or material resources
destined for works council activities are used for the purpose of industrial action.
456  Grogan J Workplace Law 3 ed (1998) p 212.
457  Section 80(5)(b)(iii).
458  Section 78(b).
459  Du Toit et al op cit note 433 p 259.
cooperative relationship between employers and works councils. Section 74 of the Works
Constitution Act gives more precise instruction on how the parties in an establishment are to
practice the fundamental order to cooperate.454 The employer and the works council must refrain
from activities that interfere with operations or imperil the peace in the establishment. Industrial
action between the employer and the works council is unlawful; the employer may not lock out
the works council, nor may the works council call a strike in the establishment. Internal disputes
must be dealt with through the intervention of the conciliation committee or the competent
labour court.455 The German model offers guidance in dealing with the more subtle actions which
may be subversive to the functions of workplace forums under the LRA, particularly those which
are not expressly prohibited by the Act.
7.4 INITIATING WORKPLACE FORUMS
According to section 80(2) read together with section 80(1), any representative union may apply
for the establishment of a workplace forum in a workplace that employs more than 100
employees. The Act requires that the application be made to the CCMA and a copy be sent to
the employer.456 It is also very important that there should be no functioning workplace forum
in that particular workplace.457 The Act once more shows preference for majority unions in the
initiation of workplace forums.458 Du Toit et al459 point out that minority unions have three
possible options: firstly, they may have to increase their membership in order to meet the
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461  ‘In the Netherlands, some two thirds of works council members in the larger enterprises are trade
unionist. The trend is even more marked in Germany, where some 86% of works council members are trade
unionist and some 75 % are members of unions affiliated to the social-democratic union federation, the DGB.
Union representation on works councils is more than twice their representation in the workforce as a whole. In
countries with higher union density such as Belgium, on the other hand, unions are said to have colonized the
works council’: Du Toit op cit note 452 p 799.
threshold; secondly, minority unions may act together in order to establish the necessary majority
and thirdly, it could seek to establish a non-statutory structure for the purposes of consultation
and joint decision-making. It is important to understand the role of the CCMA at this stage. If
the trade union and the employer can reach agreement, the CCMA will withdraw and the parties
will regulate the workplace forum according to their agreement. But if there is no agreement the
CCMA can establish the forum against the will of the employer.460
Since workplace forums were not conceived as an alternative to trade unionism, it makes sense
that workplace forums be triggered by trade unions. International experience has shown that
works councils cannot exist apart from trade unions.461 In Germany the Works Constitution Act
provides that the works councils can be initiated by either workers or a trade union. The German
position therefore is distinguishable from the South African position as it allows non-union
employees to initiate works councils just like trade unions. This position is advantageous as it
makes the works councils a real employee institution instead of the domain of trade unions.
Although evidence shows that in practice works councils are dominated by trade unions, it is
significant that independent employees can compete with trade unions and counter the possibility
of the works councils addressing only trade union concerns.
South Africa can follow the German position in future once trade unions have recognised that
workplace forums will not threaten their existence. Allowing non-unionised employees to initiate
the establishment of workplace forums would facilitate the growth of employee participation
without making it the exclusive preserve of trade unions.
The requirement that only workplaces with more than 100 employees can establish a workplace
forum presents a problem because workplaces with less than 100 employees will not be in a
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p 176.
463  Ibid p 25.
464  Olivier op cit note 452 p 808 writes: ‘Why the legislature opted for such a high threshold is unclear
and unjustified, especially in view of the way in which business organize themselves in the South African
context.... it is estimated that this could exclude up to 74% of the workers in the formal sector. Small and medium-
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most needed.’ Also see: Du Toit D op cit note 451 p 803: ‘Why does the draft bill set its face against the
establishment of works councils in smaller enterprises? If cost is the issue, it could be a simple matter to stipulate
the kinds of costs for which employers will be liable and the circumstances under which they would be liable for
what. Alternatively (or additionally) provision could be made for forms of representation specially adapted to the
situation of the smaller enterprise. In many small workplaces it is arguable that no special structures of employee
participation are needed since the parties are in one-to-one contact. Even here, however, the objects of worker
participation are no less valid than in larger workplaces and even if no special structures are created, the
appropriate rights of consultation and joint decision- making should be vested in the workforce as a whole.’ 
465  Rudd C et al Guide To The LRA 1995 Part 1 (1996) p 462. 
position to establish workplace forums. There is absolutely no reason why a lower threshold was
not preferred. For instance in the Netherlands, enterprises with 35 or more employees who work
at least one-third of the normal week must establish a works council.462 In Australia the threshold
is even lower where the law requires that a works council may be formed on staff initiative if the
enterprise has at least five employees aged over 18.463 The South African position is very
disadvantageous to small enterprises which seem to be fast growing in South Africa and are
providing employment to a majority of people.464 On the other hand, there is nothing stopping
employees within such small establishments from negotiating with their employers to establish
participatory structures. There should be a consideration of reducing the threshold in order for
the LRA to be in line with international trends. 
A problem linked to the preceding one is the way in which the Act defines a workplace. Section
213 states that: 
In this Act, unless the context otherwise indicates, workplace: (c) in all other instances means the place where
the employees of an employer work. If an employer carries on or conducts two or more operations that are
independent of one another by reason of their size, function or organisation, the place or places where the
employees work in connection with each independent operation, constitutes the workplace for that operation.
This definition would support the establishment of a workplace forum in any place or places
where more than 100 employees of an employer work.465 The problem is what happens if an
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467  In Paper Printing Wood and Allied Workers Union v Lane NO (1993) 14 ILJ 1366 (IC), where the
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Employees of the first respondent were dismissed and the second respondent selected some of them for
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simultaneous creation of the second respondent was a device used to among other things, to get rid of part of the
workforce without having to enter into a retrenchment exercise. The court held that this constituted unfair labour
practice (1369 J).
468  Speciality Stores v Commercial Catering and Allied Workers Union and Another (1997) 18 ILJ 992
(LC) at 1003(F-G). In NUMSA and Feltex Foam ( Law Library CCMA KN1441), there was emphasis on the
element of being ‘physically distinct’ thus constituting a separate entity: see also Cheadle H Current Labour Law
(1997) 
p 6. 
469  SA Commercial Catering and Allied Workers Union v Speciality Stores Ltd (1998) 19 ILJ 557 (LAC)
at 565 (C-E), where Froneman DJP stated that: ‘It must also be kept in mind that the definition of a workplace in
section 213 of the Act is preceded by the qualification that it bears that meaning unless the context (of the Act)
otherwise indicates.’ As pointed out by Cheadle et al ibid p 4 the context of determining a proper workplace in
employer establishes several workplaces producing different components of a single product,
three blocks from each other employing less that 100 employees each? 
According to Grogan466 each of the foregoing examples would be a workplace because they are
operations conducted by an employer which by reason of size, function and organisation can be
regarded as independent. Employers who are reluctant to interact with workplace forums may
organise their workplaces in such a way that they make sure that they do not employ more than
100 employees in any single operation. It is very unfortunate that the Act does not provide a
definition for ‘operation’, neither determines which size is required nor which criteria should be
taken into account in determining ‘independent’. The Industrial Court under the LRA 28 of 1956
was prepared to declare artificially dividing of an enterprise for purposes of frustrating the
intentions of the Act, as improper conduct.467 The interpretation of workplace under the LRA
does not provide a clear guideline of what happens in such cases. The LC has only stated that
the definition of the workplace in section 213 of the LRA was intended to apply whenever it
appeared in the Act and bears the same meaning throughout the various sections of the Act.468
However, the LAC was to make a different determination from that of the LC by stating that
workplace may have different meanings in different circumstances under the Act.469The LAC
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organizational rights dispute. The possibility of different determinations of a workplace, in different contexts, is
contemplated and accepted in terms of the Act itself.
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enterprises e.g if they employ less than 100 employees they are not obliged to establish workplace forums, even
the  Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 does not entail greater obligations for businesses that employ less than
50 employees and has a turnover less than that stated in schedule 4 of the Act (see section 1 on the definition of
a designated employer).
471  Jordaan B ‘Workplace Forums: Their structure and function’ (1997) 6 LLN p 2.
472  Section 80(6).
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position may provide a guideline to commissioners or arbitrators in dealing with employers who
strategically organise their operations in order to avoid the establishment of workplace forums
by their employees. Otherwise the LRA should have included an anti-avoidance clause so as to
make sure that employers do not deny employees the establishment of workplace forums by
creating a multiplicity of workplaces with less than 100 employees.470
It is widely held that the Act gives rise to four models of workplace forums:471 b rgained forums;
forums with a bargained constitution; forums constituted by the commissioner and trade union-
based workplace forums.
7.4.1 Bargained Forums
Section 80(2) provides that a representative trade union may apply to the CCMA for the
establishment of a workplace forum. This presupposes that the employer and the trade union
must seek to agree on the establishment of a workplace forum with the assistance of the CCMA.
After having been satisfied of the requirements as per section 80(5), the commissioner must assist
the parties or trade union and the employer to reach a collective agreement472 on the
establishment of a workplace forum. If the employer and the relevant trade union are able to
reach an agreement over the establishment, powers and constitution of the forum during
negotiations, the provisions of chapter 5 of the LRA do not apply473 as the forum is then
governed solely by the collective agreement. The parties are then free to add to or limit its
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functions. This opens the forums to the sole domination of unions, who can in turn use them to
achieve union aspirations to the detriment of non-union members, since the general functions of
these forums as per section 79 could be excluded.474
A contrary interpretation is that the collective agreement derives its life from section 80(7) and
as such should be reflective of the contents of Chapter 5. This would mean that if the collective
agreement deviates from the provisions of the chapter, such deviation should not amount to a
fundamental departure from what the Act requires. Whatever the contents of the collective
agreement, section 79 of the Act must be included in the collective agreement .
7.4.2 Forums with a Bargained Constitution
Section 80(9) provides that should the parties be unable to conclude an agreement over the
rights, powers and duties of the workplace forum, they may nevertheless with the aid of the
commissioner be able to reach agreement on its constitution. This would mean that the forum
would retain the functions in section 79 which include the organisational rights in sections 85 and
86. Schedule 2 will serve as a guideline to the contents of the constitution. The guidelines in
Schedule 2 item 4(2) provide for the eligibility of non-unionised members to stand for election
to the forum. Section 82 will still be relevant since it contains provisions which must be included
in the constitution of the forum.
7.4.3 Forums Constituted by the Commissioner
Section 80(10) provides that:
If no agreement is reached on any of the provisions of a constitution, the commissioner must establish a workplace
forum and determine the provisions of the constitution in accordance with this chapter, taking into account the
guidelines in Schedule 2. 
This section once again provides employees with another avenue to ensure the establishment of
a workplace forum if the employer is reluctant to establish one. It is not clear whether the
commissioner is to intervene when parties disagree on the entire or part of the constitution,
because there is no provision that the parties must declare a point of disagreement. It seems
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therefore that it will be the responsibility of the commissioner to decide when to intervene.475 It
is also expected that the employer and trade union will have a right to be heard in the process,
if the forum to be established is to be legitimate in the eyes of the parties. If any of the parties is
not satisfied with the way the commissioner has carried out his duties, Du Toit et al write that
such dispute may be referred to the Labour Court in terms of section 158(1)(b) or section
158(1)(a), depending on the circumstances.476
7.4.4 Trade Union-Based Workplace Forum
Section 81 (1) provides for the establishment of workplace forums by a trade union recognised
by the employer in terms of a collective agreement. This must be a majority union entitled to
bargain on behalf of all the employees in the workplace. The trade union can constitute the
workplace forum exclusively of its own members in that particular workplace who will most
probably be members of the shop stewards’ committee. If the workplace forum is established in
terms of section 81(1), the provisions of section 80 and section 82 will apply with the exception
of those sections dealing with the election of a workplace forum.477 Th  union's constitution will
be applicable in the nomination and election of members of workplace forums. Although the Act
wants to promote employee participation through workplace forums, the legislature provides a
threat to this very goal through the heavy involvement of trade unions.478 The fact that a
collective agreement is to be concluded for the establishment of a workplace forum, immediately
introduces the concept of collective bargaining and adversarialism. This may also undermine the
cooperative relations that are supposed to prevail in these forums. The Act further provides for
the election to the workplace forum of trade union representatives in the workplace
(shopstewards) who may come with a mind-set of adversarial bargaining which may militate
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against the cooperative approach which is necessary for employee participation. The intention
of ensuring that workplace forums serve the needs of all employees in the workplace is also
threatened, since most members of the workplace forum will be from a trade union and only a
minority may come from non-unionised members whose interests may tend to be disregarded in
favour of trade union aspirations. Section 79 may be the answer to the threat posed by union-
dominated forums.479 Although the Act creates forums separate from the collective bargaining
structures, the Act does not succeed in this institutional separation,480 at best the forums will be
supplementary structures for collective bargaining dominated by trade unions.
In Germany works councils exist independently of the trade union network as a matter of law.As
in the South African situation, although trade unions and works councils are institutions which
are completely independent of each other there are, however, some personnel and functional links
between them. Moreover, on the basis of the right of association protected by the Basic Law,
the trade unions are entitled to represent their members' interests in the establishment. The Works
Constitution Act dissolves the strict separation of functions on the one hand and the personnel
and functional links between trade unions and works councils on the other hand.481 The German
position makes the case even stronger for allowing non-unionised employees to initiate
workplace forums so that they will only have functional and personnel links with the trade
unions. The power that trade unions presently enjoy over workplace forums, creates doubt in the
independence which is necessary for them to promote employee participation for the benefit of
all employees in a particular workplace.
Finally, the plural ways of establishing workplace forums have ensured that employees will not
be stopped by employers when they want to establish a workplace forum, provided they (the
employees) meet the requirements of establishing such a workplace forum. It is significant that
primarily the LRA allows the parties to establish workplace forums through negotiation based
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on a collective agreement. A consensual establishment of a workplace forum sets a precedent in
the parties’ relationship of cooperation and will ensure that all parties respect the credibility of
the forums. However, compulsion is important in case some employers are resistant to the idea
of a workplace forum, hence the forums which can be established with the assistance of the
CCMA. The different approaches to the establishment of a workplace forum will ensure that
employee participation is not strangled at inception. Perhaps the concern about the significant
role of trade unions in the operations of workplace forums needs to be monitored to ensure that
it does not militate against the achievement of employee participation in decision-making.
7.5 MEETINGS OF THE WORKPLACE FORUM
Meetings are important in understanding the role of workplace forums. It is only within the
context of a meeting situation that the workplace forum and the employer can engage in the
other two main functions of the forums namely: consultation and joint decision-making. It is also
important to understand how the workplace forums derive their mandate and account for their
actions in the course of enhancing employee participation in decision-making. In section 83, the
Act envisages three types of meetings namely: meetings of the workplace forum, meetings
between the workplace forum and the employer; and meetings between the workplace forum and
the employees employed in the workplace.
Firstly, section 83(1) provides that there must be regular meetings of the workplace forum. This
section does not proceed to say exactly how regularly the meetings must be held. Guidance can
be sought from schedule 2 item 6(c), according to which the workplace forums must meet
whenever necessary, but at least once a month. It would therefore seem that necessity will be the
guiding factor on how frequently the forum must meet. Another important factor is that members
of the workplace forum must be given time off to perform their functions and duties as members
according to item 7(a)(i) of schedule 2. 
Secondly, section 83(2) provides that the workplace forum and the employer must have regular
meetings. At those meetings the employer must present a report on its financial and employment
situation, its performance since the previous report, and its anticipated performance in the short
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term and in the long term.482 The employer may further consult the workplace forum on any
matter arising from the report that may affect employees in the workplace. Section 83(2) also
leaves it to the employer and the trade union party constituting the workplace forum to agree on
how often they will meet. It is also very important to point out that this meeting is given
significance, because it is at this meeting where the employer must present a report of his
financial and employment situation. These are matters which were traditionally reserved for
management only to deliberate on. Furthermore, the employer is expected to reveal its
anticipated plans for the future. This gives this meeting an important status in the decision-
making process outside the matters reserved for consultation and joint decision-making.
However, section 83(2) raises serious questions: for instance, are there any limitations to the
disclosure of the financial situation of the employer; is it assumed that the limitations to
disclosure in section 16(5) are applicable here? It remains for the commission to define the extent
of disclosure in this section. Another issue is that consultation in this section is confined to
matters emanating from the employer’s reports and the section does not stipulate the aim of
consultation in this section. It may be the case that the legislature wanted to give consultation
here its ordinary meaning without any requirement for the parties to agree on anything, however,
nothing prevents the parties from reaching agreement on the issues being discussed. It would also
seem possible that the employer may consult on the matters referred to in section 84 in one of
the regular meetings or call for a specific meeting for consultation.483 
In the third place section 83(3) provides that there must be a meeting between members of the
workplace forum and the employees employed in the workplace at regular and appropriate
intervals. In this meeting the workplace forum must report on its activities generally, on matters
in respect of which it has been consulted by the employer and matters in respect of which it has
participated in joint decision-making. This is a report-back mechanism to ensure that the
workplace forum is accountable to the employees for its activities. Item 6(f) of schedule 2
suggests that such meetings could be held at least four times a year. In a single workplace the
meeting with employees should be with all members of the workplace forum. However, in a
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workplace with geographically dispersed locations the meetings with employees should be with
one or more members of the workplace forum. In one of the meetings with the employees, the
employer must present an annual report of its financial and employment situation, its performance
generally and its future prospects and plans.484 This section provides a unique situation whereby
the employees, and not only their representatives get together with the employers to discuss the
state of the workplace. The Act does not define the status of the meeting whether it is a
consultative one or not. Furthermore the extent of disclosure is not defined. If there are
restrictions to disclosure to a few people such as members of a workplace forum, it can be
expected that it will be more so in a meeting with all employees. 
It is not clear whether in cases where employees do not agree with the decisions taken by the
workplace forum and the employer, they can alter such decision in the meeting with both the
workplace forum members and the employer. This raises the question of what exactly the
relationship is between decisions of the workplace forum and this meeting of employees and the
employer. If this meeting is just for the employer and the workplace forum to report and no
decisions are to be taken, effective employee participation would be foiled, whereas it would be
strengthened by accountability and the possibility of altering unsatisfactory decisions.
Under the German Works Constitution Act485 provision is made for the consultative meetings
with the employer at least once a month and under the Dutch model such consultative meetings
are to be held with the employer at least six times per year.486 These meetings could be equated
to the consultative meetings envisaged under section 84 of the LRA. It would seem that in other
jurisdictions there is a separation of the processes between consultative meetings and meetings
held for the purpose of accounting to constituencies, and the employer does not duplicate the
consultative process with the works council and the employees in the workplace. It remains to
be seen how the processes will develop in South Africa. However, a separation of meetings for
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consultation purposes and for accounting should be clearly defined, in order to avoid any
duplication of processes.
7.6 MANDATORY CONSULTATION
Workplace forums are granted rights which are aimed at bolstering their influence in the
decision-making process in the workplace. One such right is the right to be consulted over
certain matters. Section 84 provides that a workplace forum has to be consulted on the matters
stated in the section, unless there is a collective agreement regulating such matters. It is possible
that through a collective agreement, matters for consultation may be reduced which would
obviously militate against the scope of influence that employees have gained. Sometimes a
reduction on the matters for consultation can occur as a result of making concessions which will
extend gains on other matters for the employees. However, section 84(2) gives the impression
that what is envisaged is an increase of the matters for consultation. This would in fact accord
with the objective of enhancing employee participation in decision-making. The implication here
is that collective agreements will not have a negative effect in so far as the scope for consultation
is concerned but they will also help widen the scope for consultation.487 
Section 84(1) outlines the matters on which the workplace forums are to be consulted and this
shows the extent to which the legislature was prepared to reduce the scope of management
prerogative in decision-making. Deal488 categorises these matters as follows :
(i) Business decisions: investment decisions; corporate structures; strategic business plans;
mergers; transfers; partial or total plant closures.
(ii) Production decisions: productivity; quality; production planning system; production
development plans; introduction of new technologies; and new work methods.
(iii) Organisational decisions: changes in the organisation of work; working time patterns; and
restructuring the workplace.
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(iv) Personnel decisions: dismissal based on operational requirements; education and training;
job grading.
Additional matters for consultation may be agreed upon by a bargaining council according to
section 28(j).489 It is also possible for the parties to define the matters for consultation in the
constitution of a workplace forum, whether by adding to or subtracting from the list contained
in section 84(1).490 Furthermore, workplace forums may acquire the rights to be consulted on any
other matters provided for by any other law according to section 84(5).491 Finally, a
representative trade union may agree with the employer that the workplace forum may be
consulted on health and safety matters according to any applicable health and safety legislation.492
The foregoing is an indication of how extensive the matters are upon which workplace forums
have to be consulted. Although the LRA provides for a limited list of issues, this list can be
expanded as parties realize the importance of the forums.
 
7.6.1 Content of the duty to consult
Section 85(1) provides that: 
Before an employer may implement a proposal in relation to any matter referred to in section 84(1), the employer
must consult the workplace forum and attempt to reach consensus with it.
The employer has to initiate the consultation process. This is a problematic arrangement as it may
weaken the effectiveness of the consultation process in the sense that the employer is given the
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right to subjectively decide whether to initiate consultation or not.493 This may allow employers
to initiate consultation when they think they are in a stronger position and the workplace forum
in a weak position to offer very strong resistance. One thing that is clear though, is that
workplace forums will not be consulted on trivial matters which are linked to the issues for
consultation. The issue must be important for consultation to begin. Du Toit et al494 say, the
Dutch system can be instructive in this regard. If consultation was meant to enable employees
and employers to continuously communicate on matters, the legislature should have given the
workplace forums the right to initiate the consultation process.
The commencement of the consultation process is also very important in determining the
effectiveness of the decision-making process. Under the retrenchment procedure which is one
of the issues for consultation, consultation has to commence as soon as the employer
contemplates the possibility of retrenchment.495 In the AD decision of the Atlantis Diesel Engines
case496 it is stated that consultation should begin once an employer recognises that the business
is failing, considers a need to remedy the situation and identifies retrenchment as the possibility.
Section 85(1) does not specify exactly when consultation should begin, apart from the fact that
this has to be before implementation of the proposal. This opens a possibility for employers to
decide on the matter and just pretend to be consulting openly with the workplace forum. In the
Netherlands, consultation must commence in a ‘timely fashion’ to permit both careful
consideration of issues presented and also to permit the advice of the works council to affect the
146
497  Works Council Act of 1979, Section 25(2).
498  Works Constitution Act of 1952, Section 90.
499  In Denmark where they have corporate committees (the equivalent of a workplace forum) established
according to the Corporation agreement of 1947, article 3 provides that management must involve the corporation
committee at an early stage in the decision-making process, so that the viewpoints of employees can be taken into
account: see Knudsen op cit note 454 p 86.
500  Section 85(2).
501  Section 85(3).
502  Atlantis Diesel Engines (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA supra note 496 at 5H where it is stated that:‘consultation
provides an opportunity, inter alia to explain the reasons for the proposed retrenchment, to hear representations
on  possible ways and means of avoiding retrenchment and to discuss and consider alternative measures.’
ultimate decision-making process.497 This position is similar to that in Germany whereby
consultation with the works council has to commence ‘in good time’.498Although the German
and the Dutch positions seek to clarify when consultation must commence, they do not offer any
clarification because ‘good time’ and ‘timely fashion’ are very broad terms which could be open
to manipulation by the employer. Therefore, it would be correct to adopt the approach under
dismissal for operational requirements, where consultation must commence as soon as the
employer contemplates a proposal.499 The legislature would not have intended a different point
of consultation for the workplace forum on retrenchment matters as provided for in section
84(1)(e) from that which is set out in section 189(1).
The consultation process is strengthened by the fact that the employer must allow the workplace
forum an opportunity during the consultation process to make representations and advance
alternatives.500 Furthermore, the employer must consider and respond to the proposals made by
the workplace forum, and if the employer does not agree with the proposals, reasons for
disagreeing must be stated.501 This is a codification of the principles of consultation established
under the retrenchment jurisprudence.502 The workplace forum is given the opportunity to make
meaningful and effective proposals which may ultimately influence the decision of the employer.
Under the Dutch system, in addition to discussion and consultation, the statute provides that
before a company's management board may render a decision on certain specified subjects, it
must seek the advice of the works council. Furthermore, the works council must be advised in
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advance of the reasons for the decision being contemplated, the consequences it will have for
their employees and the measures management intends to take in light of those consequences.503
This goes further than the LRA in the sense that the Dutch Act prescribes what the employer has
to make available to the works council. In fact it goes beyond just consulting on the proposal but
also on the consequences it will have and what the employer plans to do having regard to those
consequences. The Dutch position may be a consideration for making consultation in workplace
forums even more effective. 
The consultation process must be coupled with an attempt to reach consensus. As has already
been discussed in dismissal for operational requirements,504 this con ultation does not make
agreement mandatory. This process is obviously distinguishable from joint decision-making and
negotiation under collective bargaining.505 If the workplace forum and the employer cannot reach
any agreement, the employer is entitled to implement its proposal, after invoking any agreed
upon dispute resolution mechanism.506 This indicates the extent to which the management
prerogative to decide on the matters for consultation has been maintained. Although the
workplace forum can make representations on alternative proposals this means very little if the
employer ultimately implements its proposal. The fact that the employer can still implement its
proposal may seem to threaten effective consultation. However, it is significant that the
consultation process, if done with an open mind, will ensure that the ultimate decision to be
implemented by the employer has been influenced by the employees through the process of
consultation. 
It is also significant that the Act provides an opportunity for a third party to assist the workplace
forum and the employer to be reconciled if they do not agree. This will be done through any
agreed procedure between the parties which may be included in the constitution of the workplace
148
507  Ottervanger et al op cit note 486 p 401.
508  Ibid.
forum in terms of section 82 and possibly in a collective agreement where applicable. If,
however, one of the parties to the consultation process feels that there was non-compliance with
the procedure for consultation, such a dispute may be resolved through section 94 on arbitration,
which is a further limitation of the management prerogative. 
The Dutch position is clearer and more detailed and supports the participatory aim of works
councils. According to section 26 of the Works Council Act of 1979, if having obtained the
advice of the works council, the company's management makes a decision contrary to that
advice, it shall promptly advise the council of its decision and explain why it has not followed the
council's advice.507 Where the company's management has made a decision that is contrary to the
advice given, it may not implement such a decision for thirty days, during which time the works
council may appeal the decision to the Enterprise Chamber of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal.508
The sole basis for an appeal to the Enterprise Chamber is that the management board could not
have reasonably reached a decision had it weighed all the interests involved. This is a very strong
mechanism of maintaining checks and balances on the process of consultation compared to the
weaker system under the LRA. In fact after reviewing the decision, the Enterprise Chamber may
issue an order requiring the enterprise to withdraw the decision as a whole or in part and to
reverse specified consequences of that decision or enjoining the company from taking any acts
implementing its decision. Decisions of the Enterprise Chamber may be appealed to the Supreme
Court of the Netherlands. It is important that the concept of corporate decision-making be
limited in favour of ensuring that employees are given significant influence in the decision-making
process. To ensure that parties are focussed and that employees are given an effective
opportunity to influence the decision-making process, strong mechanisms to evaluate the
substantive and procedural correctness of the decisions should be put in place in the LRA similar
to the Dutch position.
7.7 JOINT DECISION-MAKING
Trade unionist have viewed joint decision-making as a victory and a furtherance of the
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democratisation process in the workplace.509 Due to the fact that joint decision-making is a new
concept in our law, there are no precedents on the subject. However, we can trace the origins
of this concept from Germany where it is called co-determination.510 This is he process whereby
the workplace forum can participate in the decision-making process on an equal footing with the
employer. According to section 86(1) of the LRA the employer must consult and reach
consensus with the workplace forum before implementing proposals on the issues under the
provision. The provision makes joint decision-making peremptory on the issues outlined.
However, the provision is applicable only if the issues for joint decision-making are not regulated
by a collective agreement. Like the right to consultation, only the employer can initiate joint
decision-making. This differs from the German position where the works council has an equal
right of initiating co-determination. The German legislature found this to be necessary because
otherwise the employer could prevent the works council from exercising its right of co-
determination through omitting to take a decision.511 In fact, under section 87 of the Works
Constitution Act of 1952, works councils have an enforceable right of initiative mainly in social
matters. Since our legislature had already decided that it shall grant workplace forums and
employers equality in making decisions on matters under section 86(1) of the LRA, equal rights
of initiative could not have limited management’s prerogative, to any greater degree than already
has been done by the very fact of joint decision-making.
7.7.1 Matters for Joint Decision-Making
As already mentioned in Germany the matters for co-determination are mainly social issues. It
would seem therefore, that it is an international trend to confine issues for joint decision-making
to social matters. Section 86(1) requires the employer to engage in joint decision-making on the
following matters: disciplinary codes and procedures; rules relating to proper regulation of the
workplace in so far as they are related to the work performance of employees; affirmative action
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issues; and changes of rules regulating social benefit schemes. Decisions on these types of issues
will have a direct effect on the lives of the employees. The range of matters is very conspicuous
in its limitations. This may be an indication of a compromise by the legislature to the already
shrinking managerial prerogative. However, it is interesting to note that matters can be added
through a collective agreement between a representative trade union and an employer according
to section 86(2)512 and any other law can increase the matters for joint decision-making as per
section 86(3).513 
In both Germany and the Netherlands,514 works councils have to engage in co-determination with
employers on about 12 matters. Although section 86 of the LRA is limited in scope, it is very
significant for employee participation in decision-making to the extent that it brings an end to
unilateralism in respect of certain issues. However, by facilitating joint decision-making on social
matters, the achievement of employee participation would be strengthened 
7.7.2 An employer must reach consensus with a workplace forum
Under section 85(1) workplace forums are only required to attempt to reach consensus with the
employer on the issues for consultation. However, for the purposes of joint decision-making, the
employer must not only attempt, but must reach consensus with the workplace forum.
Mandatory agreement required by this section indicates a stronger sense of purpose in the quest
to enhance employee participation in decision-making. This goes beyond collective bargaining
which entails negotiations with a view to compromise coupled with the threat of industrial action.
In spite of compromise, in joint decision-making the employer and the workplace forums enjoy
equal status in decision-making . 
However, once the decision has been taken by both the employer and the workplace forum it
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does not appear that such a decision can be reviewed. Only newly established workplace forums
(according to section 87) can request a review of the criteria for merit increases or payment of
discretionary bonuses, disciplinary codes, and procedures and rules regarding the regulation of
work performance. Under the Dutch system where co-determination is concerned, a continuing
dialogue is contemplated. It would make sense for the LRA to ensure that workplace forums and
employers do not only engage in joint decision-making when the employer has a proposal but
there should be a continuous process. 
According to section 86(4), if the employer and the workplace forum cannot reach consensus,
the employer may refer the dispute to arbitration in terms of any agreed upon procedure, and if
there is none, refer the dispute to the CCMA in terms of section 94. The commission has to try
to resolve the dispute through conciliation and if it still remains unresolved, then it should be
resolved through arbitration. There seems to be a diversity of ways in which non-agreement in
co-determination matters can be resolved in different jurisdictions. Under the Dutch model, if the
works council does not consent to the decision proposed by the management board, the board
may request the Industrial Committee to approve the decision.515 Such approval shall take the
place of the consent of the works council. What this implies is that the decision-making is
removed from the employer and the works council and then made by the Industrial Committee.
It is possible that both the works council and the employer make representations, after which a
decision is made, which is more akin to arbitration. A decision made without consent of either
the works council or the Industrial Committee is null and void. 
In Germany under section 76516 if the works council and the employer do not reach agreement
a ruling shall be given by the conciliation committee. That decision shall supersede an agreement
between the employer and the works council.517 It is interesting to note that in both Germany and
the Netherlands conciliation is not a prerequisite prior to a decision being made by the
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independent forums. This clearly makes the LRA more friendly to employees' interests because
conciliation gives the employees a chance to get a decision which they have clearly contributed
to although it may not be absolutely favourable. The problem of arbitration is that it allows the
independent body to make the decision based on what it deems to be appropriate and the parties
are bound by the arbitration decision. This may immediately be seen as a decision which is being
imposed on the forum and not one which employees participated in and the implementation of
such a decision is prone to be frustrated. Although the workplace forum may not be happy with
the arbitration award, the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to hear the matter and the workplace
forum cannot engage in industrial action. 
7.8 DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION
The success of the consultation and joint decision-making processes rests on the knowledge the
parties to the process have about the proposals being made. Thus, the legislature has granted
workplace forums the right to information in section 89.518 The employer must disclose to the
workplace forum all relevant information that will allow the workplace forum to engage
effectively in consultation and joint decision-making. The wording of this provision is similar to
that of section 16. 
The disclosure of the information by the employer is mandatory and to that extent the workplace
forum need not request such disclosure. The stage at which such disclosure is made is also very
important. According to section 89(1) the disclosure is intended to allow the workplace forum
to engage effectively in consultation and joint decision-making. This implies that disclosure
should occur prior to the commencement of the processes which will allow the parties to prepare
for either consultation or joint decision-making.519
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The employer has to disclose all relevant information. Relevance in these circumstances is not
as problematic as in the retrenchment and collective bargaining context, because relevant
information here will refer to information on the issues that are subject to consultation520 and
joint decision-making.521 What is important is that the information disclosed must enable the
parties to engage effectively in consultation and joint decision-making. Full disclosure is
necessary for effective participation of the workplace forum. The workplace forum may request
further disclosure subject to the limitations that the following information may not be disclosed:
legally privileged information; information that cannot be disclosed because such disclosure will
contravene an order imposed by law or order of court; disclosure may cause substantial harm to
an employee or the employer; and private and personal information.522
Although the limitations to disclosure are similar to those under section 16, it would seem that
workplace forums are entitled to more generous disclosure than a representative union. Firstly,
employers are not just required to disclose information that will allow the workplace forum to
engage in consultation and joint decision-making only, but the information to be disclosed is
outlined under the issues for consultation and joint decision-making. Therefore, the subjective
evaluation of relevant information by the employer is limited. Secondly, the employer at section
90 is supposed to allow the forum to inspect any documents containing information to be
disclosed in terms of section 89 or at the request of the workplace forum. Furthermore, the
employer should provide copies of the information to the members of the forum. However,
confidentiality of the information disclosed should be respected by the workplace forum
members, as breach thereof can result in the withdrawal of the right to disclosure from a
workplace forum by the commissioner.523 Thirdly, beyond the consultation and joint decision-
making matters, section 83(2)prescribes that the employer must have regular meetings with the
workplace forum, at which the employer must present a report on its financial and employment
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situation, its performance since the previous report and its anticipated performance in the short
term and in the long term, and consult the workplace forum on any matter arising from the report
which may affect the employees in the workplace. Furthermore, section 83(3)(b) provides that
at least once a year the employer must meet with the employees in the workplace covered by the
workplace forum, at which meeting the employer must present an annual financial report and a
report on the employment situation, its performance generally and its future prospects and plans.
The interesting point is that there seems to be no limitation to the disclosure at this point. It may
be reasonably assumed that the principles of good faith bargaining may serve as a guide in
regulating the handling of information disclosed in the process. However, the significant point
here is that these meetings provide the workplace forums and employees in the workplace with
a further opportunity for disclosure. It remains to be seen whether the limitation in section 89 (2)
will apply to section 83.
All the foregoing is evidence of the extent to which the legislature has sought to enhance the
effective participation of employees in decision-making through workplace forums. It is clear that
it is not only through section 89 that workplace forums are to obtain information, but also
through section 83 in compliance with which as already mentioned, specific information should
be disclosed. An analysis of the information to be disclosed gives the impression that the
workplace forum, together with the employees in the workplace, will be given an opportunity
to understand the general status of the company. If workplace forums are to be informed of the
financial status, employment situation and future plans of the company, they are brought into the
terrain that used to be reserved for shareholders of a company. Although disclosure in the case
of workplace forums has been widened, it is important that the information should be provided
within its full context. This means that the employer must not present only the information that
will support its intentions. The information must also be provided in a clear and unambiguous
way. It is possible that employers may present information that requires skill to analyse and
understand, which may not be easy for the employees in the workplace forum to grasp. Hence
the reason why it becomes important that the employees be empowered in order to understand
the processes in the workplace forum. Where the employees feel that the information is too
intricate for their understanding, it will be important for them to obtain the assistance of an
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expert in analysing the information at issue.524
In case of a dispute about the disclosure of information, the issue must be resolved by the
CCMA.525 The CCMA must first attempt to resolve the issue through conciliation and if the issue
remains unresolved it should be determined through arbitration. As provided in section 16 the
commission must first determine whether the information sought is relevant and also determine
whether disclosure will cause the employer any harm. The commissioner can either order the
employer to disclose all the information sought by the workplace forum or order disclosure that
will limit the harm which may ensue as a result of the disclosure.
A comparative analysis with other jurisdictions reveals a slight variation in the disclosure
provisions. The Dutch model under the Works Council Act of 1979, provides that the
management board should provide information at the request of the works council.526 This i
different from the LRA where the employer is supposed to disclose information without a request
from the workplace forum. In the Netherlands information to be disclosed must pertain to the
legal and factual organization of the company and the names and addresses of its executives (at
the beginning of each term of office), the financial statements, budgets, the expectations which
the management board has for the future, investment plans, long term plans (twice per year), the
employment situation and social policy (once per year).527 This position is nearly identical to the
position in the LRA save for the fact that it goes further to stipulate how often the information
is to be disclosed to the works council. Members of the works council are however obliged to
observe secrecy regarding matters of which they learn in their capacity as council members.528
This is a very restrictive position compared to the LRA where, confidentiality is to be observed
only on matters labelled as confidential. However, the Dutch position seems to apply in all
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situations where the members of a works council have come to obtain information in their
capacity as members. In both the Dutch and South African consultation by the works councils
and workplace forums respectively with employees is limited by a confidentiality provision. It
is to be questioned whether this does not militate against the effective accountability of either
workplace forums or works councils to their constituencies.
The German position is very similar with the LRA position. According to section 80(2)529 the
employer must supply comprehensive information to the works council in good time to enable
it to discharge its duties under the Act. The section proceeds to provide that the works council
should be granted access to any documentation it may require for the discharge of its duties. This
provision is also supported by other specific rights to information which are not directly linked
to other participation rights.530 These rights, however, can be considered as preliminary stages
of or prerequisites for other participation rights for instance to give advice and make
recommendations. For instance at section 90, the employer has to inform the works council in
good time of any plans in respect of the construction, alteration or extension of production,
technical equipment, work procedures and routines or jobs. Although the employer is obliged
to inform the works council, this does not at the same time oblige him to consult the works
council. The observance of secrecy under the German statute is even wider and more restrictive
than that of the LRA. Section 79(1) provides that members and substitute members of works
councils shall not divulge or exploit trade or business secrets which have come to their
knowledge through their membership of works councils and which the employer has explicitly
described as confidential. There is some commonality with the LRA in the sense that a member
of the works council only breaches confidentiality if the information is labelled as confidential
whereas this is not the case in the Netherlands. The section goes further to apply to former
members and substitute members of works councils. However, it does not apply between
members of a works council.
In comparison the LRA is more liberal in disclosure of information to workplace forums as it
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negotiations between the employer and the trade union. An example of such a clause in a workplace forum
constitution is provided in Cheadle H et al Current Labour Law (1997) p 174.
532  Van Holdt op cit note 439 p 34.
533  Ibid.
534  For instance, the constitution of every workplace forum which is subject to section 82, must require
the employer to allow members reasonable time off with pay to perform their functions and receive training
(sec.82(1)(p)), require the employer to provide facilities for the workplace forum to perform its functions (sec.
82(1)(r)), provide for the designation of full-time members of the workplace forums if there are more than 1000
employees in the workplace ( sec.82(1)(s)), provide that the workplace forum may invite any expert to attend
meetings, including meetings with the employer, and will be entitled to any information that the workplace forum
is entitled to (82(1)(t)); and provide that office-bearers or officials of the representative trade union will likewise
does not impose extensive secrecy provisions which may tend to restrict effective participation.531
This may occur in the sense that the members of the forum may be restricted from discussing
pertinent issues with the employees in the workplace because information would be regarded as
confidential. The CCMA should interpret this section in favour of disclosure even if it means
restrictive disclosure. 
 7.9 CONCLUSION
The success of workplace forums will surely depend, in addition to what the Act provides, on
the attitude that employees and employers adopt towards them. If the workers see the forums
as a step towards achieving worker control532 which is informed by a socialist ideology, and the
employers as a threat to their management prerogative which is informed by a capitalist ideology,
then the necessary cooperation will not be achieved. However, it is hoped that the functions of
the forums stated in section 79 will serve as a guide to the approach that the parties should
adopt.
The basis which the LRA provides for the workplace forums to enhance employee participation
in decision-making for instance through the rights of consultation and joint decision-making, will
definitely contribute to the transformation of labour relations in South Africa.533Through the
provision of organisational rights to support the functioning of the workplace forums, the LRA
has ensured that employees will not be handicapped by the lack of time and expertise to perform
their work effectively.534 The functioning of the workplace forums will also be enhanced by
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information disclosure in consultation.
536  Summers C ‘Workplace Forums from a Comparative Perspective’ (1995) 16 ILJ p 809 writes that:
 ‘ you have a very difficult and unique problem in constructing such a system, primarily because you presently lack
centralization of collective bargaining which leads easily to a separation of functions. In so far as you have
bargaining councils or develop them, the goal is within reach. The bargaining councils can limit themselves to the
distributive or economic terms and can, by their agreements expand the subjects of consultation beyond those
prescribed by the statute.’
537  Some have suggested that there be clear cut boundaries for each representative structure at plant-level
and that elected union representatives be not considered for election to the workplace forum. The success of these
two suggestions is very doubtful because throughout the drafting of the LRA the unions wanted to make sure that
they have great influence in these forums. It may be that the parties will realize the importance of not utilizing the
forums for purposes which they were not set for. After all evidence shows that works councils in Germany and the
Netherlands are stronger where strong union structures exist: see Du Toit op cit note 451 p 800. 
information disclosure535 under section 89 and the information that will be disclosed during the
meetings required by section 83. 
However, one of the factors of concern which will be crucial to the success of the workplace
forums is their relationship with trade unions. The relationship between workplace forums and
collective bargaining, is firmly established through the necessary link between trade unions and
the forums. This primary link is the fact that workplace forums can only be established at the
instance of trade unions. Since trade unions are strongly involved in collective bargaining, they
are obviously going to link the functions of workplace forums with their bargaining agenda. The
following points will show the extent of this link. Firstly, matters for consultation and joint
decision-making can only be handled by the workplace forum if there is no collective agreement
regulating those issues. Collective agreements are concluded in the process of collective
bargaining and as such the functioning of workplace forums will be dependent on the extent to
which the trade unions will want to operate the two processes. Secondly, through collective
bargaining in the bargaining council, matters for consultation and joint decision-making can be
increased. This means that the extent of employee participation which will be enjoyed by
workplace forums will be dependent on the success of centralised bargaining.536 There will be a
need for the employees and employers to guard against creating an identity crisis for the forums,
through making sure that they do not confuse the forums with collective bargaining.537
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Another problem which still needs to be resolved is the status of the agreements between the
employer and workplace forums. These agreements are not collective agreements as defined in
section 213 and they do not seem to be covered by section 23. This problem is also linked to the
question of whether the workplace forums have a legal status to enter into legally binding
agreements. Du Toit et al538 express the view that the Act does not treat workplace forums as
legal persons capable of concluding contracts, suing or being sued. However, they do state that
such legal status may be conferred through a clause in a constitution of a workplace forum
established through a collective agreement. The legal status of the workplace forum agreements
is very important if the forums are to become powerful institutions. Otherwise parties may be
tempted not to honour such agreements. It is hoped that employees and employers will honour
their agreements in order to nurture the strength of workplace forums. The situation in Germany
is very clear, section 77 of the Works Constitution Act makes agreements between the works
council and the employer binding on the parties and their application may only be waived on the
authorisation of the works council. Trade unions therefore may not overturn the agreements
entered into by the works council and the employer. The position in Netherlands is as
problematic as the position under the LRA.539 In interpreting the binding effect of the agreements
of the workplace forum and the employer under the LRA, the German position seems to be more
sensible.
Another threat to the success of workplace forums is the possibility of industrial action once the
workplace forum and the employer have consulted and ended in deadlock. If employees utilize
their right to industrial action, the adversarialism which the forums are set to reduce will in fact
be increased. It is necessary to consider inserting a binding peace obligation between employers
and workplace forums, which will prevent industrial action on matters for consultation. The
German position would be very instructive in this regard, where works councils are prohibited
160
540  Lehulere op cit note 439 p 46 writes that: ‘ the important issue raised by the provision on the right to
information is that: workers in the forums cannot share the information with their unions; unions should also have
access to this information. There is no clear provision that workers have the right to information on holding
companies. Capitalists use a lot of tricks to shift profits among their different holding companies. In order to
counter possible misrepresentation, workers must have the right to information on holding companies. The forum
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from engaging in industrial action on consultation matters.
Although the LRA provides the workplace forum with the right to disclosure of information, the
Act limits the disclosure to the constituency which is represented by the workplace forum. This
will limit the accountability that workplace forums need to be subjected to if real participation
is to be achieved. In fact, employees may tend to view the workplace forums as having secret
meetings with the employer and thus create mistrust.540 There i  a need to consider creating a
mechanism that will allow the employees represented by the workplace forum to have access to
the information. This will enhance the level of participation amongst the employees and
ultimately result in the effective participation of workplace forums in decision-making.
 
Finally, workplace forums should not be seen as emasculating the effectiveness of trade unions.
Trade union representatives should realise that for workplace forums to be effective, trade unions
need to support them. The two are not mutually exclusive and workplace forums have more
facilities in the workplace, which they could put to effective use for the benefit of the trade
unions. The trade union, on the other hand, can supplement the weakness of the workplace
forum's strength without dominating it. This supportive relationship between trade unions and
workplace forums will ensure that employee participation in decision-making is a shared
responsibility amongst all workers .
161
CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION
8.1 INTRODUCTION
Although only two years have passed since the promulgation of the LRA 66 of 1995, it can be
fairly concluded that the LRA sets up a framework for employee participation in decision-
making. This framework is strongly dependent on the new democratic values of the South
African state founded on the values in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108
of 1996. The supremacy of the Constitution and the democratic values that it embodies have
permeated labour law, as evidenced by the inclusion of labour relations rights in section 23 of
the chapter on fundamental rights in the constitution. 
The entrenchment of industrial democracy and hence employee participation in decision-making
in the LRA, is embodied in the intention of the legislature to create a break from the past by
establishing a more democratic order in the workplace. It is an objective of the Act that employee
participation is to be promoted through the establishment of workplace forums. Although
workplace forums are the primary means of achieving employee participation, they are certainly
not the only means for so doing. There is also evidence of employee participation structures
which were established before the promulgation of the LRA and which may continue to exist
thus contributing to the development of employee participation in decision-making in general.
8.2 JURISPRUDENTIAL BACKGROUND
An evaluation of the previous regime of labour law statutes provides evidence that employee
participation in decision-making is not an entirely new concept in our labour law. The LRA 28
of 1956 although not having placed the achievement of employee participation amongst its
purposes, indirectly gave birth to some of the principles of employee participation in decision-
making. The very fact that collective bargaining was the means through which the LRA 28 of
1956 sought to quell industrial unrest, is proof of the nurturing of certain principles of employee
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participation in decision-making. In the process of bargaining, employees through their trade
unions were involved in the decision-making process. Perhaps one of the most significant
contributions to the participation jurisprudence was the enactment of the unfair labour practice
jurisdiction which was interpreted by the Industrial Courts as entailing a duty for employers to
bargain with their employees. Once employees and employers were expected to bargain in order
to arrive at mutually acceptable decisions, the stage was set for employees to participate in the
decision-making process. Although good faith bargaining is an American concept, it was
enforced in our labour law, as a consequence of which the Industrial Court developed principles
which discouraged sham bargaining and encouraged openness in the bargaining process through
disclosure of information. These principles have provided a jurisprudential background for the
development of employee participation in decision-making.
Certainly the foregoing were not the only means through which employee participation in
decision-making was nurtured. The LRA 28 of 1956 also provided for the establishment of
industrial councils where employees in an industrial sector could collectively influence the
decisions of employers in that sector. Furthermore, the Act provided for the establishment of
works councils which were aimed at being forums where employers and employees could jointly
make decisions about the workplace. However, these forums were unable to effectively promote
the participation agenda. 
Perhaps the most significant foundation to participatory forums were the works committees and
non-statutory forums which were established by employees and employers who saw the need for
cooperation in the workplace. There is documented evidence of the existence of such structures
in companies like VW SA and Toyota.541 A fair conclusion is that the LRA 28 of 1956 provided
a circumscribed opportunity for the development of employee participation. The limited
provision for employee participation can be attributed to the highly adversarial relations between
employers and employees at the time. Industrial action was frequently utilized to press home
employee demands. Albeit previous legislation provided a shaky foundation for employee
participation, there is a case for expecting employee participation to be firmly established under
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543  (1997) 18 ILJ 474 (LAC) where the applicants sought an interdict against COSATU’s general strike
for reasons of failure to comply with three aspects of section 77. Generally the dispute concerned the exercise by
COSATU of its right to engage in protest action.
544  (1997) 18 ILJ 671 (LAC)where the applicant sought to interdict a strike, inter alia on the grounds that
the notice given by the respondents under the Act had been invalid. Section 64(1) of the Act requires 48 hours
written notice to be given of the commencement of the strike action. The notice given by the respondent had stated
that the strike would start at any time after 48 hours from the date of this notice.
545  Op cit note 543 p 479B.
546  Jammy P ‘Interpreting the New Act: getting down to business with the Labour Appeal Court’ (1997)
18 ILJ at 910.
LRA 66 of 1995. 
8.3 INTERPRETATION
If employee participation in decision-making is to assume a subject of significance in South
African labour law jurisprudence, the interpretation of the LRA by the Labour Courts, and by
the CCMA will be very important. Section 3 provides that: 
Any person applying the Act must interpret its provisions:
(a) to give effect to its primary objects; (b) in compliance with the constitution; (c) in compliance with the
international law obligations of the Republic.
Although the jurisprudence on the interpretation of the Act is just emerging, Grogan542 writes
that:
‘[I]n cases of uncertainty or ambiguity a court must interpret the Act in order to protect individual labour rights
rather than restrict them.’
In the above statement it is not clear whether Grogan is suggesting a purposive and generous
approach to interpreting the provisions of the LRA. However the LAC has provided an
indication of the appropriate approach to interpreting the provisions of the LRA in Business
South Africa v COSATU and NEDLAC543 and Ceramic Industries Ltd v NACBAWU and
Others.544 In the Business South Africa case the respondents had argued that the Court should
interpret the Act in a purposive manner in order to give effect to section 1 of the LRA. In its
majority judgment, the court expressed the view that a purposive interpretation of the Act was
appropriate.545 In fact, according to Jammy546 section 1 of the Act contains its own directive in
favour of purposive interpretation. The foregoing statements indicate that the purposive
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interpretation is on ascendency in labour law.547 Perhaps another motivation for adopting the
purposive interpretation is that the LRA must be interpreted in compliance with the constitution.
Section 39(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 provides that:
When interpreting any legislation..... every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, the purpose and
objects of the Bill of Rights.
The jurisprudence on the interpretation of the constitution indicates the adoption of a purposive
approach to interpretation.548 The question arises whether the LRA should also be interpreted
purposively. Devenish answers this question when referring to section 39(1) of the constitution
by writing that:
‘This provision is not merely “an exhortation to the courts to seek and discover the values underlying the Bill of
Rights” rather it is a prescription to apply the values encompassed in the Bill of rights in the process of
interpretation.’549 
One of the values of the constitution is to create a fair and democratic environment in South
Africa, and it is within this objective that employee participation should be included. The
contention is valid that employee participation in decision-making is an aspect of democratising
South Africa , if the role of employees is not limited just to struggling for job security and better
wages but is viewed in the wider context of instilling democratic values in all facets of life. 
Another important matter is whether the purposive interpretation is to be coupled with a
generous or liberal interpretation of the LRA provisions? In the Business South Africa case the
court (majority judgment) remarked that: 
‘[D]epending on the proper purpose of the Act, a particular section may have to be interpreted restrictively rather
than extensively.’550 
According to the foregoing view, the adoption of a purposive approach does not automatically
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entail that a generous approach should be adopted in interpreting the LRA. The approach will
be determined by a consideration of each and every section.551 The problem with a restrictive
application of the objects of the Act, is that employees’ rights might be limited, whereas there
is a need to generate jurisprudence which will define the limits of the rights of employees to
participate in decision-making. The minority judgment of Nicholson JA552 in the same case
provides a further direction on how the purposive approach should be supported. Nicholson
sought to emphasize the different purposes of the Act, including advancement of economic
development, social justice, labour peace and the democratisation of the workplace. Based on
the consideration of the foregoing matters, Nicholson’s judgment indicates that the values and
the experiences in South African labour relations will be taken into account. Since employees in
the past were disenfranchised and the workplace was not underlined by democratic values,
employee participation should be viewed as one of the elements which the LRA seeks to instill
in labour relations. In rejecting the narrow interpretation adopted by the majority in the decision,
Nicholson pointed out that:
‘A narrow interpretation stultifies this and flies in the face of the double admonition in the Constitution and the
Act to have regard to the rights of persons, more especially those enshrined in the Bill of rights in the
Constitution.’553
The distinguishing factor between the majority judgment and the minority judgment by
Nicholson, is that he places an emphasis on the objects of the Act which should permeate the
application of each and every provision of the Act. Employee participation is one of them. 
In the Ceramic Industries Ltd v NACBAWU case554 the LAC took this approach to interpretation
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even further when it recognized the need for a two stage inquiry, firstly into the purposes of the
Act and secondly into the purposes of the particular section.555 This approach would place every
section within its appropriate context and ensure that a section is interpreted to achieve one or
more of the purposes of the Act. This would mean that for instance section 189 (1) which places
a duty upon an employer to consult with employees, will not only be interpreted to ensure
procedural and substantive fairness, but also to ensure that employee participation in decision-
making is achieved through proper consultation.556 Therefore the challenge is to ensure that in
interpreting the Act the purpose of enhancing employee participation in decision-making should
be applied in all appropriate provisions of the Act.
8.4 COMPANY LAW
Although the thesis concentrates on the LRA, it is important to highlight one of the factors
beyond the LRA which will also determine the achievement of employee participation in
decision-making. This discussion is focussed on public companies because they are most likely
to employ more than 100 employees, and thereby obliged to establish a workplace forum.557
Furthermore, the other reason is that their structural organisation may present some problems
to employee participation compared to other forms of companies. The suggestions for company
law reforms are not exhaustive except to point out some of the areas that need attention. The
question to be answered here is whether there is any motivation in the interests and structures
of public companies to readily embrace employee participation in decision-making. As in many
western countries, South African company law entrenches the powers of shareholders and
directors to make decisions for the company.558 Furthermore, in carrying out their duties
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directors are expected to act in the best interests of the company, which are underlined by the
conventional goal of business to realise a profit.559Alth ugh the LRA now provides for employee
participation in decision-making, a pertinent issue is to what extent are the interests of employees
considered as an interest of a company and whether company structures will facilitate employee
participation in decision-making. Beuthin560 writi g twenty years ago also raised this question
when he asked whether after a company has paid its employees their remuneration, it can wash
its hands of any other needs of the employee. In his analysis, Beuthin mentioned that directors
may only have regard to the interests of employees to the extent that they will affect the interests
of the company.561 That directors can only consider the interests of employees to the extent that
they may affect the interests of the company, does not seem to recognize the growing role of
employees in the administration of the company and there is a clear need for reform of the
interests of a company. 
8.4.1 Re-defining a Company’s Interests
The position that the interests of employees are not necessarily the interests of the company, is
based on the old classical approach to management, which does not view the relationship
between the shareholders and employees as a joint venture.562 However, company law has to
recognise the enhanced status of employees in the workplace which requires that their interests
be seen as those of the company. The reasons for re-defining the interests of a company were
well expressed by Esen et al563 when they wrote that:
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‘The need to give due consideration to the interests of employees in a company is an important one. The main
and obvious reason for this is that employees should be given the right to take part in the decisions of the company
that they work in and on which their livelihood depends. Such participation at management level will not only
encourage them to feel needed but will give them a certain amount of job satisfaction.’564
The foregoing statement strengthens Beuthin’s views that modern managerial techniques require
directors to satisfy the interests not only of shareholders but also the interests of employees.565
South Africa is behind in reform and this might militate against employee participation provided
for by the LRA. British company law had to face this challenge, as a consequence of which the
British Government set up the Bullock Commission to look into the matter.566 Consequently the
British Companies Act of 1985 was amended with the insertion of section 309 which provides
that: 
‘[T]he matters to which the directors of a company are to have regard to in the performance of their functions
include the interests of the company’s employees in general as well as the interests of its members.’
Furthermore, section 390(2) of the British Companies Act provides that the duty imposed by
section 309 is owed by the directors to the company. South Africa would do better by following
the British company law reform so that directors will be statutorily bound to consider employees’
interests as an interest of the company. However, the problem with this route is that if the
directors do not perform this duty, employees will be in no position to compel them to consider
their interests. This is as a consequence of the application of the rule in Foss v Harbottle567which
entails that this duty may only be enforced by the company.568 Since employees are not members
of the company they would have no locus standi to enforce this duty. In order to enforce the
duty, the employees would have to become shareholders of the company and take a derivative
action in that capacity. Alternatively our company law could require directors to reflect in their
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annual report how far they have gone in addressing employees’ interests. Gower569 view  uch
legislative reform as a strait-jacket and prefers that the present definition of a company’s interests
be left in place as it allows directors to take into account employees’ interests within the present
restricted parameters for the ultimate benefit of the company.570 However, in the South African
context the restrictive approach can no longer be sustainable because the LRA bolsters the need
for companies to involve employees in the decision-making process. It would therefore make
sense for company law to be reformed in order to finally consider the interests of employees as
interests of the company.
8.4.2 Structural Re-organisation of Companies
In order to further complement employee participation in the LRA, structural reform of the
public company is necessary. In South Africa at present, the management of a company is divided
between directors and shareholders who have the ultimate control of the affairs of the company
through the general meeting.571 Furthermore in terms of South African company law employees
have no formal say in the management organs of the company and do not play a role in the
appointment of directors.572 The need to re-organise the South African company’s structure was
also recognised by O’ Regan who wrote that:
‘In South Africa, adopting a restructured board of directors will require changes to company law, not only in
respect of the appointment of such directors, but also in respect of the exercise of their power.’573
In other jurisdictions like Germany and the Netherlands, company law has been reformed to
complement employee participation. In the Dutch model of a public company, the management
is divided into two. The overall management of the company is carried out by the management
board, the functions of which are similar to those of the South African board of directors.574 In
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addition, there is a second independent board known as the supervisory board which acts as a
watchdog to the former. Amongst the duties of the supervisory board is ensuring that employees’
interest are taken into account by management. In fact there is a close relationship between the
supervisory board and works councils because members of the former are appointed in
consultation with the works councils.575 The German system is similar to the Dutch system, in
fact it is said that the dual board system was born in Germany.576 Th  German company has a
two-tier system of management: (i) the day-to-day conduct of business of the German public
company is entrusted to the management board; and (ii) the second is the supervisory board,
which is composed of representatives of both shareholders and employees, and appoints and
dismisses members of the management board, supervises and checks their activities, and reports
back to shareholders. The managing board manages the company and the supervisory board does
not concern itself with the day-to-day running of the company. This approach has been
incorporated into the European Company Regulations577 where it is provided that member states
shall take the necessary steps to enable employees of the European Company to participate in
the supervision of the strategic development of the enterprise.
Perhaps one of the criticisms of this elaborate structure is that it will add to the running costs of
companies. However, the possible benefits of this may be that as employees get an understanding
of the state of affairs of the company at the highest level, constructive and productive decision-
making will be achieved. It is interesting that in one of the studies carried out by the King
Committee578 on corporate governance, the committee recommended that the unitary structure
is appropriate for South Africa compared to the two-tier system in other countries.579 It may be
the case that this committee made its recommendations based on the fact that employee
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an independent director. Commenting on the appointment Bobby Godsell, the chief executive officer of Anglogold
said, ‘Motlatsi’s appointment did not suggest that any lines of contest between ourselves and the union movement
have been blurred. (Rather it) indicates a growing realisation that both we and the union, however different our
world views, are entirely dependent for our future survival on the weal or wore of our industry’: see Spicer A et
al ‘Blacks join board of Anglogold’ The Star Business Report ( http://www2.inc.co.za). 
participation in decision-making had not been legislated at the time. Perhaps now there is a case
for the reform of the public company structure. The King report was only prepared to go as far
as saying:
‘Corporations should develop systems, through involving workers’ participation on works committees, executive
committees, boards or otherwise, that will assist in developing the following: effective sharing of information;
effective consultation; and speedy identification and resolution of conflict.’580 
To the extent that the foregoing statement supports employee participation in decision-making
it is significant, but it may be necessary to go even further by legislating the involvement of
employees in the company management structure. Already South African employees have started
indicating their intention to be involved in the boards of directors of companies based on their
realisation that there important decisions are made.581 It is hop d that employers and employees
will realise the importance of company law reform if employee participation in decision-making
provided for in the LRA is to be firmly grounded in South African labour law. 
8.5 DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION
One of the fundamentals that will ultimately determine the success of employee participation in
decision-making is going to be information disclosure. In this thesis it has been shown that
information disclosure is an aspect of constitutional democracy which encourages accountability
and better administrative justice. This concept has also been imported into the LRA to strengthen
industrial democracy. International experience has shown that the success of employee
participation is also determined by the disclosure of information on which employers base their
decisions. In countries like Germany and the Netherlands employee participation in decision-
making is supported by the right to information. International Labour Conventions have also
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582  Collective Bargaining Recommendation 163 of 1981 Article 7(2)(a).
supported the right to disclosure of information for the achievement of employee participation
in decision-making.582 
The jurisprudential background to information disclosure under the LRA has been established
in different fields of the South African legal system: the constitution; the doctrine of discovery
and the unfair labour practice jurisdiction under the LRA 28 of 1956. The foregoing background
will ensure that information disclosure provided by the LRA 66 of 1995 is interpreted to improve
the participation of employees in the decision-making process.
The significance of disclosure requirements in the LRA is that the culture of openness in the
relations between employers and employees is being encouraged and employees will participate
in decision-making armed with information which enables them to make decisions that are based
on facts. Although section 16(2) and16(3) define the information that employees are entitled to,
it is significant that the jurisprudence of disclosure shows that an employer is expected to be
upfront in disclosing information. Therefore employers would not only be expected to disclose
the information specified, but to include all information that will be of assistance in the decision-
making process. A factor linked to the latter is that although the LRA does not provide a test for
relevance, a purposive interpretation will ensure that commissioners will interpret relevance in
such a way as to achieve the purposes of the Act, one of which is employee participation in
decision-making.
Although there are limitations to disclosure of information, these limitations are such as to strike
a balance between the interests of employers and employees. However, in applying the
limitations, the CCMA must ensure that the application of these limitations are in favour of
disclosure which ultimately will support employee participation in decision-making.
The contribution of information disclosure to employee participation in decision-making will only
be realized if employees utilize the information they have obtained constructively to facilitate
proper collective bargaining and consultation, and not to destroy the employer. Furthermore, in
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order to avoid misconstruing information disclosed by employers, it will be important for trade
unions in particular to enhance their training programmes so that their members can understand
the information disclosed. There will also be a need for the employees to utilize experts in
analysing the information disclosed so that the right to disclosure contributes to the growth of
cooperative relationships.
There is some evidence of reluctance on the part of employers to disclose financial information,
which is usually at the hub of all decision-making. This reluctance is due to the fear that
employees will manipulate the information, resulting in the employer having to make
unfavourable concessions. In order to overcome this fear employers will have to utilize the
limitations to disclosure in order to secure their interests. It is also hoped that the suspicious
perception of employees will be solved as the culture of disclosure takes root in our labour
relations. The most significant contribution of information disclosure to employee participation
is that no longer will employees participate in collective bargaining and consultation from an ill-
informed position.
 
8.6 CONSULTATION PRIOR TO DISMISSAL FOR OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
Although consultation prior to dismissal for operational requirements is just an aspect of the
entire process, there is clear evidence of principles supportive of employee participation in
decision-making embodied in the procedure. In fact, it was partly under the retrenchment
jurisprudence that consultation and disclosure of information developed. 
One of the most significant elements of section 189 is that it gives employees the right to be
consulted and employers the duty to consult employees. From the outset a partnership in
decision-making is established and both parties are expected to seriously engage each other for
the process to be exhaustive.
The stage in time at which employees are involved in the decision-making is very important,
because the sooner they are involved the more effective the participation might be. Section 189
(1) requires that the employer must consult the affected employees as soon as he contemplates
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583  Deakin S et al Labour Law (1995) p 685.
retrenchment as a solution. Accordingly employees will contribute to the decision-making
process before retrenchment becomes a reality. Although early consultation is welcomed, the Act
needs to go further and prescribe a period for the consultation process. This will ensure that
employees are consulted timeously and employers will know how much time they have to devote
to the consultation process. Furthermore sufficient consultation may also be determined by the
amount of time spent in the consultation process and there could be a reduction of costs resulting
from protracted consultation. The UK position could be instructive in this regard. Deakin et al583
state that according to the TULRCA 1992 section 188(2) an employer who is considering
dismissing an employee for operational reasons must commence consultation at the earliest
opportunity, at least 90 days before the first dismissal takes place where the employer plans to
retrench 100 or more employees at one establishment within a 90-day period, or not less than
30 days earlier where it plans to dismiss 10 or more employees within a 30 day-period. In respect
of less than ten, there is no time stipulation, however 28 days would seem to be appropriate.
Underlying the consultation process is that it is a two-way process, which requires that both
employers and employees participate in the consultation process constructively knowing that they
are responsible for the outcome of the process. The fact that parties also have to attempt to reach
consensus, further fortifies the reciprocity required in the process. Employees and employers will
have to consider each other’s positions and make an attempt to reach an agreement where
possible. Although employees have now been placed in a stronger position they are expected to
approach the process of consultation in a very constructive way. If they fail to participate in the
two-way process, they will only have themselves to blame. Understanding this partnership in
decision-making is essential for the success of employee participation.
Section 189(2) also gives content to the consultation process by outlining the matters upon
which employers and employees have to consult. It is interesting to note that the first matter for
consultation is means to avoid the dismissal, which is indicative of the fact that even the validity
of the reasons to retrench have to be evaluated by the employees. Surely this puts employees in
a very influential position in the decision-making process. Furthermore, for sufficiency of
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consultation, the employer should have consulted the employees on all the matters stipulated
above. The above statutory provisions are significant limitations of the management prerogative
and further fertile ground for the growth of employee participation. It is also essential to point
out that for the substantive fairness of the decision to retrench, consultation with employees is
necessary, which again points in the direction of the involvement of employees in decision-
making.
To further increase employee participation in decision-making in retrenchment proceedings,
according to section 189(3) the employer is expected to disclose information to the employees.
The information should not be confined to that which supports the position of the employer but
all information that may be relevant to the making of a decision concerning the direction to be
adopted by the company. The section does not stop at just requiring disclosure, it goes further
to stipulate the type of information to be disclosed, which should be given in writing.
In spite of all the foregoing, the employer is still left with a residue of power to make the final
decision after the consultation process. After all the employer is only required to attempt to reach
consensus with the employees. What may militate against effective employee participation in
decision-making, is the extent to which this power will be utilised by employers in the decision-
making process. Clearly there are severe limitations to the management prerogative to make the
decision to retrench, and it is highly improbable that the employer after the consultation process
will implement his original decision. The decision after the consultation process will probably
reflect the influence of employees, whether agreement is reached or not. Influence is the essence
of employee participation in decision-making. Alternatively, the residual power should motivate
employees to influence the employer as much as possible before he exercises the power to finally
decide. 
8.7 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
The contribution of collective bargaining to employee participation must be approached critically
because of its adversarial nature, which creates doubt as to whether collective bargaining can
contribute to the strengthening of employee participation or not. However, as has been shown
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in the thesis, the definition of participation is wide enough to include collective bargaining. Some
elements of collective bargaining will undoubtedly facilitate employee participation in decision-
making.
The basic premise of collective bargaining is the acceptance of the fact that employers have the
right to manage the workplace. But the limitation to this right is that, where the interests of
employees are at stake, there needs to be negotiations until a mutually agreeable solution is
found. It is in the give and take process of bargaining that employees through their trade unions
are able to participate in the decision-making process although in a limited way.
The LRA shows a preference for centralised bargaining which will have a profound effect on the
success of employee participation in decision-making. Employers argue that centralised
bargaining will encourage strikes which may engulf an entire industrial sector. However, its
importance in employee participation is that it will provide employees with an opportunity to
collectively influence the decisions of employers at central level. It is also significant that
agreements reached at central level will bind all employers falling within a particular industrial
sector. The criticism of the choice for centralised bargaining is that, as strikes are declared at
central level, the adversarialism that ensues will trickle down to the plant-level militating against
the achievement of employee participation. This raises the question of the ability of the industrial
partners to separate issues which need a large measure of adversarialism and those that require
a great deal of cooperation.
The LRA also provides for bargaining councils which through their agreements, will determine
the broadening of matters that can be handled by workplace forums. Consequently bargaining
councils will contribute to the broadening of the scope for employee participation in decision-
making.
The choice for majoritarianism may be criticised for favouring majority unions in decision-making
to the detriment of minority unions. This is because more rights are conferred on majority unions
which places them in a better position to participate in decision-making. However, the
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significance of majoritarianism is that it will encourage trade unions to recruit more members in
order to increase their influence. Minority unions are encouraged to act together in order to
attain majority status. That the LRA favours majoritarianism is also important in the sense that
decisions made with the participation of a majority union will be carried through, because
democratically that union represents the significant views of employees in a workplace. Another
reason for the choice for majoritarianism is to discourage union proliferation, which is to be
welcomed because the proliferation of small unions might result in unions which will be unable
to carry through the decisions reached with the employer. Most importantly, majoritarianism may
encourage unions to be vigilant in expressing the aspirations of employees in order to maintain
their majority status.
Trade unions will undoubtedly play a pivotal role in collective bargaining and will also make
major contributions to the growth of employee participation in decision-making. However, for
trade unions to be able to contribute constructively, they will have to be accountable to their
members for their joint decisions with the employer. Although the duty of fair representation is
an American concept, its introduction to our labour law will be a means by which employees will
be able to ensure that the union is championing their cause through representative participation
in decision-making. Furthermore, to ensure that unions represent the interests of employees when
concluding collective agreements with the employer, employees may challenge agreements which
are contrary to the mandate given to the union. This extensive accountability will ensure that
union members participate in decision-making through their trade union representatives. 
The greatest threat that the LRA poses to employee participation in decision-making is the
absence of an express statutory duty to bargain. The absence of a duty to bargain may give rise
to strikes by employees in order to compel the employer to accede to their demands.
Consequently the collective bargaining process may be a breeding ground for adversarialism,
which in turn could erode the cooperation required in employee participation in decision-making.
However, in practice both employers and employees may be prepared to negotiate in order to
avoid strike action, as strikes do not only affect the profits of employers but also the income of
the employees.
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584  Perhaps an indication of the extent to which trade unions support the formation of workplace forums
would be the number of workplace forums formed to date. In a statement by Membathisi Mdladlana, Minister of
Labour on the occasion of the second anniversary of the Labour Relations Act (11 November 1998) stated that: ‘
The LRA enables the establishment of workplace forums to promote more democratic workplace decision-making.
A total of 57 applications for workplace forums have been received by the CCMA. Of these, 28 have been rejected
and 16 forums have been set up.’ Although the statistics do not cover the number of participatory forums which
have been formed outside the scope of the LRA, the low number of workplace forums formed after two years, may
be indicative of the suspicion with which trade unions are approaching workplace forums.  
Although the adversarial nature of collective bargaining is a limiting factor, employee
participation in decision-making on distributive matters, requires this element of robust exercise
of power. Therefore, it is appropriate to conclude that although collective bargaining may be
seen as conflictual, some of its elements will be supportive of employee participation in decision-
making.
8.8 WORKPLACE FORUMS
Workplace forums are the most significant innovation in our labour law and they are perhaps the
central pillar for the success of employee participation in decision-making. The centrality of
workplace forums in employee participation is borne out by the functions of the workplace
forums which according to section 79 are to promote the interests of all employees; enhance
efficiency and are entitled to be consulted with a view to reaching consensus and to participate
in joint decision-making with the employer. 
Although workplace forums are intended to promote the interests of all employees including non-
union members, their ability to do so still has to be proved because of the heavy involvement of
trade unions in the initiation of the forums. It will be important that in the election of employee
representatives, non-unionised employees be given significant representation on the forums.
Furthermore, the meaning of efficiency still has to be defined in order to further explain the
objectives of the workplace forums in their interaction with the employer. 
Another important point to raise is that, if workplace forums are to promote the interests of all
employees why are only trade unions permitted to initiate them. The heavy involvement of unions
may be indicative of the suspicion that trade unions have of the forums.584 It may be that in order
to control development of workplace forums, trade unions wanted to have control on the very
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585  Refer to chapter 7, under the discussion on initiating workplace forums (paragraph 7.4)
586  The Department of Trade and Industry has indicated that small businesses which include survivalist
enterprises (with no paid employees and minimal assets) to medium enterprises (which have up to 100 employees),
account for approximately 60 % of all employment in the economy: see ‘Financial Access for SMMEs: Towards
a Comprehensive Strategy’ op cit note 557.
existence of the forums. However, international experience shows that such participatory
structures are usually initiated by both unions and employees.585 For instance in Germany, where
works councils generally can be initiated by unions or employees . There is no reason why this
should not be the position in South Africa because unions can always use their strength to
influence the operations of the forums
Another aspect of the workplace forums is that they can only be established in workplaces
employing 100 or more employees. This is a very high threshold because there is evidence that
this will exclude a large number of workplaces in South Africa.586A lower threshold should be
considered for which guidance may be sought from the German and Dutch systems.
It is also very significant that the LRA has provided for mandatory consultation of workplace
forums. Mandatory consultation creates an expectation that the employer will have to involve
the workplace forum in decision-making. This consultation is given content because the Act
specifies the topics for such consultation, thereby defining the scope of influence of the
workplace forums. Furthermore, the Act encourages both the workplace forum and the employer
to attempt to reach consensus, which gives focus to the decision-making process. Another
strength of the mandatory consultation process is that workplace forums are allowed to make
representations to the employer and advance alternatives on the matters raised for consultation.
The employer is expected to respond to these representations. If the alternatives are rejected, the
employer has to supply reasons for doing so. Such accountability will ensure that consultation
is not just a sham but an exhaustive process. However, one of the limitations to consultation is
the fact that ultimately the employer can make the final decision.This should encourage the
workplace forums to ensure that the employer is influenced as much as possible in order to avoid
the employer deciding to the detriment of the employees. A further limitation is that only the
employer who can initiate the consultation process. It is not clear why the workplace forum
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587  Refer to Chapter 7 at paragraph 7.4.
588  Works Constitution Act 15 of 1952, section 74.
cannot initiate the process, after all commencing consultation does not mean an obligation to
agree. Therefore, the legislature should consider granting workplace forums the right of
initiative. Guidance on this matter can be obtained from the functioning of works councils under
the German system.587
The success of employee participation could be impeded as a result of the possibility of
employees engaging in strike action if consensus is not reached during consultation. This will
introduce unnecessary adversarialism into the functioning of workplace forums. Engaging in
strike action on the matters for consultation could subvert the cooperation that should underlie
the functioning of workplace forums. In Germany588 a peace obligation was introduced as regards
matters to be dealt with in the context of cooperative structures. The legislature should consider
inserting a section in the LRA that prohibits industrial action on matters falling within the
jurisdiction of workplace forums.
Joint decision-making is the real strength of workplace forums because the employer is expected
to reach consensus with them. It is also important that the LRA clearly provides that the
employer and the workplace forum may broaden the matters for joint decision-making, thus
extending the scope for employee participation. Again the only problem here is that only the
employer can initiate the joint decision-making process. There is no reason why the workplace
forum should not initiate the process since the parties are already expected to reach agreement
on certain matters. Granting the forums a right of initiative will strengthen employee participation
in decision-making.
The influence of workplace forums in decision-making is further strengthened by the right to
disclosure of information, ensuring their effectiveness in decision-making. The relevant
information to be disclosed to workplace forums is determined by the matters for consultation
and joint decision-making. 
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The Act does not seem to deal sufficiently with the problem of overlapping institutions at plant-
level. It is evident that the LRA allows the existence of both workplace forums at plant-level and
shopstewards for plant-level bargaining. It is hoped that any conflict that may arise in the
functions of these bodies will not militate against employee participation in decision-making.
After all, in Germany and Sweden there is evidence that works councils are particularly strong
where they are supported by collective bargaining. 
The status of workplace forum agreements still needs to be clarified if workplace forums are to
be respected by employers. Clearly section 23 of the LRA excludes workplace forums from the
parties that can conclude collective agreements binding both the employer and employee parties
to the agreement. If the strength of the agreements between the employer and workplace forums
is going to depend on the good faith of the parties, then the LRA 66 of 1995 has placed the
success of the forums at risk because enforceable agreements are the ultimate objective of
employee participation in decision-making. 
8.9 SUMMARY
The examination in this thesis was undertaken with the objective of establishing the extent to
which the LRA provides for employee participation. Several of the sections and principles
discussed indicate that employee participation has been formally born through the LRA, and this
is very significant in South African labour law. However, the relationship between employers and
employees cannot be regulated and enforced by statutes alone. Hence the LRA will succeed in
enhancing employee participation only if employers and employees are able to make the
necessary mental shifts and learn to trust and be trusted, the one by the other. Increased
productivity and hence the economic prosperity of South Africa, depend among other things on
the success of employee participation in decision-making as envisaged by the LRA 66 of 1995.
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